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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 As a scholar-practitioner, sometimes there is a perfect confluence of events in 
one’s activities outside the academy (care-giving, social movements, world or family 
events, friendships) and one’s activities in the academy (reading, writing, teaching).  
Their pairing is unparalleled and incredibly timely.  The dense theory and the happenings 
in one’s life illuminate each other in such a way that awful (and awe-filled) insight dawns 
and one does not know whether to offer thanks or curses for that knowledge.  
Discovering the set of ideas that elucidate happenings which one feels but of which one 
does not yet know the subtleties is like finding the right wine to compliment a complex 
cheese: flavors are distinct and rich, though not always to our liking.  Or at least that’s 
what happened in my case when I read about psychological and social theories of 
recognition. 
 As I entered my first semester of doctoral work, a long-time family friend, Jane, a 
white woman in her mid-fifties was reaching the brink of despair.  Her upbringing was 
filled with emotional abuse, and though she had tried to break those patterns, her external 
choices and interior life emulated her family history.  Married for twenty plus years and 
mother of three adult children, she felt as if her life had been a waste.  Her children, my 
closest friends, told me some of the comments that she made to them in her fits of anger: 
“I gave up everything for you!”  “You’ve abandoned me!”  “I wish that I had never had 
children!”  In her fits of despair she would remark, “My parents never loved me.”  “I 
want to die from Alzheimer’s so I don’t have to remember, so that every day will be fresh 
and new.”  “There’s no reason to live.”  Her children felt powerless, angry, and most of 
 ix 
all confused.  Weren’t parents, especially mothers, supposed to be happy that their grown 
children were becoming successful, independent, and capable of giving and receiving 
love?  Why couldn’t they, or their father, do anything to make it better?  But thinking 
back, they realized that this pattern had been in place for a long time, and that they had 
participated in it, as well.  This was the tragic culmination of years of psychological 
manipulation and ill-health reinforced by social norms of white, upper-middle-class 
womanhood.   
 In that same semester—really, within weeks of hearing these details—I was 
assigned Jessica Benjamin’s The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the 
Problem of Domination in Dr. Bonnie Miller-McLemore’s seminar on personality theory.  
Benjamin explores how the intersubjective process of assertion and recognition is 
subverted into submission and domination in interpersonal and social relationships.  
Reading and discussing it was a revelation.   Never had a book blown my mind or helped 
me make sense of reality in such a way.  Jane’s life made more sense having read 
Benjamin: the desire for love, recognition, and relationship that shapeshifts into 
manipulation and coercion and is expressed in self- and other-harming language and 
emotions.  I also found a deep compassion in myself for Jane and her children upon 
reading.  I was hooked on recognition. 
 As I continued my studies I was introduced to more and more thinkers who had 
taken up themes of recognition: political philosopher Axel Honneth, justice theorists 
Nancy Fraser and Iris Young, postcolonial theorist Frantz Fanon, queer theologian 
Marcella Althaus-Reid, critical race theorist Kimberleé Crenshaw, and political theorist 
William Connolly.  I was most intrigued by philosopher Judith Butler and her theory of 
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gender performativity which hinges on intersubjective and social recognition as well as 
performance failure.  Like Jessica Benjamin, her theories were revelatory and 
stimulating.    
 I continued to hear personal and social stories of misrecognition and non-
recognition in my graduate studies in various settings and populations: working-class 
families participating in food justice movements; young adults receiving transitional 
housing services; one-on-one pastoral counseling with clients; and hospital chaplains 
whom I interviewed for a research project.  These stories brought tensions of recognition 
and assertion as secondary concepts within theories of care and theories of justice to the 
foreground of my research.   
 Caring and justice-making are interrelated activities in pastoral theology, care, 
and counseling.  In fact, the recent publication of Injustice and the Care of Souls: Taking 
Oppression Seriously in Pastoral Care (2009) in the discipline speaks to the growing 
conversation about what it means to take oppression seriously in pastoral care. The 
authors, under the guidance of editors Sheryl A. Kujawa-Holbrook and Karen B. 
Montagno, answer that oppression-sensitive pastoral care pays attention to marginalized 
persons in their contexts and communities. As a corollary, caregivers must also pay 
attention to their own privileges and/or internalized oppressions to witness to a care that 
does justice.  Overall, the tome invites direct pastoral theological engagement with wider 
and more complicated issues of structural violence and oppression, and challenges easy 
dichotomies between care and justice.1   
                                                
1 Sheryl A. Kujawa-Holbrook and Karen B. Montagno, eds., Injustice and the Care of 
Souls: Taking Oppression Seriously in Pastoral Care (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2009). 
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 However, holding these two categories of activity together poses challenges.  In 
political theory one hears about the “care/justice debate” which posits the terms and 
practices of each as oppositional and dichotomous.  When the debates between justice 
and care are played out, they break over fundamental descriptions of the state of human 
nature.  Over and against accounts of morality and social-political interaction that 
prioritize utilitarianism or a Kantian deontological ethic, a care perspective suggests that 
a codification of just states of existence coupled with a description of the person as 
autonomous, rational, and, at some level, proportionately self-interested, will not suffice. 
Monique Deveaux explains, 
 The underlying message of the care perspective is as powerful as it is succinct: 
 put briefly, it states that human relatedness and the practices that support it shape 
 us in profound ways.  It also states that taking this fact seriously in political terms 
 would precipitate fundamental changes in our social arrangements.2  
 
Critics challenge the care perspective for upholding feminine norms of self-sacrifice, 
impracticality in terms of political implementation, and lack of universality.3  Again, 
Deveaux explains that the liberal paradigms of justice are precisely those that care 
perspectives challenge.  As such, there is no “need to match liberalism concept for 
concept.”4  
 The proper spheres of influence and action are another dichotomy in the debate.  
The argument goes that care is about personal relationships, the family, friends, and 
charitable organizations while justice is about the public sphere, the political, economics, 
                                                
2 Monique Deveaux, “Shifting Paradigms: Theorizing Care and Justice in Political 
Theory,” Hypatia 10 (Spring 1995) : 115. 
 
3 Ibid., 116-117. 
 
4 Ibid., 117. 
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and capital.  The care perspective argues that dividing justice and care in such a way is 
harmful and denies what feminists have long noted: the personal is political.  Virginia 
Held comments, “Feminist analyses have shown how faulty are traditional divisions 
between the personal and the political….we can see how unsatisfactory it is to assign 
justice to public life and care to private….”5    
 In the life of the church and the writings of pastoral theology, care and justice are 
not nearly as dichotomous, although divisions do exist.  The traditions of the social 
gospel, public theology, and social movements, like the civil rights movement of the 
1960s or the sanctuary movement of the 1980s, were fueled by an interstitial approach to 
care and justice based in theologies of liberation.  Pastoral theology’s interface with 
liberation theology has expanded the focus of pastoral theology from practices that are 
therapeutic in nature to social-political and policy driven practices of intervention and 
caring.  However, addressing the person and society at the same time is a difficult task.  
Pastoral theologian Bonnie Miller-McLemore writes, “Current problems in sustaining a 
public voice for pastoral theology go right back to an effort that, with Walter 
Rauschenbusch’s immersion in New York soup kitchen ministry, once joined social 
ethics and pastoral care as two sides of the same coin.”6  The problem with two sides of a 
coin is precisely that balancing on an edge requires that the coin be in motion to show 
                                                
5 Virginia Held, “The Meshing of Care and Justice,” Hypatia 10 (Spring 1995) : 128. 
 
6 Bonnie Miller-McLemore, “Pastoral Theology as Public Theology: Revolutions in the 
‘Fourth Area,’” Pastoral Care and Counseling: Redefining the Paradigms, ed. Nancy J. 
Ramsay (Nashville: Abingdon, 2004), 53.  Additionally, Miller-McLemore describes 
disputes between major figures in the field over pastoral counseling.  Those in favor of 
private pastoral counseling (Carroll Wise and Howard Clinebell) supported it as a 
specialized ministry requiring special training and practice in private settings.  Pastoral 
theologians Seward Hiltner and Wayne Oates disagreed and argued that pastoral 
counseling ought to remain connected to church communities.  
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both sides.  Thus, caring for women requires addressing gender injustice; caring for 
families requires examination of public policy that contributes to hardship or 
disintegration of families; caring for persons of color or an ethnicity different than that 
possessed by the caregiver provokes personal and social critique of oppressive forces and 
stereotypes, and their subsequent internalization and social repetition. As we pastoral 
theologians engage issues of systemic injustice, we will need to articulate how justice and 
care are related in our research, teaching, and pastoral and public practice.  We will 
especially need to develop pastoral theologies that maintain the creative tension between 
caring for individual persons while attending to social injustices, their effects on the 
individual, and pastoral theological interventions to enable human flourishing.  As a 
theological hope, I believe that we must assert that good care is also care that does 
justice, and good justice ensures that transformative care that enables human flourishing 
is prioritized in the private and public sphere.    
 As I argue in Chapters One and Two, feminist pastoral theologians are keeping 
the coin of social ethics and pastoral care in motion, examining problems of individual 
care as they conduct social and theological analysis.  However, as I note in Chapter One, 
writing and practicing good care and good justice require reflection on the possibilities 
and limitations of recognition and as well as consideration of how the subject is 
constructed.  In that same chapter, I begin by reflecting on the specifics of a case of my 
research that focused on decision-making in hospital chaplaincy.  From there, I develop 
questions about recognition and subjectivity in relationship to feminist pastoral theology 
and its traditions of liberative care for persons who are marginalized and oppressed.  
 xiv 
Specifically, I ask what resources are available in psychology, philosophy, and feminist 
pastoral theology to deepen our understanding of suffering, care, and justice. 
 In Chapter Two I explore the centrality of the subject in pastoral theology 
broadly, and in feminist pastoral theology more specifically.  I describe the state of the 
field by telling the history of the subject through the language employed by the 
discipline: paradigms, functions, and human experience.  I also hone into feminist 
pastoral theological anthropologies and their contributions to theories of subjectivity. 
Speaking to subjects of difference who have experienced otherness through ecclesial, 
social, and political exclusion or inattention, Joretta L. Marshall develops a pastoral care 
attentive to sexuality and lesbian identity, and Carroll A. Watkins Ali develops a pastoral 
care attentive to racial injustice and the multiple jeopardies of race, gender, and class.  
Extending her scholarship on the feminist subject and difference as well as her 
scholarship on pastoral theology as critical reflection on practice, Elaine Graham 
examines cultural representations of aliens, monsters, cyborgs, and other post/human 
subjects to deconstruct the idea of the pure human subject.  Expanding concepts of 
selfhood primarily located in pastoral counseling theory and practice, Barbara J. McClure 
articulates theory, theology, and practice to develop a social selfhood, itself a reflection 
of the interaction between social structures and individual well-being. Finally, Pamela 
Cooper-White outlines a positive theological anthropology that accounts for multiplicity 
of the self.  By engaging these authors I develop a critique of the state of subjectivity in 
feminist pastoral theology.  Namely, I argue that complex experiences of individual and 
social suffering ask feminist pastoral theologians to build theologies of care attentive to 
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the mutually-informing dynamics of subject formation through psychological and social 
acts of recognition.   
 Theories of recognition are crucial to the ongoing work of not only describing, 
but also determining, who suffers and how one suffers.  Feminist pastoral theology 
developed as a corrective to the assumed norm of a male-oriented approach to care, and 
later, womanist pastoral theology developed as a corrective to the assumed norm of a 
white woman-oriented approach to care.  Both developments indicate an opacity, or 
blindness, which prevents practitioners and scholars from fully seeing patterns of harm at 
the social level and their presence at the familial and intersubjective level.  To say it 
another way, as practitioners and scholars we are formed, informed, and deformed in 
relationship to oppressive systems that normalize sexism and racism, as well as 
heterosexism, classism, ageism, and ableism.  Our theologies of care for suffering 
subjects ought to acknowledge the difficulty of recognizing those who suffer at an 
intersubjective and social level as well as identify pastoral theological practices that 
promote a subject’s ability to press claims for recognition.  Thus, I argue that theories of 
recognition drawn from psychology, philosophy, and feminist pastoral theology ought to 
dialogue with each other in order to speak more aptly to the state of the subject, caring 
interventions, and strategies to attend to subjects who are misrecognized or not 
recognized at all.   
 In Chapters Three and Four I turn to psychological and social theories of 
recognition.  Recognition is a paradoxical process and one which is in flux, even in 
individuals who we view as the most psychologically and socially healthy, as well as 
those, like Jane, who struggle for a sense of belonging and purposefulness.  Drawing on 
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psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin’s intersubjective and psychological account of 
recognition and assertion, I explain how the insidious cycles of domination and 
submission work and how they will be broken when both men and women sustain the 
tension between assertion and recognition.  Critiquing and expanding Benjamin’s work, I 
show that structural violence and political repression are cases of social domination in 
which there is no one agent against whom one can make assertions for recognition.  
Instead, gazes are averted, indifference is interpreted as tacit consent, or explicit consent 
is manufactured owing to fear of future harm.  At the end of Chapter Three, I argue that 
bodily and vocal lament is an act of assertion, either for oneself or in solidarity with those 
who suffer from an injustice.  While helpful to process grief, lament is also a first step to 
resist domination of all sorts and to press claims for recognition at a personal and public 
level. 
 Recognition also speaks to subject formation through identity, such as race, 
ethnicity, gender, or sexuality, as well as the formation of one’s whole self.  In Chapter 
Four I turn to philosopher Judith Butler and her theory of gender performance as 
suggestive of the limitations of recognition.  Recognition, in this case, is a paradoxical 
process wherein self-realization is conditioned by social norms which shape the ability to 
reach self-realization, itself.  Judith Butler puts it this way: “Paradoxically, the discursive 
condition of social recognition precedes and conditions the formation of the subject: 
recognition is not conferred on a subject, but forms the subject.”7  The process of 
recognition not only enables individuals to choose to become more fully themselves, it is 
also the process by which individuals are rendered socially intelligible.  An ethic based 
                                                
7 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 226.  Henceforth BTM. 
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on recognition thus requires a subject’s ability to mourn what she will not become.  
Critics of Butler argue that her theory, particularly of gender, does little to advance 
feminist liberation projects, and instead normalizes subjection.  While I am sympathetic 
to this line of argumentation, I show Butler’s responses to these claims.  Lastly, I suggest 
that one contribution of feminist pastoral theology to a theory of recognition and gender 
performance is a consideration of the hopes and the resilience of a subject’s participation 
in identity performances. 
 While lament, resilient performances, and hopeful participations are three ideas I 
briefly explore to more adequately account for the processes of intersubjective and social 
recognition in subject formation, in Chapter Five I describe key components of a feminist 
pastoral theology of recognition.  Following those remarks, I describe a feminist pastoral 
praxis of encounter using the image of the street journalist to capture the tensions of 
recognition and subjectivity as situated practices. 
 I hope that for subjects like Jane and her children a feminist pastoral theology and 
praxis of recognition affords them the things that they seek, consciously and 
unconsciously: the sense of being known and heard, even imperfectly; the capability to 
advocate for themselves in light of harmful internalized stigma; learned self-reflexivity 
for the sake of flourishing; and the building up of a sense of self through mirroring.  
When persons or social institutions cannot see dis-ease for what it is, like Jane who can 
think of no other path forward, encounters are opportunities to think anew, to interrupt 
the processes of pathogenic belief and action, to grow despite limitations.  As we 
encounter, circumstances, incidents, and accidents provide opportunities to recognize 
other subjects.  Like Jacob, one of the patriarchs in the Hebrew Scriptures who did not 
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know with whom he wrestled, encounters are demanding, leave us breathless, and 
possibly hurting at the hip joint.8  If Jacob received his blessing (and a new name!) by not 
letting go all night and by demanding a blessing, then we too should expect that wrestles 
to receive the blessing of recognition might be prolonged but also fruitful.  Further, we 
might even come to understand that the wrestling has brought to us to Peniel, the place 
where we see the face of God and each other, and live. 
                                                
8 Genesis 32:22-32, (NRSV). 
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CHAPTER I 
 
PROBLEMS IN PASTORAL CARE, PROBLEMS FOR PASTORAL THEOLOGY: 
SUBJECTIVITY, IDENTITY AND RECOGNITION 
 
 
 
 Pastoral theology as a reflection on pastoral care begins in concrete, real-life 
problems.  Pastoral theologians tend to choose big problems that are experienced by the 
individual but which implicate familial, ecclesial, social, and/or political institutions.  
Sometimes pastoral theologians speak directly to theological traditions and their 
concepts, challenging normative beliefs with wisdom culled from the vastness of human 
experience.  Always, pastoral theologians are interdisciplinary in multiple ways: they 
move between academic disciplines in attempts to diagnose problems and prescribe a 
course of treatment; they move between theory, practice, and reflection in attempts to get 
at the heart of the matter; lastly, they move across various spheres, writing and educating 
in the public sphere, academic sphere, and ecclesial sphere.   
Recognizing, naming, articulating, and nuancing problems are central tasks of 
pastoral theologians.  Pastoral theologians know the importance of asking questions that 
lie close to the well-ground of experience to enable the flourishing of the people of God.  
In that same spirit of pastoral theology, I recognize, name, articulate, and nuance the 
problem in pastoral ministry that catalyzed my interest to study the construction of 
subjectivity in feminist pastoral theology.  I examine my own case of research in order to 
situate the problem of subjectivity and explain its connections to the psychological and 
social-political concept of recognition.  Additionally, I describe my research method and 
situate myself as researcher informed by certain epistemologies and theological loci. 
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Practices of Ministry Provide the Starting Points of Theoretical Reconsiderations 
 
An Overview 
In fall 2008 I began research on the use of ritual in pastoral care.  I was enrolled 
in an innovative doctoral course that brought students and practitioners of ministry 
together to reflect on issues in ministry in a sustained and intellectually challenging 
manner.  During the course I became deeply intrigued by several overlapping questions: 
How do ministers use ritual as pastoral care?  How do ministers negotiate between the 
administration of sacramental rituals and the desire for sacramental ritual, especially 
chaplains working in traditions that highly value apostolic authority and ritual, like 
Roman Catholicism?  Why do people ask for ritual care?  What kinds of people?  
 In my studies I listened to “Stephen,” our minister-theologian, and chaplains I 
interviewed, talk about best practices of care for women experiencing stillbirth or fetal 
demise.  Additionally, I read pastoral theologians and theologians who use experience to 
understand how they responded to pastoral situations that cried out for some kind of 
ritualized care and what they thought the parent(s) desired.  I found some answers to the 
question I asked my sources, namely, how does one provide ritualized pastoral care that 
remains aware of the traditional theology of the sacraments while also responding to 
grief, pain, and suffering?   
 Yet, I also was deeply disturbed by what I did not find: terribly complex selves.  
That is, at some level I had expected to hear comments on the differences that make the 
human experience diverse: race/ethnicity, sexuality, class, gender, ability, religious 
orientation.  I had expected to hear commentary related to health justice, prenatal care, 
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age, and citizenship status.  I had hoped to hear about the divergent cases where there 
might have been a twinge of relief on the part of the female or her partner or a general 
emotional numbness.  To be fair, I did not specifically ask for these stories.  I asked for 
any experiences that stood out in decision-making processes in ritual caregiving.   
 Yet that lacuna in the research nagged at me.  Was there something to the fact that 
the minister-theologians did not socially or politically contextualize their subjects when 
telling their stories?  Was there something to the fact that the subjects seemed to be 
possessed by intense grief, perhaps even hysteria, especially when their stories were told 
by others, namely pastoral caregivers or pastoral theologians?  Was there something to 
the fact that the stories were told as a moment frozen in time, an unconnected memory 
given the life trajectories which came before and after the moment?  I unpack the 
research and my ensuing questions below.  
 
Through Ritual Identity Emerges 
 “Stephen” was a minister-theologian in my doctoral seminar.  He shared with us 
numerous stories about the challenges of ministry, but I became intrigued by one part of 
his story that stirred me to think about the moral decision-making required in ritual 
pastoral care situations:  A woman gave birth to a stillborn fetus.  She asked for her 
daughter to be named and baptized in the Christian tradition.  Stephen, ordained in the 
Episcopalian tradition, was conflicted.  In one ear he heard his sacramental theology 
professor saying, ‘Baptism is for the living, not for the dead.’  In the other he heard his 
pastoral care professor saying, ‘The sacraments are not ours to withhold.’  He was 
confronted with a moral decision.  How should he proceed in order to stay faithful to the 
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tradition which recognized him as a minister and, at the same time, care for a woman who 
asked him to act as an agent of God? 
 Stephen’s quandary is not unusual.  When I sought guidance on this problem from 
practitioners and theologians through pastoral literature, church teaching, and 
professional associations, the answers largely fell into two camps.  The professional 
literatures answered that a chaplain ought to give the bereaved parent exactly what she 
requested or a chaplain ought to hold a hard line to protect the doctrine and refuse any 
request for baptism.  Believing that chaplains in hospital ministries have vast wisdom 
about the everyday contours of ritual and pastoral care, authority and innovative ministry, 
and doctrine and practice, I submitted a proposal to and received approval from 
Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Review Board to undertake a pilot study of hospital 
chaplains asking them about their experiences through a semi-structured face-to-face 
interview format, common in ethnographic research. 
 The conversations with chaplains were rich in reflection and they provided 
contextual answers for my required minor area paper in Theology and Practice.  I heard 
them speak about three distinct moments in moral-decision making as a minister.  I list 
them below. 
1. Gain Clarity.  Chaplains ought to know departmental hospital policy regarding 
baptism of non-viable fetuses and infant death, particularly if serving in a hospital 
with a clear religious affiliation.  Chaplains ought to also know intimately their 
own tradition which recognizes them as a minister as well as have a base 
knowledge of other traditions’ views of ritual.  
 
2. Maintain Clarity.  Chaplains ought to have a clear understanding of ritual acts and 
their purpose.  That is, they should be able to articulate clearly their theology of 
baptism or theology of ritual, gesturing toward sources of authority, whether 
culled from the Bible, theo-intellectual, ecclesial-institutional, or practical 
tradition. 
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3. Enact Clarity.  Chaplains ought to be clear in conveying to bereaved parents what 
ritual they are willing to enact.  Chaplains ought never lie or fib.  Do not tell 
grieving parents that the child is receiving the sacrament of baptism when a 
naming and blessing of remains is offered.  Ritual dishonesty breeds neither 
compassion nor genuine care. 
 
In my interviews, I focused on the decision-making process for chaplains giving 
care in a Catholic milieu, a milieu which at first glance appears rigid and rule-based.  For 
example, if a chaplain works in a Catholic hospital system—a hospital that is owned or 
sponsored by a religious community, like the Franciscans—or if a chaplain is 
credentialed by the National Association of Catholic Chaplains, then ritual care, which is 
one dominant form of pastoral care in the Catholic tradition, is reserved for persons who 
are living.  The sacramental tradition holds that baptism is for the living, not for the dead.  
Thus, on the books at least, a request for baptism of a fetus or stillborn infant must be 
refused.  How do chaplains in these Catholic milieus respond to this request?  How do 
they reason through--do they 'reason' through--the request?  Is reason even the best word 
to use in describing the ways in which chaplains proceed to give care in stressful 
situations where made and revealed doctrine rubs up against human pathos, suffering and 
tragedy when a great expectation is foreclosed? 1     
I remain deeply grateful for the wisdom shared by the chaplains. Yet, I was 
troubled by how I constructed well-intentioned guidelines from their reports that 
nonetheless failed to account for difference or identity.  Though not nearly as highly 
                                                
1 The definition of the word ‘reason’ is critiqued by feminist ethicists of care, and 
feminist theorists more broadly, for its insistence on a male-influenced, singular self 
acting without emotion and wholly through logical rationale.  See Carol Gilligan, In A 
Different Voice (1982) and Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and 
Moral Education (1984), as well as conversations in pastoral theology by Bonnie Miller-
McLemore, postcolonial theory by Uma Narayan, analytical philosophy by Marilyn 
Friedman, and political theory by Iris Marion Young.   
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detailed as the moral handbooks written at the turn of the 20th century for U.S. priests 
and candidates for priesthood to guide them through ritualistic pastoral care in the 
Catholic tradition, my suggested best practices still contained the inner logic of the 
handbooks.  Namely, the subject of care's particularity in context is lost in moments of 
crisis, and thus care appeared to be reductionistic in relationship to fullness of 
personhood especially in crisis.  Religious identity came to the foreground, and other 
identities drifted to the background.  As the chaplains reported, the most effective care for 
women who experienced fetal demise or stillbirth was empathic and nurturing.  This 
strategy of care is consistent with momentary crisis care in traumatic and stressful 
situations.  By momentary crisis care, I am referring to the proximity of the care offered 
to the occurrence of the traumatic event.   
Crisis care is supportive care.  Hospital chaplains are no strangers to crisis care as 
they occupy unique positions as ministers.  Emotionally and spiritually developed 
ministers are ready to witness with empathy and nurturing care.  Pastoral theologian 
Howard Clinebell describes how the role and responsibilities of a traditional minister as 
congregational pastor naturally opens space for crisis ministries.  He writes, 
Pastors are natural crisis counselors because of the inherent advantages of their 
position and role--their network of ongoing relationships with their people; their 
entree to many family systems; the trust that many people have in ministers; their 
accessibility; and their presence during many of the developmental and accidental 
(unexpected) crises in people's lives, including illness, death, and bereavement.  
In the eyes of many who are experiencing crises and loss, the minister's image and 
identity have a supportive and nurturing meaning.  It is within these natural 
advantages that pastors do crisis work, including the rituals with which our 
religious heritage has surrounded the major human crises of birth and growth, 
living and dying.2   
 
                                                
2 Howard Clinebell, Basic Types of Pastoral Care and Counseling, (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1984), 183. 
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Like traditional congregation-based pastors, hospital chaplains are invested with pastoral 
authority and provide religious and spiritual leadership to those who hunger for meaning.  
Unlike traditional congregation-based pastors, the relationship with the care recipient is 
fleeting.   
The chaplains I interviewed reported that they have few recurring patients, 
especially in the case of those who requested baptism.  Because there is not a well-
established rapport between the chaplain and the patient, and most likely there will not be 
deep rapport between the two in the future, crisis care in hospital chaplaincy is about 
stabilization.  Chaplains are like emergency medical technicians who arrive at the scene 
of an accident.  While EMTs work to stabilize a person in order to transport him to the 
hospital, chaplains doing crisis care stabilize the patient in order to transport him or her to 
loving communities and persons of care, whether it be a congregation, a pastor or other 
representative of faith, hope, and care, like a rabbi or imam, or a secular professional like 
a psychotherapist.   In the case of requests for baptism after stillbirth or fetal demise, the 
hospital chaplain works to stabilize the person who, in addition to experiencing bodily 
trauma, is also undergoing emotional and spiritual trauma.  Emotional and spiritual 
trauma is upsetting.  When a woman who thought that she'd be rejoicing at a new life that 
she helped create finds that life is death, her “womb a grave,”3 lament, grief, and sorrow 
are natural.   
Ritual serves many purposes in emotional and spiritual care.  First, ritual helps 
make meaning for individuals and communities within known frameworks.  Rites of 
                                                
3 Serene Jones, “Rupture,” Hope Deferred: Heart-Healing Reflections on Reproductive 
Loss, eds. Nadine Pence Frantz and Mary T. Stimming (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2005), 48.  
Jones also uses the phrase “tomb for the never-to-be” to describe the uterus (59).  
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initiation, for example, are known quantities, especially in (Christian-Catholic) religious 
traditions: they offer recognition of personhood by a physical and spiritual community 
and then welcome the person into that same community.  Second, ritual in the highly 
sacramental traditions, like Catholicism, relies on the wise exercise of pastoral leadership, 
a unique set of skills which correlates with the development of a minister’s sense of 
religious authority as a shepherd to the flock.  The gentle exercise of religious 
authority—offering prayers and blessings—shows care, especially in tragic situations, 
like fetal demise or child loss.  One ordained Catholic priest and former chaplain 
explained that it in his formation period, he often relied on a book of prayers to help him 
speak words of healing when his own words would not come easily.   
However, while ritual binds, it can also be blind.  Differences that make a person 
unique, such as race/ethnicity, class, sexuality, ability, etc., may be less important to the 
caregiver and the care recipient in order to convey a fundamental reality through ritual: 
that the Divine has not abandoned the care recipient, even in the worst of crises.  In 
echoes of pastoral theologian Emmanuel Lartey who, following anthropologists, reminds 
us that every person is like all others, like some others, and like no others,4 ritual 
emphasizes the likeness of individuals through group cohesion.5  Thus, difference and 
                                                
4 Emmanuel Lartey, In Living Color: An Intercultural Approach to Pastoral Care and 
Counseling, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley, 2003), 34.   
 
5 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Carol Cosman (New 
York: Oxford UP, 2001), 221ff.  See also Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations 
in Cosmology (London: Routledge, 1996), 54-68.     
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unique identity fades into the background to bring to the fore an individual identity 
closely linked to the communal identity.6 
Though each person may be like all others, like some others, and like no others, 
some attributes of one’s person ought to be considered through the paradigm of 
‘difference’ rather than diversity or multiculturalism. The word difference refers to the 
inequalities that one experiences as a part of one’s diversity.  Summarizing post-colonial 
theorist Homi K. Bhabha, pastoral theologian Pamela Cooper-White writes that diversity 
is a liberal value distinct from difference.  She explains,  
The former [diversity] perpetuates an idea of consensus in which difference is 
 tacitly contained and controlled by the dominant culture; the latter [difference] is 
 “based on unequal, uneven, multiple, and potentially antagonistic political 
 identities,” multiple identities that “articulate in challenging ways, either in 
 progressive or regressive ways, often conflictually, sometimes even 
 incommensurably—not some flowering of individual talents and capacities.” 7  
 
In this case, identity is inseparable from difference.  The interplay of differences allows 
for the production of one’s own identity as set apart from that of another person’s 
identity.  As a process, recognizing difference does not guarantee that all identities are 
tolerated, much less celebrated.  At the extreme, identity converts difference into 
irreconcilable otherness, making a person an alien, a monster, or a demon.  At the scale of 
                                                
6 For my purposes I am emphasizing the likeness and cohesion that ritual builds without 
accounting for the agency of the actors, as this was how I heard the data conveyed to me.  
Since the 1960s, ritual theorists have argued that the human actor as a creative agent must 
also be accounted for in ritual, or performance, theory.  For a concise and well-developed 
account of ritual and performance theory, see Catherine Bell, “Performance,” Critical 
Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998), 
205-224. 
 
7 Pamela Cooper-White, Many Voices: Pastoral Psychotherapy in Relational Theological 
Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 45.  Henceforth MV.  
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politics, the challenges of identity and difference raise concerns for the practices of 
democracy8 and justice-making.9                         
What difference does it make to attend to the politics of identity and difference in 
offering compassionate and just pastoral care? While researching the use of baptismal or 
initiation rituals as a form of pastoral care in cases of fetal demise and stillbirth, I noticed 
patterns in the types of women seeking ritual care.  As told through the stories of the 
chaplains, they appeared to be largely working-class or impoverished, self-identified 
female-bodied, heterosexual, non-U.S. citizens or legal immigrants from the global south 
and Eastern Europe, and identified with a highly sacramental religious sensibility.  
Chaplains reported that some spoke no English or limited English.  In reviewing this data 
I was struck by the ways in which the chaplains used identity markers to do the work of 
describing the person while at the same time offering little analysis of the ways in which 
these identities and differences affected the reception of care or helped the chaplain 
                                                
8 William E. Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political 
Paradox (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1991).  Connolly argues that attending 
to the relationship between identity and difference in democratic theory necessitates a 
move toward “agonistic democracy” which “affirms the indispensability of identity to 
life, disturbs the dogmatization of identity, and folds care for the protean diversity of 
human life into the strife and interdependence of identity\difference” (x).  
 
9 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1990).  Arguing against a theory of justice as universal and comprehensive (for example, 
that of political theorist John Rawls), Young develops a critical theory that accounts for 
difference in light of injustice.  She explains that everyday discourse about justice makes 
claims that exceed the boundaries of a universal, self-enclosed justice theory.  She writes, 
“They are instead calls, pleas, claims upon some people by others.  Rational reflection on 
justice begins in a hearing, a heeding a call, rather than in asserting and mastering a state 
of affairs, however ideal” (5).  As such, a theory of justice which denies difference (e.g. a 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance) or which presupposes mastery of process leads to justice (e.g. 
the distributive paradigm) ignores how social structures or institutional contexts influence 
which social groups receive privilege and which social groups continue to experience 
domination and oppression (3).   
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determine the best way to proceed in offering care.  Moreover, the chaplains did not 
describe the ways in which an identity is not the whole and sum of a person, nor allude to 
the possibility that a person—a subject—might not be fully knowable, particularly when 
suffering and trauma are deep within.  My research had led me beyond the scopes of the 
moral decision-making processes in hospital chaplaincy and into a consideration of 
psychological and social subject formation and construction.   
I looked for writing in feminist pastoral theology to help me make sense of what I 
observed.  I searched specifically on how pastoral caregivers might attend to nagging 
places where global politics (immigration, alien or refugee status), health justice (barriers 
to access of equitable prenatal or perinatal health care, e.g. language accessibility and 
translation, women's visibility in society, financial considerations, transportation), and 
religious-spiritual-pastoral care intersected.  What methods or practices or paradigms are 
most helpful to do the initial pastoral work of contextualizing and understanding the 
complex and situated person—especially those who are most vulnerable in society or 
who have historically experienced oppression?10 
I found a pattern when I examined the feminist pastoral theological literature over 
the past twenty years.  We have offered single-authored books and multi-authored 
                                                
10 Young, 48-63.  Young identifies five faces of oppression: exploitation, 
marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.  She pluralizes the 
categories of oppression so that they do not pivot upon the ‘one group’ phenomenon.  She 
explains, “Social theories that construct oppression as a unified phenomenon usually 
either leave out groups that even the theorists think are oppressed, or leave out important 
ways in which groups are oppressed.  Black liberation theorists and feminist theorists 
have argued persuasively, for example, that Marxism’s reduction of all oppressions to 
class oppression leaves out much about the specific oppression of Blacks and women” 
(63).  For use of Young by feminist practical theology, see Nancy L Eiesland’s essay, 
“Things Not Seen: Women with Physical Disabilities, Oppression, and Practical 
Theology,” in Liberating Faith Practices: Feminist Practical Theologies in Context, eds. 
Denise M. Ackermann and Riet Bons-Storm (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 106-120.   
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collections which largely describe care by starting in identity.  This work remains 
important at a pragmatic level.  However, the fact that we have a multiplicity of 
literatures which engage care from a primary viewpoint of identity markers indicates that 
we are organizing our knowledge of the subject primarily through these markers of 
identity, even as we strive to attend to the intra- and interpersonal dimension of care and 
the unique experiences of individuals while calling attention to the social structures 
which maintain relationships of oppression.  Caring about persons, difference, and social 
inequities asks us to evaluate whether identity, as that which organizes our reflections on 
care, promotes human flourishing as fully as we can imagine. 11  While caring about 
identity has raised significant awareness of difference in our discipline, it does not 
capture the fullness of a person’s subjectivity.  As such, we ought to examine how social 
identities and experiences of difference correlate to personal experiences of suffering 
within our literature.   
 
From Attending to Identity to Constructing Subjectivity in Feminist Pastoral Theology     
 By attending to gender, feminist pastoral theologians have made rich 
contributions that enhance the understanding of the human person through reflection on 
women’s experience and pastoral care.  Feminist pastoral theology has focused on 
bringing women’s voices to the halls of the academy, church, and society, and has done 
so by foregrounding gender identity, critiquing uninformed and inadequate care that fails 
                                                
11 Feminist pastoral theology as a discipline encompasses a remarkably wide array of 
concerns and theoretical engagements.  As such, it can be difficult to frame the ongoing 
conversations without unnecessarily limiting what we are about.  Drawing from 
coursework with Barbara J. McClure and as reflected in her book Moving Beyond 
Individualism in Pastoral Care and Counseling (2010), I understand feminist pastoral 
theology as theologies and practices oriented toward human flourishing.   
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to account for gender differences, and describing a more adequate care which is attentive 
to gender.  Moreover, feminist pastoral theology has done so by attending to a wide arena 
of women’s experiences, making tentative connections between systemic social injustices 
and gender, while remaining focused on describing and developing responsive care 
strategies and feminist pastoral theologies that re-envision human flourishing. 
 In the previous section I described how in the midst of my research, I was caught 
off-guard by the lack of attention to identity by practitioners while at the same time I 
noticed how identity, beginning first in gender and then expanding to include the 
diversity of women’s voices over the last twenty years, played a substantial role in 
organizing feminist pastoral theology.  By briefly examining the literature of feminist 
pastoral theology, I show that identity is a central paradigm for feminist pastoral 
theology, and one that poses challenges, particularly when pastoral theologians try to 
account for systemic injustices which affect care of women.   
 Feminist pastoral theology shares topics of concern and methodologies with 
broader pastoral theology, such as formation of the pastoral person; pastoral functions of 
healing, guiding, sustaining, reconciling, resisting, empowering, nurturing, and liberating; 
the pastoral context of the living human web; and critical correlative methods.  Feminist 
pastoral theologian Zoë Bennett Moore has identified violence and abuse, and 
embodiment as two central themes within the literatures of feminist pastoral theology.12  
These two themes, as well as others, are explored in the multi-authored Fortress Press 
series on women’s care, Women in Travail and Transition (1991), Through the Eyes of 
Women (1996), and In Her Own Time (2000).  For these literatures it is more apt to name 
                                                
12 Zoë Bennett Moore, Introducing Feminist Perspectives on Pastoral Theology 
(Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2002), 13. 
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themes of women’s bodies, women’s emotions, women’s trauma, and women’s roles and 
relationships in family, church, and society.       
Topics central to women’s bodies include care after hysterectomy (Estock 1996) 
and mastectomy (Henderson 1996), care during first menstruation, perimenopause and 
menopause (Dell 2000; Greider 2000; Henderson 2000), and care for women with eating 
disorders (Dasher 1996; Saussy 2000).  Emotions and psychological health are 
reconstructed through a feminist pastoral framework, and depression (Neuger 1991), 
anger and aggression (Saussy and Clarke 1996; Greider 1996), and love (Gill-Austern 
1996) are addressed.  Trauma literature attends to rape (Stinson-Wesley 1996), sexual 
abuse (Ramsay 1991), intimate partner and family violence (Garma 1991; Neuger 2000), 
and the effects of trauma on development (Cooper-White 2000).  Lastly, women’s roles 
and relationships are reconstructed.  Topics include work-life and ministry (Miller-
McLemore 1991; Glover-Wertherington 1996; Ramsay 2000), family life, mothering, and 
daughtering (Robbins 1996; Treadway and Miller-McLemore 2000; Dell 2000), and 
aging (Justes 1996; Glaz 2000; Scheib 2000).      
These literatures offer significant insight into the difficulties that women face in 
all aspects of their lives.  However, they take a moderate approach to critique of systemic 
injustices, leaning toward constructive directives in care.  In her 1999 pivotal essay 
linking feminist theory and pastoral theology, Bonnie Miller-McLemore writes that the 
last 35 years of writing in feminist pastoral theology falls into three camps: an implicit 
critique of patriarchal culture, an explicit critique of patriarchy coupled with “advocacy 
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for women and other marginalized populations,” and topical reconstruction.13  These 
projects have given feminist pastoral theology a gynocentric flavor, she argues.  
“Although concerned with rights and equality, they have focused on women-centered 
knowledge and relationships.  This leaning toward a gynocentric approach accounts in 
part for the more oblique feminist critique.”14  Thus, many essays concentrate on 
directions in pastoral care without examination or challenge to the ways that systems of 
care in and through ecclesial and theological practice have colluded with patriarchy, 
resulting in an implied, but vague critique.      
Several problems arise from attending to specificity of suffering, vis a vis gender 
identity, without explicit critique of systemic injustices.  First, it disconnects group 
identity, whether claimed or bestowed, from historical legacies of oppression and 
domination.  Second, it continues to shape the subject of pastoral care in only one 
dimension by extrapolating from gendered intersections of race and ethnicity, sexuality, 
ability, class, and religion.15  Lastly, it misses the opportunity to further conscientization 
of gender inequalities, their effects on the individual level, and development of 
responsive action through personal care and beyond.   
                                                
13 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, “Feminist Theory in Pastoral Theology,” Feminist and 
Womanist Pastoral Theology, eds. Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore and Brita L. Gill-Austern 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1999), 88. 
 
14 Ibid., 89. 
 
15 K. Samuel Lee “Engaging Difference in Pastoral Theology: Race and Ethnicity,” 
Journal of Pastoral Theology 19 (Winter 2009) : 2.  Lee calls this attention to one 
identity marker without intersection of multiplying difference within individuals 
reductionistic “or what Cornel West (1990) calls ‘one-dimensional functionalism […] 
that loses touch with the specificity’ of life (p.106).”   
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Take, for example, the essay “Hysterectomy and Women’s Identity” by Beth Ann 
Estock found in Through the Eyes of Women (1996).  This essay begins in the premise 
that for most women, identity is closely linked to her relationship to her primary sex 
organ, namely the uterus.  Thus, loss of the uterus indicates a time of major transition, a 
time of loss as well as time of new possibility.    
Estock writes that the uterus is a “symbol of womanhood.”16  When a male friend 
remarked to her that having a hysterectomy was just another operation, like an 
appendectomy, Estock vigorously replied, “How would you like your penis removed?” in 
the hopes of revealing the undercurrent of sexist bias.  Because the uterus is not 
outwardly visible, its surgical removal is not assumed to carry the same kind of gravitas 
that removal of, for example a penis or testicles, would carry, she argues.  And yet, 
because it is not visible, a woman’s sense of loss may be doubled because it is not 
culturally recognized as a loss.  Estock writes, 
When a woman’s womb is removed, she may call into question her self-image 
and wonder how to define herself without that which she believes makes her 
uniquely woman.  She may be shamed into silence about these struggles by her 
church, her family, and her culture as others treat hysterectomy as thought it were 
routine surgery.17  
 
Pastoral caregivers are called to encourage women to voice their feelings and listen 
without judgment.  Additionally, a significant part of the pastoral work with women who 
have or will undergo a hysterectomy is to grapple with what it means to no longer possess 
                                                
16 Beth Ann Estock, “Hysterectomy and Women’s Identity,” Through the Eyes of 
Women: Insights for Pastoral Care, ed. Jeanne Stevenson Moessner (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1996), 192.   
 
17 Ibid. 
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their center of child creation.  Pastoral caregivers are urged to encourage and support the 
woman in stretching her self-definition and normative ideas of feminine identity.18    
 Estock offers sage analysis and advice, but it pivots on a logic which mistakes 
biological body parts for a gendered group identity.  What are we to do with stories of 
women who experience hysterectomy as neither loss nor possibility, but simply a medical 
intervention?  Do we assume that something is wrong with them for not feeling the loss 
of their uterus because it is not their “wombs” or centers of creation?  Have we then 
assumed something about what it means to perform one’s womanhood correctly if they 
do not grieve the loss of their “wombs”?  Conversely, what are we to do with stories of 
women whose racial or ethnic identity in cases of hysterectomy ought to indicate some 
larger patterns that calls for attention and social-political intervention, not just pastoral 
triage after the fact?       
 In her article “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color,” critical race theorist and UCLA School of Law and 
Columbia Law School professor Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw uses the term 
intersectionality to describe the problem that identity politics “frequently conflates or 
ignores intra group difference.”19 In her pivotal essay, she examines how battering and 
rape of black women are “the product of intersecting patterns of racism and sexism,” and 
yet “tend not to be represented within the discourse of feminism or antiracism,” leading 
                                                
18 Estock, 205. 
 
19 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991) : 
1242.  
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to further marginalization.20  “And so,” she writes, “when the practices expound identity 
as ‘woman’ or ‘person of color’ as an either/or proposition, they relegate the identity of 
women of color to a location that resists telling.”21  Moreover, the inattention to 
intersectionality results in institutional and public policies which harm women of color, 
even while aiming for the empowerment of women more generally.  
 When we read Estock’s essay with a commitment to an intersectional analysis, we 
see that she does not account for the intersection of gendered bodily concerns with any 
other identity.  We do not get a critical presentation or analysis of hysterectomy within 
any particular identity beyond a gynocentric woman.  What might happen if we rewrote 
this essay as pastoral care for African American women who have undergone a 
hysterectomy?  
First, we would have to relearn our history by taking account of the historically 
high prevalence of hysterectomies in the African American women’s community.  
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, poor black women were coerced into sterilization in 
both the southern United States as well as the north.  The practice was so common in the 
south that black communities referred to the surgery as a “Mississippi appendectomy.”22  
In the north, medical residents practiced hysterectomy on poor black and Puerto Rican 
women as a part of their training at teaching hospitals. The director of obstetrics and 
gynecology at a New York municipal hospital reported, “In most major teaching 
                                                
20 Ibid., 1243. 
 
21 Ibid., 1242. See Crenshaw’s analysis of the shelter movement and the organization 
PODER for concrete examples. 
 
22 Dorothy Robert, “Black Women and the Pill,” Family Planning Perspectives 32 
(March/April 2000) : 93. 
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hospitals in New York City, it is the unwritten policy to do elective hysterectomies on 
poor black and Puerto Rican women, with minimal indications, to train residents.”23   
This sordid history of medical practice cannot be undone without examining the 
role of religious and theological thought and practice, especially patriarchal pastoral 
practice that colludes with racism, colonialism, and heterosexism.24 The male friend’s 
comment to Estock about hysterectomy being as simple as an appendectomy takes on a 
whole new dimension when we reread her essay with historical knowledge of racially 
prejudiced and medically unnecessary surgeries.  Using intersectionality as a tool for 
critical analysis is needed to describe complex situations that beg feminist pastoral 
theologians to take note of marginalization and intragroup differences.   
Feminist pastoral theologians noted this need in writing in the 1990s and 
implicitly argued that multiple intersecting jeopardies of sexism, racism, ethnocentrism, 
heterosexism, classism, and ableism must receive attention.  Feminist pastoral 
theologians could not always adequately address these intersections but they repeatedly 
invited previously unheard pastoral caregivers and theologians to contribute their insight 
in order to address structures of oppression and shape a political-theological care agenda 
in which all could be included, much as second and third wave feminists across the 
disciplines had done.   For example, Bonnie Miller-McLemore invites the expansion of 
the living human web, calling for “a richer diversity of perspectives, particularly 
                                                
23 Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of 
Liberty (New York: Pantheon, 1997), 91. 
 
24 I find second generation liberation theologian Marcella Althaus-Reid to be a 
particularly powerful writer who interrogates the ways that racism, colonialism, and 
heterosexism are sustained in religious ideology and practice, as well as ecclesial-
institutional collusion with neo-colonial and patriarchal systems of oppression.  See her 
collection From Feminist Theology to Indecent Theology (2004) for essays.   
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womanist, Asian, and Hispanic” that may “begin to reshape fundamental presuppositions 
of pastoral theology.”25  The first essays that took up this call in the women-care 
handbooks included “The Legacy of the African American Matriarch” and “Self-Care for 
the African-American Woman” (Snorton 1996, 2000); “Sexual Identity and Pastoral 
Concerns: Caring with Women who are Developing Lesbian Identities” (Marshall, 1996); 
“Socioeconomic Class and the Life Span Development of Women” (Orr, 2000); and 
“Women with Acquired Disabilities: Constructing New Lives in a Strange Land” 
(Buford, 2000).  These five essays, while not the whole of feminist pastoral theological 
thought on multiple jeopardies, are representative of a shifting terrain from an all-
encompassing perspective of women’s experience to the emergence of a paradigm of 
difference.  While it signaled the start of a shift, it remained a perspective which was not 
yet fully developed.  They were five essays out of 46 that addressed the intersection of 
gender with, respectively, socio-economic class, lesbian identity, physical disability, and 
race in the African-American context, and were published over a decade in three 
handbooks of care for women, Women in Travail and Transition (1991), Through the 
Eyes of Women (1996), and In Her Own Time (2000).     
The most recent publication of Women Out of Order: Risking Change and 
Creating Care in a Multicultural World (eds. Jeanne Stevenson-Moessner and Teresa 
Snorton) extends feminist pastoral theology and pastoral care practices with the questions 
of difference and identity at the forefront.  The authors argue that the variables of race, 
class, and even generation generate different experiences of sexism.  “The sociopolitical 
history of any given culture will dictate the level of sexism that is condoned, supported, 
                                                
25 Bonnie Miller-McLemore, “Feminist Theory in Pastoral Theology,” 89. 
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tolerated, ignored, or challenged within a particular culture,” writes Teresa Snorton.26  
Thus this collection of essays attends to the ways that these variables come together and 
describe how they affect women given cultural difference.   
 The majority of essays focus on pastoral theology, care, and counseling at the 
intersection of race/ethnicity and gender, including the African-American experience 
(Wallace 2010; Kelley 2010; Snorton 2010), the African experience (Acolatse 2010), the 
American Indian experience (Lacock and Eastin 2010), the Puerto Rican experience 
(Figueroa 2010), the Mediterranean experience (Cavina 2010), the Chinese-American 
experience (Kwong 2010), and the Korean and Korean-American experience (Pak Son 
2010; Lee 2010; Yeon Lee 2010; Park 2010).  Other essay topics include care for 
socioeconomically vulnerable women (Nuzzolese 2010), care where race, gender, and 
sexual orientation intersect (Cooper and Marshall 2010), and the expansion of the 
locations of care to include the corporate or business sector (McClure 2010).  Religious 
pluralism and neocolonialism are emerging challenges to pastoral theology, care, and 
counseling as noted in the essays “Soul Care Amid Religious Plurality: Excavating an 
Emerging Dimension of Multicultural Challenge and Competence” (Greider 2010) and 
“Are There Limits to Multicultural Inclusion? Difficult Questions for Feminist Pastoral 
Theology” (Miller-McLemore and Sharp 2010).      
One may conclude that the liberal value of diversity and inclusion is crucial to the 
feminist pastoral theological project.  However, to attend to diversity and strive for 
inclusion results in an ever-expanding number of essays that detail pastoral care, 
counseling, and theology in light of identities of difference.  The deeper that we probe 
                                                
26 Teresa Snorton, “Introduction,” Women Out of Order, eds. Jeanne Stevenson-Moessner 
and Teresa Snorton (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2010), 1. 
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intersections of identity in our pastoral theological writing, the more difference is 
produced, resulting in even more bodies of literature to address care for women in 
distinct populations.  A multicultural proliferation poses challenges, though.   
First, attending to difference concretely and specifically requires feminist pastoral 
theology to grapple with its search for normative frameworks, a legacy of its “modern 
Western ethos of a progressive Protestant worldview and its liberal feminist offshoots.”27  
In the essay “Are There Limits to Multicultural Inclusion?” co-authors Bonnie Miller-
McLemore and Melinda McGarrah Sharp write that pastoral theologians and caregivers 
have supported the expansion of the theological and practical attention to diversity.  
However, they note, “Including everyone has not been easy, however,” and as such, 
“pastoral theology has not yet given sufficient attention to difficult questions that arise 
when feminism engages multiculturalism.”28  Difficult questions arise when women 
across cultures disagree about what constitutes care free of “violation, degradation, 
exploitation, and suppression.”29  Attending to identity and difference in feminist pastoral 
theology challenges assumptions that we hold about what is right, good, just, and 
liberative care.  How pastoral theologians, caregivers, ministers, chaplains, policy 
makers, and community organizers respond to challenges to a priori assumptions matters.  
Without deep investigation, difference is made to become an irreconcilable otherness or 
difference is elided all together. 
                                                
27 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore and Melinda McGarrah Sharp, “Are There Limits to 
Multicultural Inclusion?: Difficult Questions for Feminist Pastoral Theology,” Women 
Out of Order (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 315. 
 
28 Ibid., 314, 315. 
 
29Ibid., 315.  
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The solidification of identity is a second challenge in care frameworks that attend 
to diversity.  One speaks from a place of identity to others who do not share that identity 
when one’s identity as difference is socially recognized.  Establishing an identity, the 
ability to speak publicly as an African-American woman or as a bisexual woman, is 
preceded by a recognition of difference in oneself and between selves.  There is a 
tendency for that difference to become a thing itself rather than an expression of a person.  
Divorced from persons, identity moves from a recognition of difference to the creation of 
a vilified other.  Political theorist William E. Connolly explains that differences become 
solidified “into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure expressed the true 
order of things.”30  The concretization of identity unifies within social groups and divides 
between social groups.  Connolly explains that the pressure to maintain an identity 
necessarily marks out those who are not that identity.  Instead of persons, identities may 
essentialize an Other in relation to another, or abstract identity from subjectivity.  He 
writes, “the maintenance of one identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion of 
some differences into otherness, into evil, or one of its numerous surrogates.”31  
Confessing identity and belonging to difference is a tricky and constant game of power, 
self- and other-definition, recognition, and agency in which human actors play and get 
played.     
Recognition at the psychological and social-political level poses a final challenge 
to the identity frame of feminist pastoral theology.  Difference can be negated within the 
individual and difference can be elided between individuals and social groups.  When 
                                                
30 Connolly, 64.  
 
31 Ibid. 
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difference is negated or elided, it is, in effect, misrecognized or not recognized.  
Recognition is an intersubjective exchange between a subject and another subject, 
institution, or system of power/knowledge.  It is both a psychological phenomena and a 
social phenomena.  To suffer from misrecognition or non-recognition at the individual 
level results in challenges to the development of one’s self-determination capabilities.  At 
the social level, misrecognition or non-recognition challenges one’s ability to fully 
participate in social and political life.  Recognition is thus a critical category of human 
experience which effects the movement toward a liberative pastoral and social space. 
Critical theorist Axel Honneth writes, “The justice or well-being of a society is 
proportionate to its ability to secure conditions of mutual recognition under which 
personal identity-formation, hence self-realization, can proceed adequately.”32  As such 
the process of recognition deserves attention as a category that speaks to individual and 
social and individual suffering.  Further, it is a category which must inform feminist 
pastoral theologies, which, as I argue in chapter two, are grounded theories of 
subjectivity. 
 
Linking Recognition and Subjectivity 
Misrecognition and non-recognition contribute to oppression and domination.  
Repeated patterns of misrecognition at the level of individuals leave a counter-residue at 
the social level.  Likewise, repeated patterns of misrecognition at the social level leave a 
counter-residue at the level of the psyche-soul.  Critical theorist Nancy Fraser argues that 
alongside the tasks of economic redistribution and political representation, social (or 
                                                
32Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-
Philosophical Exchange (New York: Verso, 2003), 174.  
 25 
cultural) recognition is equally important in the work of justice.33  She writes, 
“Overcoming injustice means dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some 
people from participating on par with others, as full partners in social interaction…. 
People can also be prevented from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalized 
hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing.”34  Persons denied 
social recognition based upon group identity are subject to mistreatment or oppression.   
Social misrecognition, then, is associated with a particular identity group—
gender, sexuality, race/ethnicity, religion, ability.  At one end of the spectrum, social 
misrecognition may be an overlooking process by those who possess institutional power; 
at the other end, social misrecognition may be an othering process whereby groups of 
people (women, African-Americans, illegal aliens) are expelled from public discourse.  In 
the middle of the spectrum, we may find a “conscious acceptance” alongside an 
“unconscious aversion” toward persons with certain, identifiable identity markers.35  For 
example, we know that xenophobia, racism, sexism, heterosexism and homophobia, 
ageism, religious intolerance, and ableism are very much alive.  Some, like heterosexism, 
are more explicit and socially-politically legitimated than others, like racism and sexism.  
Those who care for (or care about) oppressed, marginalized and misrecognized 
                                                
33 Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice (New York: Columbia UP, 2009), 16-17.  Fraser argues 
that justice consists in parity of participation.  She writes, “According to this radical-
democratic interpretation of the principle of equal moral worth, justice requires social 
arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life.”  While it is outside the 
scope of this dissertation to directly engage and elaborate definitions of justice for 
pastoral theology (a worthy project, but not this one), I do so indirectly when I consider 
questions of recognition and subjectivity as they arise in literature from social and 
political theorists. 
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35 Young, 130.  
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populations are obliged to identify “contemporary manifestations of group 
oppressions.”36   
Theories of subjectivity, with special attention to recognition, are one starting 
point to identify forms of oppression that are similar to and breaks from past iterations.  
A theory of subjectivity is a theory of the human person in the social-political context set 
against qualifications of agency, power, psychological formation, and social construction.  
Theories of recognition are theories of subjectivity; likewise, practices of recognition and 
misrecognition are practices of subjectivity and subjectivation.  Like recognition, 
approaches to subjectivity fall along a wide spectrum in describing a subject’s ability to 
effect individual and social change, to resist institutions and practices that oppress, and to 
intentionally or consciously pursue desires.  
Theories of subjectivity are important for pastoral theologizing and caregiving.  
Recall the earlier dilemma I described where chaplains attended to identity markers but 
without analysis of how those markers affected care in pastoral-social spaces.  In their 
roles as minister-theologians, the hospital chaplains implicitly offered grounded theories 
of recognition and subjectivity when they spoke about their patients.  Feminist pastoral 
theologians also offer implicit theories of recognition and subjectivity when we write, 
teach, and practice.  When feminist pastoral theologians imagine the nameless mothers, 
who exactly do we imagine?  How much agency do we give the nameless in our accounts 
of best caregiving practices?  Whose claims for recognition do we hear when we attend to 
identity and diversity and whose claims do we not hear?  Thus far, I have argued that the 
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description of the subject in feminist pastoral theology is inadequate because we have not 
sufficiently attended to her construction.   
This dissertation is guided by three overarching questions.  First, what is the state 
of subjectivity in feminist pastoral theology?  Second, what resources in philosophy and 
psychology deepen our theories of subjectivity, suffering, care, and justice?  Third, what 
does feminist pastoral theology have to say in response?  In this chapter I described how I 
reached these questions by starting in reflection between grounded research on practices 
and theoretical inquiry in the literature of the discipline.  In chapter two, I continue the 
argument I began here, namely that subjectivity is at the heart of pastoral theology, and, 
as such, ought to be examined in-depth because of the implications for pastoral practice.  
In subsequent chapters, I dialogue with theories of recognition to reflect on these 
questions. 
 
Method of Research and Self-Reflexivity 
This dissertation is situated within the subdiscipline of feminist pastoral theology, 
the discipline of pastoral theology, care, and counseling, and the field of religion and 
psychology.  I use a revised critical correlational method, a method shared amongst 
feminist pastoral theology, the discipline of pastoral theology, care, and counseling, and 
the field of religion and psychology.  In this section, I describe a feminist revised critical 
correlational method and reflect on myself as a situated knower. 
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Critically Correlational, Revised, and Feminist 
The revised critical correlational method is the method par excellence of modern 
pastoral theology.  When used with commitments to human flourishing by accounting for 
gender and women’s experience, the method contributes to the creation of feminist 
pastoral theologies and methods.  In this section, I provide brief explanations of the 
correlational method, the revised critical correlational method, and feminist pastoral 
theological method.  But first, I briefly highlight the aims of pastoral theology, care, and 
counseling, and relate it to the field of religion and psychology.    
The word pastor is the Latin derivation of the word shepherd.  Traditionally, 
pastoral theology referred to a theology of shepherding in which a religious leader tended 
God’s flock of people.37  As a practical discipline, pastoral theology, care, and counseling 
begins in the Christian mandate to empathize with and care for those who suffer.  While 
pastoral theology and its practices traditionally occurred in ecclesial spheres, the 
discipline is now much broader in its scope and activities.  Nancy J. Ramsay explains, 
“Pastoral theology is a performative discipline whether done by chaplains, pastoral 
counselors, pastors, or pastoral theologians in seminary classrooms.”38  To Ramsay’s 
explanation, I add that pastoral theology may be an activity of reflection and theorizing 
also performed by non-ordained persons, particularly as the nature of care shifts into new 
                                                
37 J.R. Burck and R.J. Hunter, “Pastoral Theology, Protestant,” Dictionary of Pastoral 
Care and Counseling, Revised ed. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2005), 867. 
 
38 Nancy J. Ramsay, “Contemporary Pastoral Theology: A Wider Vision for the Practice 
of Love,” Pastoral Care and Counseling: Redefining the Paradigms, ed. Nancy J. 
Ramsay (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2004), 175.  See “Pastoral Theology as Public 
Theology: Revolutions in the ‘Fourth Area’” in that same collection (Miller-McLemore, 
2004). 
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forms that address “a wider social, political, and religious context,” such as public 
theology.39     
Three legs of knowledge support the stool of pastoral theology.  First, pastoral 
theology gathers reasonably accurate description of human experiences of tragedy and 
suffering.  While one can never fully know the depth of another’s tragedy and suffering, 
academic pastoral theologians participate “in the scholarly enterprise of understanding 
human struggle, survival, and healing” through truthful dialogue with secular theoretical 
partners.40  Second, contemporary pastoral theologians gather knowledge about the 
human condition through critical dialogue with psychology.  Scholars explore the nature 
of suffering on an intrapsychic, interpsychic, and psycho-sociocultural level and identify 
methods of offering relief, care, or cure to the suffering.  They critique harmful or 
inadequate theories and practices in theology, religion, and psychology.  As a third leg, 
pastoral theologians gather and reflect on religious and theological knowledge which 
assists the sufferer, when possible, to make sense of tragedy and pain.  With those who 
suffer, pastoral theologians explore and offer other modalities of healing, such as rituals 
or prayer practices.  As members of a dialogical discipline, pastoral theologians also 
critique harmful or inadequate theories and practices of care. 
Pastoral theology uses these three legs of the stool of knowledge to offer care and 
reflection in a variety of settings: more general pastoral care contexts in churches and 
                                                
39 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore and Brita L. Gill-Austern, eds., “Introduction,” Feminist 
and Womanist Pastoral Theology (Nashville: Abingdon, 1999), 13.  
 
40 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, “Shaping the Future of Religion and Psychology: 
Feminist Transformations in Pastoral Theology,” Religion and Psychology: Mapping the 
Terrain, eds. Diane Jonte-Pace and William B. Parsons (New York: Routledge, 2001), 
181. 
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faith-based ministries, specialized care in psychodynamic pastoral counseling settings, 
transformational and dynamic healing through broad attention to public policy and 
activism to remedy injustices, and in teaching and writing in the context of theological 
education.  Moreover, pastoral theologians who work in a dialogical fashion also offer 
critique to psychological, and, increasingly, social and political theories, and policies, a 
hallmark of the two-way pattern of the field of psychology and religion and of the critical 
correlational method.    
The correlational method has a rich theological history, beginning in Paul 
Tillich’s one-way method of correlation.  David Tracy, Seward Hiltner, Hans-George 
Gadamer, and Don Browning are contributors to a revised correlational method in which 
mutual critique and transformation of theology and culture in encouraged.  Feminist 
pastoral theologians Bonnie Miller-McLemore and Carrie Doehring have reenvisioned a 
revised correlational method using feminist theory, feminist psychology, and women’s 
experiences to engage in dialogue.  I describe these methods next. 
In Systematic Theology, Volume 1, Paul Tillich first describes and argues for a 
correlational method between Christian theology and philosophy.  The correlational 
method "explains the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and 
theological answers in mutual interdependence."41  It can be used in three ways.  First, 
the correlational method can be applied to problems of religious knowledge, second to 
statements about God and the world, and third to the relationship between the Divine and 
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1951), 60. 
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human, especially in regards to religious experience.42  Writing against theologians of the 
Christian tradition such as Calvin and Barth who argue that the Divine-human 
relationship is fundamentally unidirectional, with human knowledge dependent upon 
unquestionable divine revelation, Tillich argues that the correlational method requires 
interaction between humans and the Divine.  He writes, "God answers man's [sic] 
questions, and under the impact of God's answers man [sic] asks them."43   
However, Tillich is limited in his interpretive lens, arguing that all human 
experience can and must be made sense of through Christianity.  He explains, "In using 
the method of correlation, systematic theology proceeds in the following way: it makes 
an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it 
demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these 
questions.”44  The role of the social sciences is limited in a Tillichian correlational 
method.  Answers to theological questions must come through Christian salvation 
history, never through social sciences.  "The Christian message," he writes, "provides the 
answers to the questions implied in human existence.  These answers are contained in the 
revelatory events on which Christianity is based and are taken by systematic theology 
from normative theological sources.  Their content cannot be derived from the questions, 
that is, from an analysis of human existence."45  Social sciences assist in the identification 
of theological questions.  They cannot adequately answer them.   
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43 Ibid. 
 
44 Ibid., 62. 
 
45 Ibid., 64. 
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In Blessed Rage for Order, David Tracy argues for a revisionist correlational 
method.  It is a corrective to Tillich's correlational method and a response to other 
theological methods, namely the orthodox, liberal, neo-orthodox, and radical, that are 
deployed to make sense of the recent past which, while infused with the modern hopes of 
the emancipation and liberation, has included tragic and fatal suffering.  The revised 
critical correlational method “holds that a contemporary fundamental Christian theology 
can best be described as philosophical reflection upon the meanings present in common 
human experience and language, and upon the meanings present in the Christian fact.”46  
Social sciences and disciplines that reflect on human experience can be sites of questions 
as well as answers in a revisionist model.    
Practical theologian Don Browning contributed to the development of a revised 
critical correlational method.  His revised method reflects on third-order knowledge and 
models how to put social sciences and theology into dialogue with an orientation to 
liberal principles.  In the last ten years of his life, Browning developed a critical 
hermeneutics, drawing on Gadamer and Ricouer, which informed his work in religion 
and psychology, and practical theology.  Four considerations inform a critical 
hermeneutics for Browning.  First, critical hermeneutics begins in reflection of a 
contextual situation; second, situations are interpreted through “the ideals or classics that 
have shaped their effective histories” with sufficient insight into how those histories have 
worked to disrupt, silence, or liberate persons and communities.47   Next, critical 
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hermenutics requires the retrieval and evaluation of these ideals for how they work on a 
practical and strategic level.  Last, it reexamines the contextual situation to understand 
overlaps between religion and the social sciences, and to reconstruct ethical and concrete 
action.48     
Feminist pastoral theologians with liberationist perspectives make use of the 
revisionist method, correlating gender, social sciences, and theology.  They employ an 
emancipatory locus theologicus that begins in pastoral practice and its relationship to 
gender analysis.  In her essay, “A Method of Feminist Pastoral Theology,” Carrie 
Doehring writes that four criteria guide her work in the construction of feminist pastoral 
theology.  First, feminist pastoral theology works by dialoguing within larger disciplinary 
questions of method.49  The revisionist method articulated by Tracy and modified by 
pastoral theologian Don Browning is one methodological site.  Second, feminist pastoral 
theological constructions are “poststructural, contextual, and pragmatic.”50  Theological 
constructions in feminist perspective ought to move beyond binaries of gender, account 
for the intersection of difference and their impact on the person, and remember that truth 
claims are provisional.  Thirdly, “feminist pastoral theology will be explicit about the 
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48 Ibid., 176.  See Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, “Cognitive Science and the Question of 
Theological Method,” The Journal of Pastoral Theology 20 (Winter 2010) : 67-78.  In 
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49 Carrie Doehring, “A Method of Feminist Pastoral Theology,” Feminist and Womanist 
Pastoral Theology, eds. Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore and Brita L. Gill-Austern 
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sources and norms that shape our identities.”51  Sources and their ensuing norms may be 
biblical, denominational, experiential, gendered, or social scientific.  Lastly, Doehring 
argues that a feminist pastoral theological method bridges disciplines for the purpose of 
transformation of inequalities. 
In this dissertation I use a revised critical correlational method attentive to 
feminist theories of subjectivity and recognition.  Like Browning’s critical hermeneutics 
and Doehring’s feminist pastoral method, I begin in a concrete situation which called for 
reflection on theory and practice.  In my next chapter, I move to appreciation and critique 
of what feminist pastoral theologians have contributed to theories of subjectivity, paying 
close attention to difference and recognition.  In subsequent chapters I dialogue with 
feminist psychology and feminist social theory on questions of subjectivity and 
recognition.  In my final chapter, I return to feminist pastoral theology and pastoral care 
to offer practices that build toward an account of a feminist pastoral theology and praxis 
of recognition.      
 
Self-Reflexivity and Method 
 As a feminist scholar-practitioner living at the porous peripheries of the 
modernity and post-modernity, I am aware of the importance of inhabiting self-reflexivity 
as a situated knower.  I have built a knowledge portfolio that has both strengths and 
weaknesses based on what I have experienced, what I have not experienced, what I will 
never experience, and what I can only imagine experiencing.  I trade knowledge using 
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currencies drawn from the modern ethos of universal emancipation and the postmodern 
ethos of asking which power and whose emancipation.   
The particularity of postmodern knowledge claims is important to the enterprise 
of pastoral theology   Feminist pastoral theologian Christie Cozad Neuger explains, 
The postmodern contribution has been not only to look to the importance of 
standpoint in observations and theories, but also to recognize that value and truth 
claims have been based on criteria grounded in the ordering of power in the 
culture.  What is truth and what is myth, what is health and what is sickness, and 
what is reality and what is fantasy have been normalized by criteria determined by 
those with the power to do so.52   
 
Pastoral theologians are called to account for the power that they hold through social 
identities or locations, such as race and ethnicity, class, gender, ability, religion, 
sexuality, age, and education.  As Carrie Doehring argues in her interpretation of a 
feminist pastoral theological method, feminist pastoral theologians must be explicit about 
how their locations impact the shape of the knowledge they build. 
 One accepted way to be explicit is to name one’s social location.  I am deeply 
grateful for the fortitude and courage that women and men in pastoral theology have 
exhibited in proceeding in this manner,53 especially when naming a location is also a 
“coming-out as” process.54  However, I also resist this form.  I am too wary of 
                                                
52 Christie Cozad Neuger, “Power and Difference in Pastoral Theology,” Pastoral Care 
and Counseling: Redefining the Paradigms, ed. Nancy J. Ramsay (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 2004), 66. 
 
53 See the foreword to feminist pastoral theologian Joretta Marshall’s Counseling Lesbian 
Partners (1996) where Andrew Lester acknowledges his gratitude “to Joretta for taking 
the personal risk inherent in writing this book” (ix).    
 
54 I use the phrase “coming-out as” to denote, first, that naming and claiming an identity 
is not a one-time process, but one in which a person comes out again and again.  Second, 
I use this phrase to denote how an identity may become crystallized for us, even when we 
see our identity as something much more fractured.   
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confessions that feel coerced, of new norms of liberative practice that enslave persons in 
old economies of knowledge, of difference that solidifies and mutates into deviance.  I 
worry about these things less in pastoral theology.  Instead, I am wary of asking social 
locations to do too much work without questioning the shape of our revealed and 
revealing knowledge.  Social theorists Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper comment, 
“If identity is everywhere, it is nowhere.”55  The onus is to then communicate what might 
be conveyed through identity or social location without lapsing into extensive memoir or 
autobiography, while also acknowledging the incompleteness and tensions of every 
narrative.  In fact, this observation is central to my argument. 
 So, I tell you as I can, as succinctly as I can, of my social location and how it 
informs the shape of my research.  I have no doubt that I have already revealed things 
about myself to you in writing thus far and also by what I have not written.  I am a white 
woman.  I grew up without memorable family ethnic influence in Northern Virginia.  I 
have never been pregnant.  I am most familiar with the Roman Catholic religious 
tradition.  I appreciate its historical richness, religious ritual, and theological imagery 
while experiencing frustration at its patriarchal ecclesial structures.  I have been 
privileged to enjoy extensive education opportunities.  I situate my research interests at 
the broad intersection of theories and practices of care and justice.  I worry about 
domination and submission, subtle coercion, and psychological manipulation in everyday 
practices of caring because they are mistaken for love, for justice, for mercy, for healing.  
Working out of a feminist, pastoral, and theological framework in this dissertation, I 
intend to engage my sources with theological virtues of prudence, generosity, respect, 
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and humility for deliberation on the common good and the role of women’s experience, 
and feminist second and third-order knowledge in doing so.  I hope that those who 
engage this work will also act in the same spirit.       
 
Conclusion 
 In this first chapter I described how I came to the problem of subjectivity and 
recognition in feminist pastoral theology.  I began by explicating a problem that arose 
from the practice of hospital chaplaincy, namely how ministers make decisions when 
their religious traditions conflict with requested practices of pastoral care.  Next, I 
articulated how the research I conducted to answer this question of practice led me into 
questions of identity, recognition, and subjectivity.  I showed a pattern in the feminist 
pastoral theological literature which uses one-point of identity and intersection of two-
points of identity to speak to issues that call for attention in feminist pastoral theology, 
care, and counseling, and argued that this paradigm, while useful and needed, also limits 
the breadth and depth of subjectivity.  Lastly, I spoke to my method and social location.  
In the next chapter, I argue that pastoral theology has a history of concern for the human 
person, suffering, and power, and as such is already in conversation with theories of 
subjectivity.  I also review selections from feminist pastoral theology that engage in 
reflections on subjectivity and theological anthropology, showing both insights and 
limitations. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT: 
HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND FEMINIST PASTORAL  
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGIES  
 
 
 
“Pastoral theology attempts to grasp the complexities of lived faith.”1 
 
 
 
 In chapter one, I explained how I came to name and nuance the problem of 
subjectivity as an issue for feminist pastoral theology.  I wrote that recognition is a 
problem of subjectivity with implications for individual development at the psychological 
level and with broader impacts on group identity and social justice at the socio-political 
level.  I asked, what is the state of subjectivity in feminist pastoral theology, and argued 
that this question deserves consideration in light of theories of recognition. 
In this chapter, I dig deeper into select literature of feminist pastoral theology to 
answer the question I proposed.  But first, I step back from feminist pastoral theology to 
the larger historical expanse of modern pastoral theology and argue that pastoral 
theology, and feminist pastoral theology as a correlative, indirectly offer grounded 
theories of subject formation by theologizing from the experiences of suffering, healing, 
and personhood.  While the fact that pastoral theology is grounded in lived experience is 
not revelatory, it provides the context for a normative practice that attends to Others.2  
                                                
1 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore and Brita Gill-Austern, eds., Feminist and Womanist 
Pastoral Theology (Nashville: Abingdon, 1999), 10. 
 
2 I am using the words ‘other’ to motion toward two ideas that I will explore in Chapters 
3 and 4.  First, that a person may be made an ‘other’ through a resistance to laws, names, 
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Next, I turn to key authors in feminist pastoral theology to appreciate and critique how 
the feminist subject is constructed.  Situated within the historical development of feminist 
pastoral theology that I described in chapter one, I show how each author has contributed 
to the construction of multiple subjectivities that call for attention in pastoral theology, 
care, and counseling.  I argue that describing subjectivity without attending to 
psychological and social recognition is problematic if we are to identify and frame 
intersubjective and social suffering through a care lens that seeks justice. 
 
 
Pastoral Theologies as Grounded Theories of Subject Formation  
 
 
 
“Pastoral theology has always looked to the parishioner, the believer, the 
suffering, and the practices of religion as central resources in the search for theological 
answers,” write the editors of Feminist and Womanist Pastoral Theology.3  The human 
person, her suffering, and theological responses to enable flourishing are foundations of 
pastoral theology and pastoral ministry.  Pastoral theology reflects on ministry, context, 
process, and practice.  However, at the root of pastoral theology is concern for the self-in-
context, though the scope of the context—a cone that begins with intrapsychic forces and 
expands to familial, cultural, and socio-political forces—has not remained static.4  
                                                
and practices which then mark a person as non-normative or deviant.  In post-colonial 
terms, this is the subaltern.  Second, Others are also made within individual selves by 
cutting off pieces of one’s embodied psychological and emotional formation.  
 
3 Miller-McLemore and Gill-Austern, 11. 
 
4 Please note that I am arguing that the subject and the conditions around the subject are 
what we do in our discipline.  However, this does not mean that we are not interested in 
linking situated selves to issues that can appear to be non-human or extra-human, such as 
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Concern for the self-in-context is apparent when we examine the ways that pastoral 
theologians describe the work of pastoral theology through historical paradigms, the 
pastoral functions as activities of care, and a focus on human experience.  In this section, 
I argue that these are the three roads that help us to understand just how foundational the 
person is to pastoral theology. 
 Definitions of pastoral theology and pastoral care are complex, contested, and 
multiple because the activities and challenges do not produce static knowledge.  An 
additional complexity is a historical trajectory that spans pre-modernity, modernity, and 
post-modernity in defining pastoral theology and its activities.  In light of these 
complexities, let me share four preliminary observations about where I see the field of 
pastoral theology, care, and counseling coming from and headed toward.  First, pastoral 
theology is reflection on the activity of pastoral care, and the situations that stimulate the 
need for care. Second, contemporary pastoral theology, while aimed toward contextuality 
and diversity, cannot be divorced from its historical Christian roots in offering normative 
visions of flourishing (and salvation) through pastoral practices of care, vis a vis moral 
guidance, ecclesial wisdom, and practices of faith.  Thus contemporary pastoral theology 
sees many viable forms of flourishing in individuals from its pre-modern roots, but 
remains committed to addressing issues that stem from a modern commitment to the 
struggle for human liberation in a pluralistic, global world.  Third, this very commitment 
leads to a broadening of the scope of care.  Pastoral theologian Nancy J. Ramsay 
observes that pastoral theology has increasingly become concerned with the “wider 
                                                
ecological and sustainability issues.  See, for example, Howard Clinebell’s Ecotherapy: 
Healing Ourselves, Healing the Earth (1996). 
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public horizon for care.”5  As such, “this wider horizon has meant that pastoral 
theologians now find themselves developing normative proposals for public policy 
debates on issues affecting care in our common life such as welfare and family policies.”6  
Fourthly, by speaking about human fulfillment, human desire, and human suffering, 
coupled with taking action to address harms in the church and society, pastoral theology 
sits at several conversational loci.  It dialogues within the broader field of religion and the 
social sciences, especially psychology and religion, while also dialoging with 
theologians, ethicists, Biblical scholars, and other colleagues in practical theology.  
Additions, the praxis of pastoral theology bring us into dialogue with the fields of 
counseling psychology, micro- and macro-social work, community development and 
organizing, and public policy. 
What holds these historical trajectories and definitions together is concern for the 
person in practice, not only theory—psychological, pastoral, social, or otherwise.7  I have 
alluded that pastoral theology already participates in reflecting and formulating theories 
of subjectivity.  However, I believe that pastoral theology’s reflection on subject 
formation through appreciative inquiry of experience is unique and can be better 
appreciated when read against the backdrop of grounded theory. 
 Grounded theory is a qualitative research method of the social sciences. 
Sociologists Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, the first proponents of grounded 
                                                
5 Ramsay, 157. 
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, “Practical Theology and Pedagogy,” For Life Abundant: 
Practical Theology, Theological Education, and Christian Ministry, eds. Dorothy C. Bass 
and Craig Dykstra (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 185. 
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theory, developed their method in light of their research of dying hospital patients.  They 
contradicted the deductive model of research that tests hypotheses based on existing 
theories. Instead, they began by appreciating the lives of the research participants.8    
Like pastoral theological method, grounded theory begins by gathering rich data, 
and then turns to theorizing using heuristic devices of coding, memo-writing, sorting, 
reconstructing theory, and reflecting on the research process.9  Sociologist Kathy 
Charmaz explains, “Data form the foundation of our theory and our analysis of these data 
generates the concepts we construct.”10  As such, grounded theory rejects epistemological 
positivism. 
 Not all pastoral theologians engage in the formal methods of grounded theory or 
other kinds of qualitative research.  However, they grapple with the same kind of rich 
data that is complex and contested, not only as researchers but as practitioners in church, 
academy, and public.  Instead of grounded theory, pastoral theologians may call the 
theories they construct phronesis, prudence, or practical wisdom.11  Practical concern for 
                                                
8 Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
Strategies for Qualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).  
 
9 These same kinds of tasks are present in other qualitative research methods and in use in 
pastoral and practical theology.  See Ethnography as Pastoral Practice: An Introduction 
(Moschella, 2008) and Studying Congregations: A New Handbook (Ammerman, Carroll, 
Dudley, and McKinney, 1998) for examples in pastoral and practical theology.   
 
10 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through 
Qualitative Analysis (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2006), 2. 
 
11 Don S. Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and Strategic 
Proposals (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 3.  Browning takes up the task of describing 
how religious communities are carriers of and contributors to practical reason in this 
book.  His argument hinges on understanding communities made of practitioners of faith 
as embodiments of practical wisdom (10).  Also see Religious Ethics and Pastoral Care 
(1983) for an earlier synopsis.     
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the subject is descriptive and normative, as well as prescriptive.  Practical concern is 
grounded in situational realities of suffering that become apparent in the profession of 
ministry.  Therefore, I believe that pastoral theology implicitly contains theories of 
subjectivity because the subject—whether we refer to the subject as self, person, living 
human document or living human web—is at the heart of pastoral theology.  Reflections 
on the subject are visible in the three ways that pastoral theologians orient the discipline: 
through paradigms, pastoral functions, and human experience. 
 
Paradigms 
 Three distinct paradigms define the academic field of pastoral theology.12  The 
first is the classical paradigm; the second is the clinical paradigm; and the third is the 
communal-contextual and intercultural paradigms.  The emergence of paradigms in 
pastoral theology is a result of self-reflection on the state of the field and its aims, and 
provides one way to understand what pastoral theology and its practices are and what 
they do.  Further, the paradigms give us insight into the underlying pulse of pastoral 
theology, attentive to souls, psyches, and situated selves.  These paradigms are both 
interdependent and complementary.13   
 The classical paradigm refers to modes of pastoral care that dominated the 
American religious landscape until the mid-twentieth century.  However, the forms of 
care in the classical paradigm were not limited to the American or Protestant landscape, 
                                                
12 John Patton, Pastoral Care in Context: An Introduction to Pastoral Care (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox, 1993), 4. 
 
13 Nancy J. Ramsay, “A Time of Ferment and Redefinition,” Pastoral Care and 
Counseling: Redefining the Paradigms, ed. Nancy J. Ramsay (Nashville: Abingdon, 
2004), 11. 
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but are also found in Catholic pastoral theology and practice as well.  What marks this 
long period of time is interest in the questions of the soul, salvation, and sin.  Ministers 
provided guidance and counsel to their flock; they were physicians of the soul, and their 
work, the cure of souls.14  The classical paradigm of pastoral theology taught ministers 
the how-to’s of this work.  In the Roman Catholic tradition this included teaching the 
professed religious liturgics, sacraments, devotional practices, and complex manual 
systems of casuistry that aided the practice of penance.  In the Protestant tradition, the 
how-to’s included conversation with the faithful, preaching, conversion, and exhortation.  
The fate of the soul was of central concern in these pastoral practices.        
 Like many historical developments, there is no end-date to the classical paradigm; 
it exists side-by-side the clinical and communal-contextual paradigms.  The clinical 
paradigm and its focus on the psychological make-up of the person was preceded by a 
gradual historical movement, from “self-denial to . . . self-love, from self-love to self-
culture, from self-culture to self-mastery, and self-mastery to self-realization within a 
trustworthy culture, and finally to a later form of self-realization counterposed against 
cultural mores and social institutions.”15   
 The Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling is one key document that 
reflects the clinical paradigm while also looking toward the communal-contextual 
paradigm.  Written throughout the 1980s, and published in 1990, the dictionary serves as 
a hinge text in the field of pastoral theology, care, and counseling.  It summarizes the 
scope of the field and extant knowledge of the modern pastoral care movement in the 
                                                
14 E. Brooks Holifield, A History of Pastoral Care in America: From Salvation to Self-
Realization (Nashville: Abingdon, 1983), 11-12, 15-17. 
 
15 Ibid., 12. 
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twentieth century.  It is aware of the critical stances of postmodernity particularly on 
gender and racial difference, but mostly concerns itself with care informed by the 
humanistic psychological sciences, or a clinical pastoral perspective.  As Nancy J. 
Ramsay explains, “The clinical pastoral perspective that predominates in the Dictionary 
is more clinically focused on relationally conceived selves in the immediacy of their lived 
experience with their social context often in the background.  It values an existential 
focus on being over doing that recognizes moral issues but does not take up their political 
and social consequences.”16   
 In practice, the clinical paradigm of pastoral care focuses on caring for the 
individual through talk and empathic listening.  It relies on therapeutic models and puts to 
use psychoanalytic and psychodynamic psychology, family systems, and other 
psychologies that lead an individual to insight about his or her history, its manifestation 
in the present, and his or her ability to affect future personal life trajectories.  Pastoral 
counseling, a practice that requires psychological and theological training, and with an 
organization which oversees practitioners, the American Association of Pastoral 
Counselors, is a specialized form of this paradigm of pastoral care.  The person as 
psychological creature worthy of study and assistance forms the backbone of the clinical 
paradigm.            
 The most recent paradigms, the communal-contextual and intercultural 
paradigms, expand the scope of understanding the person.  These paradigms argue that  
the intrapersonal make-up of a self must be considered in light of the complex systems 
that also inform and impact how individuals understand themselves in the world.  
                                                
16 Nancy J. Ramsay, “A Time of Ferment and Redefinition,” 9. 
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Likewise, healing is offered in community and by community; the pastor does not have 
sole responsibility or authority for caring acts.  Patton explains that communal-contextual 
paradigm recalls earlier biblical and apostolic traditions of caring communities of faith.17 
 Emmanuel Lartey’s proposal for the intercultural paradigm indicates the 
importance of attending to “the complex nature of the interaction between people who 
have been influenced by different cultures, social contexts and origins, and who 
themselves are often enigmatic composites of various strands of ethnicity, race, 
geography, culture, and socio-economic setting.”18  The intercultural paradigm 
contributes to the understanding that practices of pastoral care and counseling and 
reflections on these practices must be considered in light of complex developments such 
as globalization, internationalization, and indigenization.19  
 The communal-contextual and intercultural paradigms also signal a shift in focus 
from personal redemption and healing to questions of relational justice.  “Relational 
justice,” Ramsay writes, “normative for the communal contextual and intercultural 
paradigms, shifts the understanding of the self to a far more contextual, socially located 
identity in which the political and ethical dynamics of assymetries of power related to 
difference such as gender, race, sexual orientation, and class are prominent.”20  She 
explains further,  
                                                
17 Patton, 5. 
 
18 Lartey, 13. 
 
19 Emmanuel Lartey, “Globalization, Internationalization, and Indigenization of Pastoral 
Care and Counseling,” Pastoral Care and Counseling: Redefining the Paradigms 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 2004), 88-91. 
 
20 Nancy J. Ramsay, “A Time of Ferment and Redefinition,” 10. 
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From within the clinical pastoral paradigm pastoral counseling had long focused 
largely on liberating persons from spiritual and psychological bondage, but 
relational justice requires that care also include attention to liberation from the 
actual bondage of oppression—the corollary of freedom from bondage is 
relational justice.  To be in bondage is to be in an unjust relationship to an 
external power, or to an external power internalized psychologically and 
spiritually.  To fulfill the image of God in human relationships, therefore, is to be 
liberated from internalized bondage and to create a human environment 
characterized by relational justice rather than oppressive structures of domination 
and subordination.  Relational justice involves redistribution of power, resources, 
privilege, and risks in an equitable manner.”21  
 
The communal contextual and intercultural paradigms contribute to pastoral theological 
projects of care, counseling, and theology to effect systemic changes for the flourishing 
of all God’s people.     
 
Functions 
 Another way to more fully understand how pastoral theology links its work to 
persons is to look at the types of activities that it undertakes.  Certain activities come to 
prominence within particular paradigms, but like the paradigms themselves, the activities 
are interdependent and complementary.  Thus while the functions of healing, sustaining, 
guiding, and reconciling inform the classical paradigm, they also extend through the 
clinical, communal-contextual, and intercultural paradigms.  In the same way, the 
functions of liberating and empowering, while prominent in the communal-contextual 
and intercultural paradigms, may also be traced through historical theological practices 
informed by the classical and clinical paradigms.  The function of nurturing which came 
to prominence in the clinical paradigm is also found in the historical trajectories of 
pastoral practice.  Lastly, the functions, while articulated as activities without substantial 
                                                
21 Ibid., 10. 
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attention to agency or subjectivity, are best understood as practices of ministry formed 
over time through the complex navigation of persons, systems, contexts, and doctrine.  In 
this section I present the functions as named by key figures in the field and show that the 
person in need of care is foundational to the exercise of the functions.    
 In his Preface to Pastoral Theology, Seward Hiltner describes the function of 
shepherding as a distinctive operation of pastoral theology.  He writes, “Pastoral theology 
is a formal branch of theology resulting from the study of Christian shepherding, that it is 
just as important as biblical or doctrinal or historical theology, and that it is no less the 
concern of the minister of the local church than of the specialist.”22  The minister as 
shepherd offers tender and solicitous concern.  He writes, “The view of shepherding as a 
perspective enables us to think of shepherding as a readiness, an attitude, or a point of 
view that is never absent from the shepherd and is therefore in some way involved in all 
his (sic) feelings and actions.”23  Shepherding provides an overarching metaphor for three 
distinctive functions of the minister as shepherd of the flock of God: healing, sustaining, 
and guiding.  
 Preface to Pastoral Theology is a foundational text of pastoral theology.  In 
writing it, he provided a clear articulation of pastoral theology as a discipline worthy of 
time, attention, and funding in theological education.  He argued that pastoral theology 
was more than the pastoralia literature and how-to manuals, which had been assumed to 
be the limits of pastoral theological thought.  Lastly, Hiltner compared methods used in 
the past through case study of Presbyterian minister Ichabod Spencer’s records of 
                                                
22 Seward Hiltner, Preface to Pastoral Theology (New York: Abingdon, 1958), 15. 
 
23 Ibid., 18. 
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ministry to then-new trends of using the insights of psychology and psychiatry in pastoral 
care.  Within the discipline Hiltner is hailed as the founder of the field for his defining 
contributions.  Additionally, his shepherding perspective reiterated that ministers and 
those who reflected about ministry were ultimately concerned with the person and his or 
her well-being. 
 In 1964 theological historians William Clebsch and Charles Jaekle asked whether 
there was any historical continuity to pastoral care understood as helping acts.  By 
sampling historical records about acts of Christian pastoral care, they made three 
significant contributions to the field of pastoral theology.  First, they argued that there 
was indeed a contiguous lineage in the pastoral care traditions, offering exhibits of this 
pastoral care beginning with Clement of Alexandria’s second epistle (c. 150) and ending 
with excerpts from William James’ Gifford lectures, The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (1901-1902).  Second, they argued that pastoral care as helping acts differed 
according to the needs of the communities and persons seeking assistance from their 
religious leaders.  As such, pastoral caregivers responds with ingenuity to address the 
diverse needs of faith communities.  Third, they identified reconciling as a pastoral 
function intended to restore right relations between persons, God, and community.  They 
conclude that acts of pastoral care are always being renewed, reinvigorated, and retooled 
so as to best support the faithful.24       
 Howard Clinebell identified the function of nurturing as central to pastoral care in 
his 1966 Basic Types of Pastoral Care and Counseling.  A foremost leader in the pastoral 
counseling movement, he argued that “the aim of nurturing is to enable people to develop 
                                                
24 William A. Clebsch and Charles R. Jaeckle, Pastoral Care in Historical Perspective 
(New York: Harper, 1967), 1-2. 
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their God-given potentialities, throughout the life journey with all its valleys, peaks, and 
plateaus.”25   Pastoral counseling in particular provides this nurturing function by 
attending to the wholistic growth of persons through reality-centered therapy.  Nurturance 
occurs between client and counselor through empathy, rapport, and reflective empathic 
listening.26 
 The functions of empowering and liberating are first advocated by Carroll 
Watkins Ali in Survival and Liberation: Pastoral Theology in African American Context 
(1999) and then rearticulated by intercultural pastoral theologian Emmanuel Lartey.27  As 
pastoral practices, empowering and liberating link pastoral care and relational justice.  
Empowering finds “ways to give power to those disenfranchised, to enable persons to 
resist oppression on their own and to take authority over their own lives.”28  Liberating 
acts are both spiritual and political acts.  Ali writes, “Liberating acts of ministry would be 
those that work toward actually setting persons free from oppression.”29  At the heart of 
these functions, as well as those of healing, sustaining, guiding, reconciling, and 
nurturing, is aid to persons and their communities.  Thus, I conclude that the pastoral 
functions, while expressed as actions, are about subjects in pastoral theology.  
 
                                                
25 Howard Clinebell, Basic Types of Pastoral Care and Counseling (Nashville:  
Abingdon, 1984), 43. 
 
26 Ibid., 74-78. 
 
27 Lartey, In Living Color, 67-68. 
 
28 Carroll A. Watkins Ali, Survival and Liberation: Pastoral Theology in African 
American Context (St. Louis: Chalice, 1999), 139. 
 
29 Ibid., 140. 
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Human Experience 
Reflection on human experience is central to the discipline of pastoral theology.  
As the practices of pastoral care were infused with new knowledge from the field of 
psychology, the study of the living human document substantiated claims that pastoral 
theology was a vital field of study in theological education.  Bonnie Miller-McLemore 
observes, 
In a sense, pastoral theology is a modern study of religion par excellence, coming 
to fruition precisely as a result of new so-called objective, measurable, empirical 
means of knowing the ‘truths’ of human experience.  In other words, the field did 
not consolidate its academic position until after the social sciences, psychology in 
particular, had given new life to the study of the person, religious experience, 
pastoral care and ministry.30 
 
As a theological discipline, pastoral theology’s existence is founded on the need for 
complex understandings of the human person and the role of religion.    
Human experience is gathered from a variety of sources and points of contact, 
including the pastoral theologian or pastoral caregiver; the student, care recipient, 
parishioner, or counselee; and other individuals and groups of persons that pastoral 
theologians seek out in order to know more about the human condition, the role of 
theology, and care.  Two terms, the living human document and the living human web, 
bear our attention. 
The phrase ‘living human document’ was coined by theologian Anton Boisen to 
specify a new source of theological knowledge, but has a history that precedes and 
                                                
30 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, “The Subject and Practice of Pastoral Theology: Pushing 
Past the Nagging Identity Crisis to the Poetics of Resistance,” Liberating Faith Practices: 
Feminist Practical Theologies in Context, eds. Denise M. Ackermann and Riet Bons-
Storm (Leuven: Peeters, 1998),177. 
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follows its coining.31  Recall that in the hands of Seward Hiltner, the study of the living 
human document prompted the founding of the operation-centered discipline of pastoral 
theology in theological education, again demonstrating the centrality of the human 
subject to the discipline.  With pastoral theologian Charles V. Gerkin, the phrase is 
renewed and reinterpreted in light of modern pastoral theology’s turn to narrative and 
philosophical hermeneutics in The Living Human Document (1984).  Finally, Bonnie J. 
Miller-McLemore refashions and updates the phrase to ‘living human web’ to capture 
“the delicate interweaving of multiple personal, social, and political strands that comprise 
every problematic situation and caring act.”32                
In 1920 Boisen suffered a major psychotic episode and was hospitalized at 
Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.  After his 
recovery and release he turned to the study of living human document, specifically his 
own case, but also those of other patients.  He recorded his experiences as a mental 
patient in Out of the Depths and Exploration of the Inner World.  Boisen warrants our 
attention for three reasons.  First, he both theologizes and psychologizes his experience of 
mental illness, and critiques those who sought to help him for their lack of knowledge 
outside their area of expertise-both ministerial and psychological.  Second, drawing from 
and assessing his experience, Boisen developed a training program for theologians and 
                                                
31 Robert C. Dykstra, Images of Pastoral Care: Classic Readings (St. Louis: Chalice, 
2005), 229.  Dykstra notes that Boisen seems to have borrowed from William James his 
phrase ‘living human document’ without proper citiation, as well as a similar approach to 
the psychology of religion.  In The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human 
Nature, James uses the phrase “documents humains” and writes that they are not 
sequestered “in the haunts of special erudition,” but encountered “along the beaten 
highway” (3 in The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902, 1982 imprint).    
 
32 Ibid., 17. 
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ministers—the Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) movement—which continues today as 
a primary means of training for chaplaincy in a variety of institutional settings.  Lastly, 
the case study method he developed reflects his drive to understand human nature by the 
study of mental illness.  The case study for Boisen, then, is an in-depth study of the 
human document and their datum of religious phenomena for the sake of easing sickness 
and suffering in the whole of humanity.  
In Exploration of the Inner World, Boisen describes multiply the role that faith, 
religion, and theology played in the shape of his mental breakdown as well as the 
reestablishment of his mental hygiene.  In the midst of his breakdown, he describes how 
he saw the moon provide a counter-illumination of a cross.  He writes, 
I was therefore much impressed one night, as I lay awake out on the sleeping-
porch, by the observation that the moon was centered in a cross of light.  I took 
this as confirmation of my worst fears.  Did not the cross stand for suffering?  
What else could it mean than this, that the moon—which, as so often happens in 
acute disturbances, I had personified—is in mourning over the coming doom?  In 
order to be sure I called an attendant and inquired if he also saw the cross.  He 
said that he did.  I was greatly impressed and agitated.  But some days later in the 
early watches of the morning as I lay awake looking at the moon, speculating 
about the terrible danger which that cross betokened, I made a discovery.  
Whenever I looked at the moon from a certain spot the cross did not appear.  I 
immediately investigated and found a hole in the wire screening!  With this 
discovery the edifice I had reared upon the basis of the original premise began to 
fall.  And only a few days later I was well again.33  
 
In this short passage Boisen shows us how his pathogenic thinking proceeded.  He saw a 
cross backlit by the moon.  Informed by theologies of which he does not speak—perhaps 
end times or final days of judgment—he reasoned that the moon was preemptively 
mourning the end of days and the suffering that would come not only to Boisen but to all 
of humanity.  In his psychotic break Boisen read the signs of the times that were available 
                                                
33 Anton Boisen, Exploration of the Inner World (Chicago: Willet, Clark, and Co.), 1936, 
4. 
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to him.  Fixating on the knowledge revealed to him, he suddenly discovered a hole in the 
screen.  His eschatological cross was the wire of the screen and the terrible doom of 
judgment was a theo-psychological projection.  Boisen attributes this realization to his 
recovery.  However, it is not the case that all religious phenomena for the mental patient 
contribute to recovery.  He comments, “Voices and other hallucinations indicate a stirring 
of the deeper levels of the mental life, something which in itself may be helpful as well as 
destructive.”34 
According to Boisen, destructive religious imagery and dogma come from 
external sources of theology, as well as internalized sources.  Boisen offers a sharp 
critique of the local visiting ministers who did not adequately understand the complexity 
of mental health or the kind of care required for patients.  He writes,  
I soon discovered that the ministers from the neighboring village who conducted 
those services might know something about religion, but they certainly knew 
nothing about our problems.  They did no visiting on the wards….All they did 
was to conduct a formal service on Sunday afternoons, and for lack of anything 
better they usually gave us the same sermons they had given their own 
congregations in the morning.35   
 
More than casual neglect of the spiritual needs of the patient, Boisen finds that the 
ministers proffer detrimental spiritual advice.  He recalls how one preacher chose to 
explicate the gospel pericope, “If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out.”  Boisen writes of 
hoping that no patient take the preacher at his word.36   
 Both types of experiences informed Boisen as he developed a curriculum for his 
theology students.  Rather than merely observing the patients, Boisen sent four of his 
                                                
34 Ibid., 56. 
 
35 Ibid., 6. 
 
36 Ibid. 
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students to work as “ordinary attendants” in the wards.37  Their position as attendants 
would afford them the opportunity to develop a more intimate relationship.  “My own 
experience,” Boisen writes, “had convinced me that there is no one upon whom the 
patient’s welfare is more dependent than the nurse or attendant who is with him hour 
after hour during the day.”38  For this reason, the theology students were going to “first-
hand sources for their knowledge of human nature.”39  Boisen writes, “I wanted them to 
learn to read human documents as well as books, particularly those revealing documents 
which are opened up at the inner day of judgment.”40     
Boisen thought that mental illness was beyond a simplistic good or evil 
orientation.  In fact, mental illness is “the price we pay for being human.”41  There is no 
stigma attached to a diagnosis.  As part and parcel of the human condition, studying the 
living human document suffering from mental distress reveals information about the 
general human condition.  In a manual designed for his students working on the wards, he 
writes several objectives of the case study method including: “To discover the forces and 
formulate the laws of the spiritual life, revealed in the disturbed conditions, which apply 
to human nature in general.”42  The case study method he proscribed for his students was 
                                                
37 Ibid., 10. 
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lengthy, seeking to understand the totality of the person.43  But more than merely 
understanding the person, the use of case study was also meant to deeply inform the 
theology of his students.  Students were to ask theological questions of the patients 
without prejudgment.  Questions were both helpful in assessing theology as well as 
determining whether (Christian) practices of care might aid in a patient’s restoration of 
health.  For example, Boisen includes the following line of questioning: “What does 
prayer mean to you?  Has it given you any special comfort or help?  Have you received 
any special answers to your prayer?  For what kind of things should one pray?”  Asking 
questions of this nature was not to indict the person of apostasy.  Rather, they served as 
way of doing assessment where the fullness and the limits of the human experience, 
including spiritual and psychological dimensions, are integrated into determining best 
treatment.  Boisen’s image of the living human document and his appreciation of acute 
and general mental illness in relation to religion again situates pastoral theology as a 
discipline of the subject.  
One additional image that speaks to the importance of the subject is the living 
human web.   Proposed by Bonnie Miller-McLemore, the living human web speaks to the 
complex embeddedness of persons in culture as well as the relatedness and caughtness in 
which persons live.  As a result, contemporary pastoral care and reflection on that care 
can no longer dialogue solely with a psychology that accounts only for intrapsychic 
forces.  “These moments,” Miller-McLemore detects, “are always and necessarily 
situated within the interlocking, continually evolving threads of which reality is woven 
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and they can be understood in no other way.”44  She gives the example of public policy 
issues which impact the health of not only the individual, but the whole web of human 
relations.  She argues that these issues are as important to pastoral theology as 
intrapsychic, individual problems.45  The role of the individual in the living human web is 
not diminished but made more intricate, with both the delicacy and strength found in the 
person and their webs.   Thus, the overarching image of the living human web, and its 
predecessor the living human document, underscore the primacy of the person or the 
subject to the discipline. 
 
Feminist Pastoral Theologians on the Subject 
 
 Feminist pastoral theologians have not been silent on subjectivity.  Indeed, they 
have actively reflected on the formation of the feminist subject.  Some, like Joretta 
Marshall (1997) and Carroll Watkins Ali (1999), have offered implicit theories of 
subjectivity by attending to the complexity of identity, suffering, and injustices, while 
others, like Pamela Cooper-White, have articulated theological anthropological visions of 
the person (2007, 2011).  In this section, I offer a selective literature review of feminist 
pastoral theologians who have reflected on subjectivity, broadly conceived.  I see each 
author progressively refining understandings of subjectivity and barriers to flourishing, 
beginning with heterosexism (Marshall), racism (Ali), and sexism (Graham), moving to 
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social constructivism (Graham, McClure, and White), and extending to multiplicity in 
theological anthropology (White).  I conclude that they offer significant contributions to 
thinking about subjectivity, but have not attended to the dynamics of intersubjective and 
social recognition which are crucial theory and practice to care for subjects.  Without 
attention to these dynamics, care for the living human web is distanced from critical 
analysis about the formation of persons through identity and the machinery of oppressive 
systems that judge and condemn based on one’s identity and performance thereof.  
 
Subjectivity and Sexuality 
 Tending to diversity and difference is one route of reflection on subjectivity, and 
one that is widely-accepted in feminist pastoral theology.  As I noted in the previous 
chapter, literature that engages specific issues of diversity proliferates.  However, it is 
important to remember that this paradigm that encourages reflection on diversity was not 
always so.  Courage was (and continues to be) required in the face of internalized and 
socially constructed institutions, practices, and thought patterns of oppression, 
marginalization, and exclusion.  For this reason, the publication of Counseling Lesbian 
Partners by Joretta L. Marshall was (and remains) an important contribution to pastoral 
theological reflection on subjectivity and sexuality.46  
At the most fundamental level, Marshall argues that lesbian individuals are 
complex subjects who, first, are not deviants from a God-given heteronormative 
sexuality, and second, are deserving of supportive pastoral counseling because God 
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affirms human sexuality that is covenantal.  She writes, “[W]omen in lesbian covenantal 
partnerships reflect the church’s normative understanding of relatedness and are to be 
affirmed and blessed by God and the church.”47  Further, Marshall explains that God 
desires that the covenant between oneself and God-self be enriched through relationships 
of love, justice, and mutuality.48     
Marshall offers us a thick theological anthropology of human development and 
partnership; she does not shy away from human brokenness in individual development or 
in the context of relationships.  As such, I believe Marshall offers us a rich theology of 
subjectivity by issuing a vision of life together as women-loving-women, but not one 
which is idyllic or which might ever be free of the pains of patriarchy, sexism, or 
heterosexism.  Thus, Marshall holds in tension the call to support partnerships of love, 
justice, and mutuality as the telos of human sexuality, while describing how challenges to 
a woman’s understanding of herself as a lesbian arise from internal and external sources.   
First, Marshall argues that the claiming of a lesbian identity is a challenge, though 
one that leads to liberation, spiritual depth, and possibilities for deeper relationships of 
mutuality and care.  She draws on clinical psychologist Vivienne Cass to provide a six-
step developmental frame for identity emergence: identity confusion to identity 
comparison to identity tolerance to identity acceptance to identity pride to identity 
synthesis.  While Cass asserts that these stages are linear, Marshall disagrees, writing, “I 
would suggest that they be seen as fluid and dynamic interpretations women bring to their 
self-understandings at different points in their journeys.  Often a movement from one 
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perspective to another is met by resistance, fear, or lack of support, making it difficult to 
fully embrace what Cass describes as the qualities of a given stage.”49  “Fluctuation and 
shifts” and identities that “may be experienced as long-lasting but are not necessarily 
fixed and permanent” are part of the formation of a sexual orientation, and a key 
component of a lesbian’s sense of self.  Thus, part of Marshall’s theology of subjectivity 
includes a sexual and embodied self whose is in-process.  Marshall’s use of language of 
self-identifying, while also being identified by others, or “naming and being named,”50 
also implies the relational nature of her theological anthropology.  As well, it implies a 
sense of coming to know who one is and having that identity positively reflected by 
another individual.     
Second, Marshall presents specific challenges to covenantal lesbian partnerships 
in the form of addiction, lesbian battering, sexual abuse survival, and fusion in 
relationships.  She notes that these challenges are not unique, “but they can be the most 
common and overlooked struggles in these relationships.”51  While she focuses on the 
intrapersonal dynamics between the challenged partners, Marshall demonstrates how to 
carefully excavate and examine personal histories and social norms that weaken 
partnerships of love, justice, and mutuality.  Additionally, she shows us how to use all the 
data available to make wise assessments and do goal-setting.  For example, she gives the 
case of lesbian battering in the couple Jane and Phyllis.  They have engaged in verbal and 
physical combat with each other, with Jane as the perpetrator of domestic violence and 
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Phyllis as the victim.  Marshall’s description of the situation fits the typical understanding 
of domestic violence, with the important exception that it is woman to woman.  She 
writes, “The most common misconception in working with lesbian partnerships is that 
women do not hit other women and that battering is not present in the lesbian 
community….Physical violence between women does exist and reckoning with this 
reality is imperative so as not to minimize abuse when it does occur.”52  By making a 
claim like this, Marshall also shows us that her theological anthropology does not assume 
essentialist feminine qualities of caring and tenderness as constitutive of gender identity.  
Instead, a woman can be violent and aggressive, emotional states which may be due to 
internalized images of “women as victims or as unhealthy persons.”53     
Lastly, Marshall’s emphasis on assessment, goal-setting, and pro-active pastoral 
care reveals a theological anthropology where relational injustices are reflective of social 
injustices and thus must be encountered within oneself and within larger social structures.  
She presents the case of Sara who is an executive director of a new pastoral counseling 
center.  Sara and the board grapple with whether they ought to reach out to the new 
communities by placing an advertisement in the lesbian and gay newspaper in order to 
grow the center.  Further, they worry what the reaction from the denominations that 
support the center might be.  Marshall uses this case to state explicitly that the theological 
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call to build community necessitates inclusion of marginalized voices.54  To refuse to do 
so is to collude with silencing and to believe that the church has nothing to do with 
injustices that arise from lack of access to resources of care.  However, to break silence 
also requires that pastoral care specialists do inner work to identify their own 
homophobia.                        
 To sum up, by attending to lesbian partnerships in all their strengths and 
weaknesses, and as part of the divine gift of human sexuality, Marshall offers pastoral 
theologians and care specialists a rich theological anthropology that, though focused on 
lesbian identities, has a wider reach.  First, she reminds us that developing a sexual 
orientation is always a process, and one negotiated at an interpsychic and intrapsychic 
level.  Second, she shows that a woman-loving-woman can embody hyper-masculinized 
qualities of control, physical aggression, and rage.  Third, while sexism, homophobia, and 
patriarchy are forces that impinge on the psychic and spiritual health of individuals and 
couples, Marshall shows us that persons have the ability to resist and to create loving, 
just, and mutual relationships, sometimes calling upon assistance from pastoral care 
specialists to help in resistance to those oppressive forces. 
 Marshall’s work is pivotal to developing and sustaining a line of questioning that 
challenges heteronormativity in Christian religious traditions and practices.  Her work 
offers a pastoral apologetic for caring about women in homosexual relationships.  In light 
of the conservative streak of the U.S. religious landscape, which responded with a ‘love 
the sinner, hate the sin’ thematic approach throughout the 1980s (and even today in some 
traditions), or demonizing desire and naming the homosexual as patient in need of cure 
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from wrong desire (e.g. reparative therapy), Marshall puts into literary flesh a liberal 
pastoral theology that dialogues with emergent psychological scholarship on supporting 
lesbians while deploying Christian theological concepts to bolster her claims.  Yet, more 
is needed in thinking pastorally about how a subject is formed in relationship to her 
sexuality.  Taken from an approach that begins in gay and lesbian studies (as distinct 
from queer theory), Marshall’s analysis of coming out requires amplification.  We know, 
for example, that to call someone ‘gay’ or a ‘homo’ remains a derogatory term.  Although 
Marshall reminds us that coming out may be a liberative and challenging process “that 
upsets the status quo and moves the world off-center,”55 she neglects to fully take on the 
possibility of psychic and physical violence.  Nor does she consider what an 
intersectional analysis of lesbian sexuality and race might mean for pastoral care, 
particularly given the politics of sexuality in the black church.56  Lastly, Marshall’s text 
does not consider the implications of queer theory, though through no fault of 
scholarship, as the approach had yet to gain prominence in religious studies or pastoral 
theology at the time of publication of Counseling Lesbian Partners.  However, by 
engaging with queer theory in chapter four vis a vis Judith Butler, I hope to develop 
theoretical resources that take up the complicated relationship between sexual identity, 
recognition, and subjectivity.     
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Subjectivity and Racialized Injustices 
 Womanist pastoral theologian Carroll A. Watkins Ali brings complex questions of 
racial injustice to pastoral theology.  Like Marshall, she is working out a pastoral 
theology with implications for care.  Thus questions of subjectivity arise as she describes 
the limit situations that affect psychological and social health for African-Americans.  
When we consider her as a womanist pastoral theologian speaking on subjectivity, as 
well as a womanist offering a contextual pastoral theology, she offers a unique view that 
accounts for subject formation by multiple identity markers and a collective history that 
makes visible racially insensitive pastoral care and theology.  Further, she remains 
hopeful that pastoral interventions may restore a subject’s own sense of self. 
Ali writes out of her own cognitive dissonance as a student of pastoral theology 
and a black woman.  She asks how pastoral theology might build “a conceptual 
framework…in the African American context that is adequate to the struggle of many 
African Americans to stay alive and be free of the oppression of racial injustice.”57  With 
this in mind, she leads us into the depths of human experience through the accounts of 
Lemonine, Pauletta, and Doris.  She notes that these stories are to illuminate and speak to 
the collective whole about survival and liberation.  
Ali’s significant contribution to a pastoral theological anthropology is an account 
of the difficulties of surviving systematic racial injustice coupled with crippling social 
and psychological suffering.  She briefly highlights the legacy of cultural loss through the 
transatlantic slave trade, the blindness of history that overlooks black women’s 
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resistance, classism and racism vis a vis unequal pay and work opportunities, the 
systematic racism that supports hard-to-break cycles of crime and violence in 
impoverished black communities, the workings of the prison-industrial complex, and the 
familial stressors of alcohol and drug abuse that maintain “genocidal poverty.”58  The 
stories of Lemonine, Pauletta, and Doris tell us about the process of becoming a subject 
in the face of survival against genocidal poverty.  I recount Ali’s vignettes next. 
Lemonine was a black woman who passed as middle class, but struggled to 
support her two children and her one grandchild as a single mother.  She experienced 
racism at her workplace, worried about paying for medical care, worried that her car 
would be stolen by gang members or would need major repairs, worried about paying 
rent. Her multiple and intersecting jeopardies of class, race, and gender shaped her to 
strive toward being a strong matriarch for the family, striving which landed her in the 
hospital for debilitating exhaustion. “Truly,” Ali writes, “life was Lemonine’s presenting 
problem.  There are no other diagnoses in the traditional sense.”59 She “was basically 
suffering from being overcome by her own personal life, while trying to cope with all the 
external social realities that affected each age group of her family members.”60  She was 
the strong black woman who suffered by trying to hold together that which social 
structures of oppression would tear asunder. 
But Lemonine was also a saavy woman, and though she could not afford therapy 
she found in Ali someone who would work with her despite her inability to pay the full 
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fee. Meeting with her for three years, Ali primarily offered Lemonine supportive therapy: 
“Each weekly session during our relationship served mainly to build Lemonine up 
enough so that she could go back out to face a hostile world for another week.”61 But this 
was not enough to reverse the cumulative life trauma and its psychological toll on 
Lemonine. Ali reports that Lemonine became more and more hopeless: “I witnessed 
Lemonine lose hope and give up on life altogether.”62 Six months after therapy was 
mutually terminated, Lemonine died of a brain tumor. 
In her second biographical sketch Ali describes her caring efforts with Pauletta. 
Pauletta was a single black mother and poor. She came to Ali to mourn the death of her 
first-born teenage son, a victim of gang violence. He was shot for wearing “the wrong 
colored hat,” a wrong doing which had occurred seven years previous to Paula’s 
therapeutic encounter with Ali.63 Session after session Pauletta grieved the loss of her 
first-born, and “the dynamics of her own personal life in general.”64  Loss of support 
engulfed her: her younger son was joining the army and church folk from whom she drew 
strength in the midst of her crisis seven years ago were tired of hearing about the tragic 
loss of her son.   
Ali offered her supportive therapy and the space to grieve and cry out her anguish. 
“The purging went on session after session, but it was what she needed.  That was not 
what was needed to solve her problems, but there was an enormous amount of grieving 
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that Pauletta had to come to terms with before she could move on with her life.”65  
Afterall, “Life as a Black female had by no means been easy,” Ali writes.66  By grappling 
with feelings of loss, abandonment, and isolation, Pauletta made positive strides in her 
life. “Currently,” Ali concludes, “Pauletta is doing fairly well; she is involved in work 
that she enjoys as a community activist.”67  
 Lastly Ali shares Doris’ story with her readers.  Doris was a black woman who 
grew up in a home filled with physical and emotional abuse. Her mother justified the 
abuse with the following line of reasoning: “I would rather beat my own kids to make 
them act right, than for them to get beat out in the street by White police.”68  Doris 
internalized this fear of violent external patriarchal and sexist systems as self-hatred: she 
abused drugs and alcohol. Her health was poor, Ali reports.  Further, all the kinds of jobs 
that her education and training qualified her to do—minimum wage and physically taxing 
work—were not manageable given her poor health.  
 Doris also had two children who were both deaf.  Seeking public aid for her 
family, she came under the watchful eye of the social work system.  The “System,” as 
Doris called it, was an aggressor that fed off her fear with threats to prove her 
inadequacies as a mother, even though her skill as a translator between the children and 
the case workers, ironically, demonstrated her commitment to caring for them.  
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 Doris was referred to Ali when her court-ordered therapy group terminated. Ali 
makes the point that Doris was resistant to seeing anyone besides a black woman.  When 
donated funds ran out to pay her fee, Ali continued therapy with Doris: “The issues were 
too serious to drop.”69  She reports,  
In reality, Doris spent most of her time at home child-rearing, in the silence of 
two deaf children, trying to negotiate the “System” and struggling with poor 
health, while people (even church people) and family distanced themselves from 
her and her children. I could see that Doris, despite all that she had been through, 
was still trying to overcome the odds without any real support. Doris was virtually 
alone.70   
 
In these three vignettes Ali shows us how systematic injustices contribute to that 
material and psychological conditions of genocidal poverty, and further how they limit 
her subject’s ability to move with freedom in their social and psychological worlds.  
From these sketches, we can see that her implicit theory of subjectivity accounts for some 
agency of the subject, but this agentic power also meets with extreme resistance in 
multiple forms: from friends, family, and church who ought to care, but can no longer do 
so; from social systems that ought to help, but are unable to effectively do so; and from 
intrapsychic forces where unfulfilled desires for hope and belonging morph into despair, 
isolation, and grief. 
To Ali, the dire conditions of African-Americans are a critique of the pastoral 
shepherding model.  Furthermore, the realities of the African-American experience 
necessitate urgency and action on the part of pastoral caregivers.  Ali critiques Seward 
Hiltner’s shepherding perspective in three ways.  First, she argues that his shepherding 
model is paternalistic and overvalues the pastor’s perspectives.  Second, his 
                                                
69 Ibid., 133. 
 
70 Ibid. 
 69 
individualistic approach is representative of white European American cultural thought, 
presumably a male rationality, though she does not articulate this point.  Last, the pastoral 
operations he proposes—healing, sustaining, and guiding—are culturally insufficient for 
the current situations of African-Americans.  As I noted previously, Ali offers additions 
to the pastoral functions in nurturing, empowering, and liberating.71 She writes, 
In general, guidelines for the pastoral care of African Americans from a womanist 
perspective call for the expansion in character and content of the ministry 
described by Hiltner’s shepherding perspective.  In terms of the character of 
ministry, the womanist perspective offers two guidelines in addition to Hiltner’s 
call for an “attitude of tender and solicitious concern.”  The first order of 
business…is…urgency….Second, the attitude of pastoral care should also one of 
advocacy that is embodied in action.   
 
Ali’s expansion of the pastoral functions and her critique of Hiltner gives us insight into 
subjectivity through a practical theological lens.  She argues that the Black church must 
engage in the practices of ministry—preaching, pastoral counseling, Christian education, 
youth ministry, and community outreach—to give hope while in the midst of struggle.72  
Because Ali is not explicit, we must draw some conclusions on our own.  Namely, the 
tasks of Christian ministry in form and in content are practices of resistance to a 
dominant cultural formation that leads to nihilism and genocidal poverty for African-
Americans.  In this sense, Ali holds open a space for a changing self-perception of self 
and others in community, and is adamant that liberation cannot come at the expense of 
denial of one’s culture. 
 It is outside the scope of her book to explicitly describe a theology of the person 
and her formation, yet I believe that Ali has done so, attentive to subject formation 
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through the evils of racism, classism, and sexism, while maintaining hope that practices 
of pastoral ministry might intervene in that same subject formation.  However, her case 
studies as grounded theories of subjectivity are problematic.  As I recounted above, 
Lemonine, Pauletta, and Doris are representative figures of the suffering that black 
women undergo, but Ali does not consider whether her descriptions potentially reinscribe 
harmful stereotypes of black women.73  Nor does she examine how cultural stereotypes 
are upheld by religious ideology and practices nor how controlling images are reproduced 
from generation to generation.  As a result, her grounded theory of subjectivity inspects 
suffering at the intersection of race, gender, and class without sufficient attention to the 
historical machinations of oppression and domination and their impression upon subjects.  
What might it mean to read the story of Lemonine, the female head of household who 
died from exhaustion, through an analytic lens that accounts for the harms of the 
matriarch image and tries to trace these harms concretely as they become visible in 
Lemonine’s family life and her interpretation of faith claims?   
 The matriarch is the strong black woman given to bouts of anger and, who 
through her unchecked aggression, drives away men.  Her unfeminine personality 
emasculates her male lovers and husbands.  Her children are without fathers because she 
will not conform to the appropriate and ideal gender behavior.  Thus, she must become 
the bread winner, as well.  Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins writes, “In this context, the 
image of the Black matriarch serves as a powerful symbol for both Black and White 
women of what can go wrong if White patriarchal power is challenged.  Aggressive, 
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assertive women are penalized—they are abandoned by their men, end up impoverished, 
and are stigmatized as being unfeminine.”74   
 Womanist pastoral theologian Teresa Snorton identifies two relational locations 
where the matriarch stereotype thrives and describes the harm it causes. First, the 
controlling image is reproduced intergenerationally.  Mothers covertly teach their 
daughters the skills of survival, namely strength and independence, so that they too are 
able to care leaders for their own households.75  Snorton explains, “Often the lessons are 
so covert that one might miss them, except for their telling impact on how one is 
expected to respond to life’s difficulties.”76  Second, an insidious incarnation resides in 
the pastoral exultation of that image.  In the wake of deep suffering, the matriarch is a 
woman of strong faith, one who cries out to God for healing and prays for the Holy Spirit 
to revive her soul.  Snorton writes, “She has many problems; however, traditions of faith 
and culture have taught her that her only recourse in this life is to look Godward.”77  In 
the middle of crisis, she testifies to the saving power of God while others look to her for 
words of comfort. 
 Ali’s case studies, and her argument in general, would be strengthened by 
attending to these cultural histories.  Her accounts of material poverty and the 
psychological state of her clients are descriptive, but not analytical, and as such, fail to 
adequately challenge oppressive systems, including pastoral systems, that cultivate 
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nihilism and genocidal poverty in black women’s lives, or to define what kind of agency 
is available to her clients.  As a result, her account of racial subjectivity is distorted and 
borders on misrecognition of black women as potentially helpless subjects.    
          
Subjectivity and the Post/Human 
Elaine Graham, Samuel Ferguson Professor of Social and Pastoral Theology at 
the University of Manchester, explores the post/human condition in the monograph 
Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens, and Others in Popular Culture 
(2002).  The term post/human connotes a trajectory of thought resulting from a 
genealogical method in which she examines the discourse of Western technoscience and 
popular culture for representations of human identity.  She writes about a large range of 
scientific and cultural material and thinkers, from the Human Genome Project and Star 
Trek to Donna Haraway and Luce Irigaray, working each thoroughly to show the face of 
humanity that is refracted through the mirror of narrative.  She explains, 
In analyzing the representations of selected post/human figures—liminal 
characters, inhabiting the boundary between the human and the almost-human—I 
have resisted essentialist models of ‘human nature’, preferring instead to 
emphasize the way in which definitive versions of what it means to be human 
emerge from encounters with the refracted ‘Other’ in the form of the monster, the 
android, the Doppelgänger, or the alien.78   
 
Using a genealogical approach, Graham shows us that current preoccupations with what 
becomes of the human subject in light of multiplying cybernetic, biomedical, and digital 
technologies is a question that is part of the mythos of the “purity and fixity”79 of human 
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nature, or what Graham terms “ontological hygiene.”80  The result of her study is a 
deconstructive theory of the person that builds on “representation, monstrosity and 
alterity, contingency of human identity, and the resurgence of the sacred.”81 
 It is important to situate her most current study within the trajectory of thought 
exemplified by her previous scholarship on gender and practice in postmodernity.  In 
Making the Difference: Gender, Personhood, and Theology (1996), Graham embarks on 
a multi-disciplinary study of gender to develop a theology of gender.  She engages 
anthropology, biology and psychoanalysis to teach her reader about normative theories of 
gender.  Once she has accomplished this task, she interrogates theories of gender through 
detailed accounts of how bodies are disciplined to social norms, not exemplars of a free 
form anthropology of gender; how what is ‘natural’ is challenged in the bodies of intersex 
or transsexual persons and thus reveals the social construction of the ‘natural’; and how 
essentialist understandings of gender expel difference in order to stabilize themselves.  
Her contribution in this book is not only a thorough account of gender theory and its 
debates, but also a movement toward a theology of gender that “must engage with the 
pluralism and complexity of interdisciplinary theories of gender at a profound level.”82  
Further, her scholarship locates her reflections squarely within pastoral theological 
reflection on subjectivity. 
 In her book Transforming Practice: Pastoral Theology in an Age of Uncertainty 
(1996), Graham develops an account of pastoral theology as a “critical theology of 
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Christian practice” that addresses the postmodern challenges to identity, power, and 
knowledge.83  She argues that understanding pastoral theology as “critical 
phenomenology of pastoral practice” lays the groundwork for a postmodern pastoral 
theology.84  In this form of pastoral theology, the grand narratives and ‘eternal’ moral 
norms of faith communities that shape practice are not absolutized and ahistoricized, but 
evaluated and investigated in light of “the complexity of human experience and their 
viability as public and communitarian forms of practical wisdom.”85  She grounds her 
conclusion by way of observation of transformative feminist praxis that issue from the 
sources and norms of women’s experience, faith traditions, and the community of faith: 
feminist preaching, feminist spiritual direction, and liturgy as women-church.  Again, her 
contribution in this demanding text is a depiction of the implications of postmodernity for 
ecclesial communities.  In light of her future work in post/humanity, Transforming 
Practice is a critical study that attends to how ecclesial practices might be understood as 
sites for engaging difference and alterity.                
 In Representations of the Post/Humans, Graham extends her scholastic reflections 
on personhood, alterity, and the postmodern turn by engaging cultural studies as a locus 
of theological reflection. Her concerns are framed better as a reflection on subjectivity 
when we ask her text what we ought to be wary of when constructing a theory of 
subjectivity.  She answers that we should be aware of the same four-fold factors listed 
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above in constructing theories of the person: representation, monstrosity and alterity, 
contingency, and resurgence of the sacred.   
 First, we ought to be wary of representation as a stand-in which displaces the 
original with a simulacrum.  Graham gives the example of the human genome project 
which becomes the ‘code of codes’—that which distills the wild diversity of humanity by 
discovering the exact sequencing of four proteins: cytosine, guanine, adenine, and 
thymine.  Decoding of the human person problematically effaces the actual person, but at 
the same time leads to questions of power and authority.  If the code is only partially 
representative of human diversity, as scientists are increasingly coming to believe, then 
who has the power to speak for whom?  Further, “representations that are ideological or 
reductionist—humans as genes, machines, nature as feminized other—serve to enshrine 
and reify certain assumptions about normative and exemplary humanity, but at the 
expense of excluding others from the discourse altogether.”86  At stake in representation 
is the question of who has the authority to determine what and who is legitimately 
human, and the potential to repress or oppress that which is deemed alien or monster. 
 Second, we ought to be aware of the ways in which human creature-liness is 
reconstructed as alien or monster.  Graham examines monstrosity, or teratology, as a 
discursive site on boundaries and identity.  Examining Star Trek as cultural artifact, 
Graham shows that the fear and anxiety over technology’s encroachment on the male 
rational subject works against an ethos of equity, diversity, and tolerance.  For example, 
in Star Trek: The Next Generation the android Lieutenant-Commander Data desires to act 
as and be understood through human subjectivity.  In one episode his legal status as a free 
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subject with rights is called into question when Commander Bruce Maddox wishes to 
experiment on him.  He wins the trial and his capacity for self-determination by 
articulating the fact that his life is at stake.87  In other episodes, Data longs for human 
emotion, but fails to ‘get it’ quite right, failing at poetry, stand-up comedy, and romantic 
relationships.88  At the prospect of being dismantled, Data worries whether his digitized 
memories will contain the ‘essence’ of the memory.89  Thus, true humanity is marked out 
by what Data struggles to secure for himself, namely, liberty, emotive capabilities, and 
subjective experiences.  Graham concludes that though Star Trek gives the appearance of 
attention to post/human difference, it defines authentic humanity as freedom and 
individuality by misrepresenting Data as an observer of human culture, always at the 
margins of full participation.  As an ethos for constructing subjectivity, Graham observes, 
“This should encourage interpreters of representations of the post/human to be mindful of 
the invisibility or objectification—the misrepresentation—of those whose existence 
guarantees coherent categories, but whose non-participation or exclusion underpins the 
prosperity and security of others.”90  Following Derrida’s observation that every seed of 
knowledge contains its own possible destruction, her analysis shows that attempts to 
describe an ontologically pure human nature subvert their own stable and fixed discourse 
by evoking alterity. 
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 Third, we ought to consider an ethic of relationships in a theory of subjectivity.  
In particular, Graham argues that attending to “the digital, cybernetic and 
biotechnological” is cause to reflect on the porous peripheries between human and non-
human.  She uses the example of Donna Haraway’s cyborg to show the contingency and 
hybridity of human nature—or rather, the fact that human nature cannot be said to exist 
as it cannot be isolated from technology.  With this in mind, a post/human ethic 
advocates attention to difference without dominion.  Graham writes, “Ethically and 
experientially, the cyborg is a heuristic figure that suggests the rejection of solutions of 
either denial or mastery in favour of a post/human ethic grounded in complicity with, not 
mastery over, non-human nature, animals, and machines.”91  Furthermore, the hybridity 
of human and technology leads to a coevolution that is thoroughly material.  
 Lastly, when theorizing or analyzing subjectivity, we ought to reflect on deep 
motivations, especially fears and hopes.  Graham does this well, observing that   
representations of the post/human contain a Gnosticism in their discourses of 
transcendence, where the body and incorporality are denigrated and technology draws us 
toward the transcendent and spiritual.  However, the idealism and dualism of the 
transcendence is “not so much about love of life, as paradoxically, a pathological fear of 
death, vulnerability, and finitude.”92  It is not the technophobic who is afraid of death, 
Graham argues, but the technophilic.  From these insights, Graham concludes that the 
ideology of transcendence diminishes the sacramental nature of transcendence as 
embodied in person and technology.  She observes, “This would acknowledge the 
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fabricated, technologized world of human labour and artifice as equally capable of 
revealing the sacred as is the innocence of ‘nature.’”93 
 Graham offers astute analysis of culture and the idea of the person.  As reviewers 
noted, this book “reads like a ‘pre-quel’” to a theology of transcendence in light of the 
post/human 94 or “an extended anthropological prolegomenon to a contemporary 
theology.”95  As a theory of subjectivity, she refrains from normative and teleological 
statements.  Instead she unravels what informs our imagination to advocate for an 
enlargened ethic that refrains from turning the Other into a monster or alien.  Her unique 
contribution is a turn to cultural studies and her analysis of the theological in everyday 
discourse.  She does not write an explicit theological anthropology informed by feminist 
pastoral-practical theology,96 but, as I’ve shown, she does share rich insights that show 
how Others are made in discourse.  Yet, we are left to describe on our own any 
implications for everyday practice related to church, care, or pastoral ministry.               
 
 
 
                                                
93 Ibid., 233. 
 
94 Peter Scott, review of Representations of the Post/Human: Aliens and Others in  
Popular Culture, by Elaine L. Graham. Theology and Sexuality 10 (March 2004) : 114. 
 
95 Clive Marsh, review of Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens, and 
Others in Popular Culture, by Elaine L. Graham. Political Theology 5 (Jan 2004) : 124.  
96 I say pastoral-practical here because of Graham’s context as a theologian in the United 
Kingdom.  In the U.K. ‘pastoral’ has tended to have a more expansive definition than in 
the U.S. Protestant contexts where ‘pastoral’ often refers to the narrowed activities and 
research around care and counseling, while practical is the broader framework.  See 
helpful definition entries on pastoral and practical theology in Dictionary of Pastoral 
Care and Counseling (1990).    
 79 
Subjectivity and the Social Self 
 Pastoral theologian Barbara J. McClure offers a theory of the social self, an 
individual who is the embodiment of social systems, contra “an asocial, ahistorical, 
‘authentic’ self” who informs the practice and theories of pastoral theology, care, and 
counseling, in Moving Beyond Individualism in Pastoral Care and Counseling.97  She 
argues that the individualistic paradigm is pervasively institutionalized in pastoral 
theology and its practices of care and counseling, explaining, “A liberal Protestant notion 
of selfhood—which provides the background for most of my training and prevails in 
most pastoral theology and practice—includes a generally optimistic focus on the 
individual’s personal responsibility and ability to change, but does not account as well for 
the social and institutional realities that shape our experiences and our selves.”98  She 
argues that it is not enough for pastoral theology “to rail against” individualism or to 
“treat the negative effects.”99  Instead, pastoral theology must examine its “overly narrow 
conceptions of selfhood.”100 
McClure finds that a strong social construction theory accounts for the ways in 
which individuals are reflections of dominant systems, as well as how individuals are 
agents in these conditions.  For McClure, a self encompasses all dimensions of the 
person—“thinking, feeling, acting, relating, giving, receiving, with conscious and 
unconscious elements, hidden and performative qualities, sinful, graced, alone and 
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related, consistent and surprising.”101  The self is embodied, emotive, spiritual, and 
rational, and also much more, because the self is always embedded, reflective of, and in 
relationship with the social, and thus also power.   
In this line of social theorizing, it is tempting to assume that a self dissipates 
under the oppressive tide of dominant systems, and thus becomes a deterministic 
theological anthropology.  On the contrary, McClure asserts that a strong social theory 
shows how potent a synergistic view is in shaping a self’s agency.  She writes,  
When we fail to recognize the fact that we are ontologically synergistic selves 
who come into being in the dynamic interplay between our physical selves, our 
interpersonal relationships, and the sociocultural contexts in which we are all 
embedded, we fail to understand the importance of reflexive agency in the face of 
conditions that make for distressed, fragmented or depressed selves.  The origin of 
our agency is in the interstices of social contexts that have constructed us, the 
contexts and experiences that have come together in unique ways, creating 
perspectives and forms of agency that are new.102   
 
New perspectives and new forms of agency arise due to the thoroughly unique creation of 
that who is one’s self.  Each relationship with person, institution, and system and one’s 
overall life experience contributes to the creation of a unique individual.  Further, this is 
an ongoing, never-complete process. 
 Drawing from process and liberation theology, McClure develops a theology with 
strong normative visions for interpersonal relations between God, self, and others. 
Synergistic theology parallels the synergistic person.  That is, God, like the self, is ever 
changing and responding to the actions of persons in the world; what does not change is 
the principle that God is love.103  She explains, “God is immanent, related, and is 
                                                
101 Ibid., 181. 
 
102 Ibid., 201. 
 
 81 
constantly and in every moment doing everything within divine power to prevent and 
repair needless and destructive suffering.  But God cannot act without the will, 
responsiveness, and creative engagement of persons who can participate in easing or even 
preventing suffering.”104 
 The ramifications of a synergistic self, God, and society offer new opportunities 
to the field of pastoral theology, care, and counseling.  A synergetic reality means that 
suffering is not an individual occurrence, but one connected to sociopolitical realities.  
Further, a synergetic reality presses upon our human agency and urges us to participate in 
the salvific work of changing oppressive institutions that uphold the status quo.  This is 
the cultivation of the “kin-dom of God,”105 and the work that must be done for the telos 
of human flourishing.   
Following this theoretically rich material, McClure outlines theological, 
theoretical, practical, and organizational proposals for the field.  She urges pastoral 
theologians to describe and effect the kin-dom of God, paying attention to who is able to 
access the institutions that support pastoral care and counseling, and to reclaim the 
capacity to name sin in order to make social critiques that lead to changes for better 
health.  Theoretically, she urges pastoral theologians to move beyond individualism and 
develop “more socially adequate theological anthropologies.”106  Consequently, that 
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which falls under the purview of ‘pastoral’ will continue to broaden into the public and 
social spheres.   
What does this mean for the practice of pastoral care and counseling?  First, 
pastoral caregivers and counselors must prioritize active engagement and participation 
rather than insight and withdrawal.107  Second, the pastoral caregiver’s physical office is 
a liminal space in which client and therapist must not only gain insight, but regain a sense 
of agency to change that which denigrates holistic flourishing.  Third, pastoral caregivers 
must delineate the difference between the ideology of individualism and caring for an 
individual.  Fourthly, McClure writes that training will require an expansion of 
perspectives beyond ego psychology and one-on-one, long-term counseling.  These 
implications will require organizational shifts, such as moving beyond the fee-for-service 
model and developing business models that build upon relationships between parishes 
and counselors. 
McClure makes theoretically dense material both accessible and practical.  This is 
a feat to be lauded.  Her expansive social notion of the self gives pastoral theology the 
handholds it needs to scale the peaks of social suffering.  Further, her concern for on-the-
ground practice, the health of institutions, and her encouragement to other pastoral 
theologians and practitioners to develop more socially adequate theories of the self fund 
my own project.   
However, McClure does not narrowly attend to the processes of intersubjective or 
social recognition in her account of the social self who suffers.  Without attending to 
these dynamics in her project, McClure does not account for how domination may disable 
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a subject’s ability to seek recognition as a step toward flourishing.  Further, the type of 
agency she develops through a social construction of self sounds more akin to a definition 
of agency offered by anthropologist Saba Mahmood as “capacity for action that 
historically specific relations of subordination enable and create” rather than “resistance 
to relations of domination.”108  As Mahmood shows in her description of the mosque 
movement, Egyptian Muslim women cultivate modesty or shyness as an expression of 
piety through embodied practices, such as wearing the hijab.  While she argues these 
agentic practices shape “memory, desire, and intellect,” her interpretation (and the 
women of the mosque movement) is critiqued as participation in patriarchal systems of 
oppression rather than liberative feminist practices.109  In a project like McClure’s, which 
aims for liberative actions to enable a broadly defined concept of human flourishing, a 
consideration of the processes of recognition would enable further discussion and critique 
of practices and institutions that reinforce harm.          
 
Subjectivity and Multiplicity 
 Anglican priest, counselor, and feminist pastoral theologian Pamela Cooper-
White provides an elegant theological description of the human person as multiple in her 
many essays and books.  She is most explicit about her relational theological 
anthropology in Many Voices: Pastoral Psychotherapy in Relational and Theological 
Perspective (2007), though she wrestles complexly with questions of subjectivity, 
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multiplicity, and the ethical dimensions of subject formation in a gathered collection of 
essays published under the title Braided Selves: Collected Essays on Multiplicity, God, 
and Persons (2011).  In Many Voices she unfolds her nine characteristics of the human 
being that can be summed up in one sentence: “human beings are good, yet vulnerable; 
embodied; both alike and unique; intrinsically relational; multiple; mutable; loved, and 
therefore loving beings.”110  In articulating her description, I show that Cooper-White 
provides the most systematic account of subjectivity as theological anthropology.  Her 
feminist pastoral lens enables her to hold together paradoxes of the human condition.  
However, her description remains insufficient in articulating how the depths of 
intersubjective and social suffering impede recognition as a tool for self-determination, or 
the role that identity recognition, misrecognition, or non-recognition plays in subject 
formation.        
 A strong theology of God’s presence acting in the world informs her first 
articulation that human beings are good and also vulnerable.  A fundamental principle of 
Christian theology is the belief that God has acted and continues to act in the world—
through creation, redemption in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, and in the 
movement of the Holy Spirit.  She concludes that there is goodness is all of creation 
because the triune God renews the face of the earth.  Despite some Christian approaches 
to human sin that focus on total human depravity, she argues, “No matter how muddied 
and dim that spark of goodness may seem to the outside observer, however buried under 
layers of suffering, fear, and negative, even evil, behavior, this primordial goodness is the 
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original inheritance of all created beings from the beginning of time.”111  A seed of 
goodness lies in the depth of all creation.  
 Second, Cooper-White states that human beings are embodied.  She traces the 
Platonic separation of the body from the soul, and its use in early Christianity through the 
Reformation and Enlightenment, but then notes that the scriptures are “less dualistic.”112 
She cites the linguistic unity for the words in the Hebrew Scriptures for body, soul, 
feeling, desire, and life, as well as Paul’s emphasis on the body and soul as different 
orientations to the same whole person in the Christian Scriptures.  With feminist and 
womanist theologians, she affirms the body as a location for knowledge of self and God. 
 Third, Cooper-White writes that human beings are both alike and unique.  
Drawing on the observation cited by pastoral theologian Emmanuel Lartey that every 
person is “like all others, like some others, and like no others,”113 Cooper-White draws 
out conclusions that relate directly to subjectivity questions of identity, Otherness, justice, 
and recognition.  Drawing on contemporary thinkers like Lévinas, Buber, Bhabha, and 
Spivak, Cooper-White theorizes the Other.  Each person is irreducible; therefore an 
otherness always exists in our knowledge of other persons.  She explains, “This emphasis 
in postmodernism and postcolonialism on restoring the speech and subjective stance of 
the ‘other’ has lifted up previously unheard and unseen individuals, and created a strong 
case for respect for the uniqueness of each human person and subgroup within larger 
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society.”114  Yet, each other’s demands for recognition raises challenges to our 
preconceived ideas of justice.  Who are our neighbors?  How are we to engage each other 
as our neighbors, especially when we may have competing demands?  
 Though every human may be like no other, we are also like some others.  Cooper-
White affirms that group identities are positive for human being: “Bonds of group and 
culture can create powerful communities and societies, knit together by ready empathy 
based on shared values and perceptions, and affection based largely on mutual 
identification.”115  However, she also warns that these bonds may also be negative, 
xenophobic, or exclusionary.  Asserting a dialectical relationship between persons and 
culture, she emphasizes that new variations of culture and of persons in that culture arise 
as people go about the practices of their everyday life.  Navigating the tension, then, that 
we are like some others without falling into unknowable uniqueness of the individual, or 
claiming a removal of difference, is a significant ethical challenge.116   
 To be like all others is to affirm a shared sense of humanity that bolsters empathy 
and relationship amongst persons.  However, Cooper-White also shows that an 
unconscious desire to deny difference and overemphasize sameness may be a 
developmental challenge where a person must cope with her internal differences.  
Drawing on cross-cultural research, she concludes that we are all alike in some aspects 
especially human affect and human needs, both of which are primary basis for assertion 
that all human beings are intrinsically relational. 
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 We are relational by the fact that we live in communities, that we depend upon 
each other and creation for existence.  “Humans live in contexts, which include both the 
natural environment and human-generated cultures,” she writes.117  Additionally the 
intrinsic relationality of the human person is God-given.  She states “God uniquely 
created and bestowed human beings with the capacity for this relation, however obscured 
it may be by the brokenness of creation and the consuming preoccupations of daily 
human existence.”118  We long for deep connection with each other and with God. 
 So far, I have explained four features of Cooper-White’s theological 
anthropology: that human beings are good and vulnerable; that human beings are 
embodied; that human beings are alike and unique; and that human beings are 
intrinsically relational.  Cooper-White articulates four additional features: that human 
beings are multiple; that human beings are mutable, fluid, and in process; that human 
beings are loved; and that human beings are loving.  I will flesh out the first two 
remaining features and briefly summarize the last two. 
 Weaving together relational psychology and postmodern French philosophy, 
Cooper-White deftly expands the idea of the person beyond a unitary self to a self of 
multiplicity.  Additionally, she is attentive to the psychology that dialogues with pastoral 
theology, invoking Freud’s hydraulic model of the unconscious, preconscious, and 
conscious, and repression and drive theory, followed by object relations theory, to show a 
trajectory toward an expansive self.  What is uniquely Cooper-White’s is her use of 
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French philosophers’ Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s image of the rhizome to speak 
about the “multiply-constituted mind.”119   
 In biological terms, rhizomes are root systems that spread out, moving 
horizontally, rather rooting down vertically.  Any person who has ever weeded to rid a 
landscape of bermuda grass understands the lessons of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s 
rhizomatic approach and their influence on Cooper-White’s understanding of the mind as 
multiple: that a rhizome is connected at any point to anything; that it is heterogeneous, 
spreading out along networks that are not always visible or conscious; that the mind is 
spatially multiple, connected by lines, not points or nodes; that like an uprooted and 
ruptured rhizome, it can be torn from the ground, but will begin again, either starting 
from an old line or beginning a new one; that one’s history must be mapped and 
remapped, not told in a genealogical fashion, particularly in light of getting at ‘the roots’ 
of a pathology or neurosis; and lastly, that like the rhizome, there is no deep, 
predetermined structure, but instead “a form of mutable, open, experimental 
exploration.”120   
Cooper-White does not abandon psychoanalysis nor relational psychology and its 
emphasis on linking neuroses to events, behaviors, and feelings rooted in early childhood. 
Instead, she holds the psychoanalytic traditions in tension with the rhizomatic model.  
She explains,  
The rhizome presents an alternative model to the classical psychoanalytic 
assertion that all thought, all behavior, proceeds genetically and to some extent 
deterministically from a deeper root cause in the past.  With Delueze and 
Guattari’s rhizome image held in tension with the image of roots, the 
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psychoanalytic importance of tracing associations is retained, but now we can see 
the possibility for a different kind of associational chain of events—horizontal, at 
times more randomly selected, and linked by present conditions as well as past.121 
 
The result is a ‘both-and’ approach that imagines the mind, and also subjectivity, as both 
tree and rhizome.  She elaborates, 
Imagine mind and self in terms of a three-dimensional multiplicity (or more)—
neither vertical “depth” nor purely horizontal “plane,” but an infinitely 
dimensional, quantum substance, with internal indeterminancy and some fluid 
external parameters.  Imagine a subjectivity, a multiple self, identifiable as both 
an “I” and a “Thou” simultaneously, and with a mobile consciousness that scans 
and networks various parts of the “self,” in an illusory but functional sense of 
self-cohesion, self-regulation, and self-continuity.122   
 
In this understanding, there is no unitary self, no core self, except the one that comes to 
be through desire.  Cooper-White points out how this understanding of the self as 
subject—a being of “contingency and relatedness”123—might be frightening, but is an 
opportunity to live creatively, exploring subjectivity, ‘Self,’ and ‘Others.’  Thus, Cooper-
White argues that “human beings are mutable, fluid, and in process.”124      
 As mutable, fluid, and in process subjects, heretofore unexplored dimensions of 
ethical and creative living beckon from the emancipation of living as a rational One.  
Rules, procedures, and individual rights are not the exclusive terrain for determining 
ethical behavior and just action.  Instead, ethical and creative living is more like dancing, 
where each subject has space to move with funk, grace, beat, and sometimes mixing 
multiple elements in a new dance of freedom.  It is bodily inhabitation with room “for 
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those nonverbal mental contents that are only symbolic, or even presymbolic.”125  Yet, 
Cooper-White emphasizes that this new ethical and creative living comes with an 
expansion of conscience for oneself and for others, even as each continually grows, 
expands, and changes. 
 Finally, Cooper-White shows us that human beings are loved and loving beings.  
We are “profoundly known and loved by God,”126 with our mutability, fluctuations, 
impermanence, and delicacy.  Thus, human beings are also loving beings because the 
abundance of love for all creation spills across time and space.  We are called to love 
each other—an ethic that calls us to “do justice, to love kindness, and to walk humbly 
with our God.”127   
 To conclude, Cooper-White’s eight-fold theological articulation of the human 
person introduces a complexity to the subject that resonates with the complexity of 
modern experience.  She brings the shifting terrains and their viewpoints to pastoral 
theological anthropology with cogency and clarity while retaining a voice that affirms 
humans as imago Dei and challenges the fixity of this image, as well.  In her later 
collection of essays, Braided Selves, Cooper-White explores multiplicity and difference 
in more depth.  However, reflection on how to practice what a pastoral theological 
anthropology of multiplicity demands—in subject formation and in ethical action—
deserves more attention from the whole discipline.  For example, what events impede the 
formation of a multiple self?  What happens when a subject is unable to scan and network 
                                                
125 Ibid., 63. 
 
126 Ibid., 64. 
 
127 Micah 6:8, (NRSV). 
 91 
various parts of the self to establish an illusory cohesion and continuity due to everyday 
injustices and oppressions?  Taking account of psychological and social theories of 
recognition enables pastoral theologians to be on the look-out to develop critical accounts 
of persons whose voices are marginalized or disabled through misrecognition and non-
recognition.                   
        
Conclusion 
 
So far, I argued two points.  First, that answering the question ‘what is a person?’ 
and subsequent questions that arise, like ‘what is suffering?’ and ‘how does a person 
come to be?’ are questions that the field has taken up both explicitly and implicitly.  We 
give answers to these questions when we define the nature, scope, and activities of the 
field.  Second, I argued that feminist pastoral theologians have been about the work of 
reflecting on the state of subjectivity, again both implicitly and explicitly, by attending to 
the psychological and material effects of racism, classism, sexism, and heterosexism 
(Watkins Ali and Marshall), the representation of post/humans that is a refraction of what 
culture understands about the human condition (Graham), the social construction of the 
self (McClure), and theological anthropology for pastoral psychotherapy (Cooper-White).  
Thus, I am claiming that feminist pastoral theological reflections on subjectivity are on-
going, and further, that my work is in broad dialogue with theologians who reflect on 
subjectivity, formation of the self, and theological anthropology.   
Feminist pastoral theologians Watkins Ali, Marshall, Graham, McClure and 
Cooper-White each offer a slice of the vision of the subject and her formation in light of 
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theology, individual and relational psychology, and the sociopolitical and cultural 
difference.  Common to all these views is concern for those who are marginalized, 
oppressed, or made other.  I share these concerns, and as I reflected in chapter one, I 
believe that theories of recognition contain insight for feminist pastoral theological 
constructions of subjectivity.  Feminist pastoral theology has yet to grapple sufficiently 
with the complexity of psychological and social recognition.  Nor has it understood or 
even begun to adequately explore the role of religious communities and practices in the 
formation of a subject whose being and becoming is affirmed and recognized in light of 
oppressive social structures.   
Along with Barbara J. McClure, I argue that a theory of psychological formation 
of the subject cannot be divorced from a social formation.  To contribute to the 
discussions on subject formation from a psychological and social perspective, I dialogue 
with theories of recognition, concentrating on the feminist psychoanalyst Jessica 
Benjamin and feminist philosopher Judith Butler while also drawing on additional 
theorists and resources in the next two chapters.  I argue that attending to the problem 
(and the solution) of recognition is necessary as we feminist pastoral theologians continue 
to explore how individuals and groups of persons become othered, how otherness is 
internalized, and also how resistance to oppressive systems of domination is to be 
cultivated for agency and transformation of self and society. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
INTERSUBJECTIVE FORMATIONS AND EVERYDAY INJUSTICE: 
CIRCUITS OF RECOGNITION AND ASSERTION/ 
CIRCUITS OF SUBMISSION AND DOMINATION 
 
 
 
“A theory or a politics that cannot cope with contradiction, that denies the irrational, 
that tries to sanitize the erotic, fantastic components of human life cannot visualize an 
authentic end to domination but only vacate the field.”1 
 
 
 
It is almost a truism to say that suffering exists, and further that the type, cause, 
and duration of suffering affects who a person becomes.  Defining the nature of suffering 
becomes important in determining how to focus resources for personal, ecclesial, and 
social-political care, domains with which pastoral theology as a public enterprise 
interfaces.  To try to define the nature of suffering is also to try to answer who suffers the 
most and thus deserves limited care resources.   
However, to try to answer this question misses a central point.  In addition to 
defining the nature of suffering and whose suffering calls for our attention, we must also 
examine the psychological conditions that make unjust suffering so commonplace that 
sometimes we do not recognize the experience of suffering.  We must try to understand 
how suffering is weaved into the textures of everyday existence, especially in the forms 
of domination and submission in personal relationships, as well as the effects that 
oppression through structural violence takes on the subject.  Taking up these questions 
                                                
1 Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of 
Domination (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 10. 
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assists us in identifying theories and practices that enable agency and critique harmful 
structures in society, church, and self.    
In my case on ministerial moral decision-making I wrote that I was perplexed by 
presentations of the women who suffered.  I wrote that in my interviews I had expected to 
hear about how specific personal and social identities shaped the experience of suffering 
the loss of a child, but did not.  At the same time, I juxtaposed this evidence against the 
written record of feminist pastoral theology which has produced a significant amount of 
literature that speaks to identity and pastoral care.  I argued that to better attend to 
persons in our caring and writing practices our identity paradigm must be in conversation 
with theories of recognition, as they help us to understand how oppression and 
domination as forms of social suffering are manifest in the lives of individuals.  Likewise, 
I stated that feminist pastoral theology also has much to contribute to an understanding of 
recognition through the role of religious care practices and the meaning-making.   
 In this chapter and the next, I argue that theories of recognition are powerful tools 
for analysis of individual and social suffering as they formulate how subjects are shaped 
by personal and social forces that are beyond individual and even collective control.  As 
theories, they provide the how and why of subject formation which leads to more precise 
articulations of the what and who of suffering.  Further, theories of recognition help us 
tighten the connections between individual suffering and the need for care, and social 
suffering as a result of structural injustice and the need for transformations of systems.  In 
this chapter, I turn to the work of psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin to explain how 
recognition, domination, and submission are linked.  I critique and build on Benjamin’s 
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recognition by examining the nature of structural violence and political repression.  
Lastly, I turn to theological lament as a practice of assertion and recognition. 
 
Understanding Intersubjective Recognition and its Social Implications 
 
Recall our chaplains who ministered to women experiencing stillbirth or fetal 
demise and our lack of knowledge about these women, their backgrounds, their identities, 
and how they made meaning out of their loss.  Who were these women?  What were their 
backgrounds?  Are there patterns in their lives which link individual suffering and 
everyday manifestations of structural injustice and violence?  When feminist pastoral 
theologians ask questions along these lines of contextuality, we amplify our 
understanding of the person caught in the midst of personal, relational, social, and 
political webs.  In particular, feminist pastoral theology better understands the contours of 
suffering and its effects on the self when we look at the interplay of the developmental 
tasks of recognition and assertion, which, when taken to the extreme, may lead to 
sporadic or on-going instances of domination and submission in intersubjective 
relationships.  I draw my primary psychological description from the psychoanalytic 
author Jessica Benjamin.     
Jessica Benjamin is a practicing psychoanalyst and adjunct faculty in New York 
University’s Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis.  She is the 
author of The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination 
(1988), Shadow of the Other: Intersubjectivity and Gender in Psychoanalysis (1997), and  
Like Subjects, Love Objects: Essays on Recognition and Sexual Difference (1998).  Using 
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a feminist lens, her work focuses on gender, social structures, intersubjectivity, and 
psychoanalytic theories such as object relations theory, relational psychology, and ego 
psychology.  For the scope of this chapter, I primarily elaborate the concepts she puts 
forward in The Bonds of Love. 
In The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination 
Benjamin explores how persons not only accept but also perpetuate unequal relationships 
of domination and submission.  Drawing from and reconstructing psychoanalytic theory, 
Benjamin argues that domination and submission are complex psychological processes in 
which both parties participate.  Thus, it is an intersubjective process, and one reproduced 
from childhood, through adulthood, and with manifestations in family life, social 
institutions, and sexual relations.  She argues that domination and submission pivot on 
the psychological need and capacity for recognition and assertion.      
Benjamin argues that the desire for recognition is a primary psychological reason 
for why the dominated submit.  Likewise, recognition is one reason why the dominator 
has power that results in submission of another.  She explains, “Domination and 
subordination result from a breakdown of the necessary tension between self-assertion 
and mutual recognition that allows self and other to meet as sovereign equals.”2  
Recognition holds such sway over us because it is a human need and a human capacity.  
Her hope, then, is for the shackles of domination and submission to be transformed into 
circuits of assertion and recognition.   
The heart of Benjamin’s argument is centered around the tension between 
recognition and assertion and its gendered distortions in intrapsychic, familial, and social 
                                                
2 Ibid., 12. 
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contexts.  When women are not conferred recognition as subjects in their own right, they 
participate in the reproduction of gendered systems of domination in order to gain that 
which they seek: recognition.  Instead of actually leading to recognition, women retain 
status as objects who cannot encounter an outside world.  Advancing claims from 
sociologist Nancy J. Chodorow, Benjamin argues that women are denied their 
subjectivity beginning in early childhood triangular relations between mother, daughter, 
and father, and reproduced through adulthood, resulting in women as the receptive, done-
to, and objects, while men are the active, doers, and subjects.  These specific gender roles 
are not only internalized but also reified in gender roles in society, marking women as 
domestic, child-rearers, and lacking exposure to the outside world, while men are of the 
world.  Not only are these gender roles detrimental to individual development, they are 
patriarchal.  In The Reproduction of Mothering, Chodorow explains, “Women’s 
mothering, then, produces psychological self-definition and capacities appropriate to 
mothering in women, and curtails and inhibits these capacities and this self-definition in 
men.”3  The reproduction of mothering contributes to the recreation of a patriarchal 
society in which women are objectified and denied subjectivity.  In Benjamin, to cultivate 
subjectivity, women and men must make the difference through intersubjective circuits of 
recognition and assertion that challenge and subvert shackles of submission and 
domination.  In this section, I present Benjamin’s work on recognition by organizing it 
into three categories: the formational intersubjective relationship between child and 
primary caretaker (often mother), critiques of Oedipal theory, and the transmutation of 
domination and submission in sexual forms to social and political forms.       
                                                
3 Nancy J. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology 
of Gender, 2d ed. (Berkeley: University of California, 1999), 208. 
 98 
Intersubjectivity and Child Development 
 Jessica Benjamin forges an intersubjective theory of the human development in 
critique of Margaret Mahler’s theory of human development.  In The Psychological Birth 
of the Human Infant, child psychiatrist Margaret Mahler and her coauthors argued that an 
infant developed through the separation-individuation process.  Mahler writes that 
“separation consists of the child’s emergence from a symbiotic fusion with the mother, 
and individuation consists of those achievements marking the child’s assumption of his 
own individual characteristics.”4  Separation and individuation mark the emergence of a 
separate self, a self which is no longer fused, or in symbiosis, with the mother.  In 
separation and individuation, the human infant comes understand himself as an I, and his 
mother as a not-I.5  All this occurs within the first 24 months of the child’s life.  The 
ultimate goal of this process is libidinal object constancy, which can only be established 
through positive internalization of the mother figure.  This cannot occur, however, 
without a crisis.   
 Mahler argues that from 15-24 months the infant undergoes a rapprochement 
crisis.   The toddler comes to understand that he and his mother are two separate persons.  
There is “an increased need, a wish for mother to share with him every one of his new 
skills and experiences, as well as a great need for the object’s love.”6  Although the 
toddler wishes for symbiosis, his own increasing mobility and verbal communication 
become the tools which show to him that the symbiosis of his early months is impossible.  
                                                
4 Margaret Mahler, Fred Pine, and Anni Bergman, The Psychological Birth of the Human 
Infant: Symbiosis and Individuation (New York: Basic, 1975), 44. 
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid., 77. 
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The junior toddler “gradually realizes that his love objects (his parents) are separate 
individuals with their own personal interests.  He must gradually and painfully give up 
the delusion of grandeur, often by way of dramatic fights with the mother….”7  Through 
the rapprochement crisis the toddler begins to define his personality and attains a level of 
object constancy, namely by internalizing a positively cathected mother image.8   
Trust is a key component of the positive mother internalization.  The toddler must 
have experienced safety and nurturance as an infant in order to internalize a full 
representation of the mother object—that is, without splitting the mother object into only 
good or only bad.  The toddler may feel hate toward the object because she is not present 
to him and yet by internalizing the good aspects he is able to self-soothe by calling upon 
this inner representation of the mother.  Mahler argues that the separation of the self is 
required in order to fully develop into a person with a unique personality and sets of 
desires. 
Benjamin critiques Mahler’s theory for its emphasis on the separation of 
individuals as the only way to achieve a full and healthy personality.  Instead she argues, 
echoing psychoanalyst and infancy researcher Daniel Stern, that the infant is not born as 
a blank emotional and relational slate, unified to the mother out of necessity, who must 
then differentiate to become a person.  Rather, the infant is a being who is interested in 
other persons from start.  Benjamin explains, “Once we accept the idea that infants do not 
begin life as part of an undifferentiated unity, the issue is not only how we separate from 
oneness, but also how we connect to and recognize others; the issue is not how we 
                                                
7 Ibid., 79. 
 
8 Ibid., 110. 
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become free of the other, but how we actively engage and make ourselves known in 
relationship to the other.”9  Human development does not require a complete cut-off of 
self from others, especially objects of love and care.  Instead, the self becomes itself more 
fully by being in relationships in which assertion and recognition are balanced.  This is 
the intersubjective perspective.  It positively affirms the relational process of becoming 
oneself, but also brings challenges to development and maturation.  
Benjamin writes that the intersubjective view is “the study of a self who suffers 
the lack of recognition, as well as the new perception of the active, social infant who can 
respond to and differentiate from others.”10  Human development occurs in relationship 
to other subjects who are persons, not merely objects, from this viewpoint.  The self and 
the other subject are alike, but also different.  That each subject is able to recognize this 
very point is the basis of Benjamin’s intersubjectivity, a term that has its roots in 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas’ social theory.11  
In Benjamin, intersubjectivity criticizes the exclusiveness of the intrapsychic 
perspective in development.  In child development, intersubjectivity emphasizes a self 
                                                
9 Benjamin, 18. 
 
10 Ibid., 19. 
 
11 In his article “Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence” (1970) Habermas 
used the phrase “the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding” to speak about an 
individual’s capacity and the social sphere.  In the anthology On the Pragmatics of 
Communication (2000), his definition emphasizes the prelinguistic, shared understanding: 
“the term “intersubjective” no longer refers to the result of an observed convergence of 
thoughts or representations of various persons, but to the prior commonality of a 
linguistic pre understanding or horizon of the lifeworld – which, from the perspective of 
the participants themselves, is presupposed -within which the members of 
communication community find themselves before they reach an understanding with one 
another about something in the world” (355).  See Benjamin’s footnote on 19 for further 
clarification.         
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who looks to another outside himself for recognition which ideally affirms his sense of 
agency, ownership, and responsibility for himself. She explains, 
A person comes to feel that ‘I am the doer who does, I am the author of my acts,’ 
by being with another person who recognizes her acts, her feelings, her intentions, 
her existence, her independence.  Recognition is the essential response, the 
constant companion of assertion.  The subject declares, ‘I am, I do,’ and then 
waits for the response, ‘You are, you have done.’ Recognition is, thus, reflexive; 
it includes not only the other’s confirming response, but also how we find 
ourselves in that response.  We recognize ourselves in the other, and we even 
recognize ourselves in inanimate things: for the baby, the ability to recognize 
what she has seen before is as Stern says, ‘self-affirming as well as world-
affirming,’ enhancing her sense of effective agency: ‘My mental representation 
works!’12       
 
These kinds of reflexive moments build on each other.  As a young self asserts herself 
through action, she is recognized by the other who can mirror the emotions displayed 
through the action.  Each act of assertion followed by recognition serves to build a 
positive sense of a self-in-relation.  Additionally, each act of recognition cultivates an 
empathic self.  
Relatedness of self and other selves is a task of mutuality.  Emotional congruence 
between two persons affirms that recognition is indeed happening and that, rather than 
leading to feelings to separation, instead leads to feelings of connection.  Benjamin gives 
the example of a child shaking a rattle in joy.  The mother, she writes, shows that she 
feels similarly (I am happy, too!) “by matching his level of intensity in a different mode 
(she whoops).”13  While the child is happy with the rattle, the mother is happy because 
her child is happy, and so they share similar emotions despite a difference in causation.   
                                                
12 Benjamin, 21. 
 
13 Ibid., 30. 
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The shared emotions between mother and child are part of the emotional attunement of 
the two subjects.  The pleasure of the child produces pleasure in the mother who in turn 
shows that same pleasure to the child.   
However, within this process is the possibility of an internalized self-other 
conflict.  “At one year the infant can experience the conflict between the wish to fulfill 
his own desire (say, to push the buttons on the stereo), and the wish to remain in accord 
with his parents’ will.  Given such inevitable conflict, the desire to remain attuned can be 
converted into submission to the other’s will.”14  Thus, as the child asserts himself, 
internal conflict arises from the need for recognition.  At psychological best, the child 
becomes the adult who asserts himself and “experiences his own agency and the 
distinctness of the other,” even when recognition in the form of tacit approval does not 
come.15  But this is not always the case.    
 
Domination and Submission: An Extreme Means of Recognition 
 “[B]oth this flogging and the chain attached to the ring of your collar…are 
intended less to make you suffer, scream, or shed tears than to make you feel, through 
this suffering, that you are not free but fettered, and to teach you that you are totally 
dedicated to something outside yourself,” writes Pauline Réage, author of The Story of 
O, a tale of erotic submission of a woman to her sexual male master.16  Jessica Benjamin 
uses this story to show how an unfulfilled desire for recognition transmutes into a desire 
                                                
14 Ibid., 31. 
 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Pauline Réage, The Story of O, trans. Sabine d’Estrée (New York: Ballantine, 1965), 
17. 
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for fusion.  Fusion and merger create submission; submission is accompanied by a loss of 
subjectivity, and paradoxically, submission results in the fulfillment of the desire to be 
recognized. From this story Benjamin considers how “domination is anchored in the 
hearts of those who submit to it.”17  In this next section, I explain how domination and 
submission are powerful psychological motivations in sexual relationships that lead to 
relational and inequitable distortions between two selves.   
Situated as one chapter (“Master and Slave”) within her text, Benjamin’s 
interpretive reading of The Story of O is an illustration of the extremes of domination and 
submission.  Using this provocative story, which I briefly narrate below, Benjamin gives 
a concrete, but extreme, example of the psychological destruction of woman as ‘other’ 
and ‘object’ through denial of recognition.  She describes the female submissive, O, as a 
subject who attaches herself to a masculine idealized authority figure.  The idealized 
authority figure represents a father figure who liberates her from an engulfing mother 
figure.  By identifying with the idealized father figure, submissive women hope to gain 
freedom rather than repeat their mother’s experience.  That is, seeing the mother 
dominated within sexist and misogynistic family and social relations, and yet being 
dependent on her, the daughter moves towards a figure who can free her from the 
bondage of becoming an other and object.  Benjamin writes, “The denial of subjectivity 
to women means that the privilege and power of agency fall to the father, who enters the 
stage as the first outsider, and so represents the principle of freedom as denial of 
                                                
17 Benjamin, 52. 
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dependency.”18  Paradoxically, that movement toward and identification with the 
idealized figure does not guarantee freedom, but may reproduce submission. 
The problems for Benjamin are more complex.  Viewing one’s mother as object is 
linked to the view of women as objects in society at large.  Benjamin writes, “Only a 
mother who feels entitled to be a person in her own right can ever be seen as such by her 
child, and only such a mother can appreciate and set limits to the inevitable aggression 
and anxiety that accompany a child’s growing independence.”19  Yet what results in 
mother/woman as object and father/man as subject is a gendered split, what Benjamin 
calls gender polarity, which pervades “social relations, our ways of knowing, our efforts 
to transform and control the world.”20  For Benjamin, confronting and unraveling the 
effects of gender polarity requires that we disentangle the intersubjective ties of 
domination and submission so that they become circuits of recognition and assertion.  It 
is from within this context and hope that Benjamin gives us the portrait of O as a severe 
case study of warped and distorted recognition.                                     
Circuits of recognition and assertion gone awry become chains of domination and 
submission.  Like recognition and assertion, the chains of domination and submission are 
forged through an intersubjective process.  Thus, the circuit of domination and 
submission is not oppositional to recognition, but made possible by the desire for 
recognition and assertion.  Benjamin explains,  
Domination…is the twisting of the bonds of love.  Domination does not repress 
the desire for recognition; rather, it enlists and transforms it.  Beginning in the 
                                                
18 Ibid., 221. 
 
19 Ibid., 82. 
 
20 Ibid., 220. 
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breakdown of the tension between self and other, domination proceeds through 
the alternate paths of identifying with or submitting to powerful others who 
personify the fantasy of omnipotence.  For the person who takes this route to 
establishing his own power, there is an absence where the other should be.21 
 
That is, submission and domination are agential psychic forces that are tied together from 
the very start.  Benjamin makes the point that both parties desire recognition even when 
their actions would drive them further away from a truly mutual exchange of assertions 
and recognitions.  A lack of mutuality in recognition is not one-sided.  Both agents are 
involved and both submit to and dominate each other, though in distinct ways. 
 In the Story of O, a female fashion photographer, O, submits to eroticized 
branding, chaining, whipping, masking, blindfolding, and piercing.  She is trained to be 
available at any time for anal, oral, and vaginal intercourse.  Yet, she is also asked to 
giver her consent to her own torture.  As the story begins, O is brought to the château at 
Roissy by her lover, René.  She is trained to serve the group of men who gather at Roissy, 
including René.  After her initial training, René places her in the hands of a more 
dominant master, Sir Stephen, as an act of love, trust, and generosity.  For her, pleasure is 
dependent upon being dominated by another.  Under the tutelage of Sir Stephen, O 
masters her role as submissive, agreeing to a labia piercing and a branding of Sir 
Stephen’s initials and insignia.  At the climax of the story O appears completely naked at 
a public party, save for an owl-like mask, where she is treated solely as an object.  She is 
now an animal who has willingly abandoned her own freedom. 
 The Story of O is not only a tale of submission by violence or coercion.  For 
Benjamin it is a teaching tool.  First, it shows how submission for the gain of recognition 
is enticing.  Second, it demonstrates the pain and suffering which individuals will 
                                                
21 Ibid., 219. 
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undergo in order to achieve recognition which masquerades as love or acceptance.  
Lastly, it teaches us about the entanglement between the psyches of dominated and 
dominator.        
 Talk of domination and submission often engender feminist theological, political, 
and social disgust because we assume that there is nothing to be gained by submission.  
This is a falsehood.  Indeed, there is much to be gained through submission, including 
pleasure, recognition, and a certain kind of security, even if it is one where pathogenic 
beliefs constitute reality and recreate pathogenic beliefs into life action again and again.  
Human development is so deeply tied to recognition that even its most ‘twisted’ versions 
evoke and fill the psychological needs normally associated with a non-sadomasochistic 
love relationship between self and other.  
Patterns of domination and submission are transmitted from generation to 
generation in families.  To achieve independence, a child must receive recognition from 
those she has been dependent upon.  In families where the mother/primary caretaker and 
child are undifferentiated, patterns of domination and submission occur.  Take, for 
example, the mother who is unsatisfied with her life and lives out her life through her 
child.  The child comes to identify with the mother, not out of desire, but out of psychic 
necessity.  The child receives a form of approval—often mistaken as love and 
acceptance—when she fulfills the mother’s desires.  Her submission to her mother’s 
desires fulfills her need for intersubjective recognition while at the same time suppressing 
her capabilities for self-determination.   
For the child who is only recognized for what he can provide to the mother-figure, 
recognition and its fruits of independence and decision-making are suppressed.  The child 
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feels abandoned because he is unable to exact the kind of emotive outpouring that 
accompanies recognition by the primary caretaker.  It is not that the child stops asserting 
his existence with the expectation of recognition.  Rather, the hole left by a lack of 
recognition, which in healthy maturation the adult self ought to be able to fill 
intrapsychically, is filled by relationships to patterns and things (like addictions and 
unhealthy relationships) which mirror the twisted primary bond of love.  Thus, the same 
pattern repeats itself with lovers, friends, therapists, strangers, and even institutions, 
resulting in relationships of submission and domination.  These patterns are formed by 
pathogenic beliefs about the self in relation to others.  Even more importantly, the drive 
behind the pattern is one’s psychic safety, albeit safety is twisted to mean to lack of 
mutuality and vulnerability in relationship to the other.   
According to Benjamin, The Story of O exemplifies how the bonds of twisted love 
developed in psychic relationship to primary caretakers occur in eroticized physical 
relationships.  Instead of the psychic pain of failed recognition, O submits to physical 
pain.  Benjamin writes,  
The pain of violation serves to protect the self by substituting physical pain for the 
psychic pain of loss and abandonment.  In being hurt by the other, O feels she is 
being reached, she is able to experience another living person.  O’s pleasure, so to 
speak, lies in her sense of her own survival and her connection to her powerful 
lover.  Thus as long as O can transpose her fear of loss into submission, as long as 
she remains the object and manifestation of his power, she is safe.22 
 
The only way for O to feel safe is to be protected by the power of her dominator, Sir 
Stephen.  As Benjamin interprets the story, through her submission, O gains the same 
kind of recognition that she desires—recognition in which physical pain substitutes for 
                                                
22 Ibid., 61. 
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psychic pain and which is made possible by her submission to a master to whom she can 
bind her desire to his will. 
 Yet, O does not feel her submission as pain.  Instead, it is pleasurable.  In the text, 
O shows off her scars to her friend Jacqueline.  They are a source of pleasure, a source of 
pride, even though Jacqueline is disgusted.  Benjamin explains to us that O’s pained 
pleasure is secondary only to her master’s pleasure.  In fact, her pained pleasure is 
dependent upon her ability to take refuge is a more dominant power, that of her master.  
Benjamin explains,  
The experience of pain has yet another dimension.  In Freud’s terms, pain is the 
point at which stimuli become too intense for the body or ego to bear.  
Conversely, pleasure requires a certain control or mastery of stimuli.  Thus Freud 
suggested that the eroticization of pain allows a sense of mastery by converting 
pain into pleasure.  But this is true only for the master: O’s loss of self is his gain, 
O’s pain is his pleasure.  For the slave, intense pain causes the violent rupture of 
the self, a profound experience of fragmentation and chaos.  It’s true that O now 
welcomes this loss of self-coherence, but only under a specific condition: that her 
sacrifice actually creates the master’s power, produces his coherent self, in which 
she can take refuge.  Thus in losing her own self, she is gaining access, however 
circumscribed, to a more powerful one.23 
 
By her submission, O gains a freedom that she believes she never would have been able 
to access on her own.  This is the temptation of games of domination and submission—a 
double dose of power gained through another—but it comes at a steep price. By complete 
submission to master, the submissive relinquishes control and the anxiety of decision-
making.  The power of submission lies in psychically understanding that O’s psyche 
merges with one greater than herself.  She believes that she gains, even if she is lost and 
destroyed in the process. 
                                                
23 Ibid., 61. 
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However, the submissive is not the only person to suffer.  Masters suffer as well, 
but from withheld ‘consent’ and withheld pain infliction, rather than reception.  For the 
master, pleasure is derived not only in the acts of domination, but also through the 
responsiveness and consent of the slave.  Every question of consent posed by the master 
contains within it the potential for refusal by the slave, and thus increases the power-
laden tension between the two, even if the master mistakes true consent and the freedom 
to choose for cultural formations which restrict the ability to make free choices.  In each 
act of bearing pain, he derives pleasure.  This is so because, he believes, that she holds 
the key to his pleasure and so pleasure is derived from the fulfillment of his desire, to be 
the dominant.  In a more colloquial way, the phrase, “the bottom is in charge” speaks to 
this element.  Thus, the master’s suffering comes from his vulnerability and need to 
recognize the slave through an assertion of submission.   
In the essay, “This grass is very dark to be from the white heads of old mothers,” 
Michael Joseph Gross recounts his experiences attending the annual International Mister 
Leather, the largest convention of leather men in the world and a gathering filled with 
masters and slaves.  He narrates how the submissive is a powerful role in the leather 
world: 
The good Daddies I have known have had one thing in common: they use 
humiliation to paradoxical effect, revealing how absurd shame actually is.  Daddy 
calls boy his bitch; he brings the bottom’s hidden shame into the open and plays 
with it, makes shame a source of pleasure, beauty, and even power.  The first 
leather top I met taught me a maxim of the leather world—that the bottom is 
always in control, because the bottom chooses a safe word at the beginning of the 
scene.  A good top knows how to read his bottom, to take him to his limits of 
pleasure or pain, and then push just beyond it.  For the times when Daddy’s 
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judgment fails, however, the safe word is the bottom’s power.  I say that word, the 
scene is done.24 
 
Here, Gross implies that submission is not about complete loss of power and subjectivity 
resulting in objectification of a person.  Instead, he explains that in a good submission the 
currency of shame is converted into currencies of pleasure, beauty, and power.   
Additionally, in the sadomasochistic relationship, the currency of the 
submissive’s power values over time.  Gross relays another conversation he had with a 
Daddy named Tony.  “Afterward he told me that his last relationship had been a three-
year Master/slave arrangement.  He said that he had thought that being a Master was the 
ultimate safeguard against being abandoned. ‘I thought if I owned him, he would never 
leave me.”25  In this example, the power dynamic is again reversed.  Whereas it would 
appear that the master has no particular need or emotion, and thus stems innate cruelty, 
Tony remorsefully indicates that his desire to dominate had everything to do with his own 
need to never be abandoned.   
Even though we may come to understand why submission and domination are 
powerful forces or even decide that the games of erotic submission and domination may 
not cause harm for some individuals, larger problems remain. First, safe words do not 
exist in every master-slave relationships.  There are times when the pleasures of inflicting 
violence and pain on another, even until death, overcome the desire to have the 
experience with that same partner again.  Cases of intimate abuse or of violent rape are 
examples.  Here, there is no play.  It is all reality with no words to cut the scene.  
                                                
24 Michael Joseph Gross, “The grass is very dark to be from the white heads of old 
mothers,” Open House: Writers Redefine Home, ed. Mark Doty (St. Paul: Graywolf, 
2003), 156. 
 
25 Ibid., 157. 
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Second, pleasure cannot be the sole criterion in judging sexual acts of domination 
and submission.  It is essential to mark out the peripheries between playing and reality, 
and to examine in what ways they become blurry and even mutually informing.  Again, 
Gross writes,   
When I asked one sexy, single Master whether he and his slave would ever break 
character when they were in public, he said, “I don’t think of these as roles.  This 
is who we are.  Most people in our lives would not know that we are Master and 
slave.  But I would dominate him in subtle ways in public.  He would open the 
door for me as we enter a restaurant.  When I realized that I’d forgotten my 
glasses in the car, he would retrieve them.26     
 
Fetching another’s reading glasses and opening the door for another are rather mundane 
activities, not ones we might associate with domination, but instead with courtesy or even 
love.  That the Master can seemingly dominate his servant in these most pedestrian 
activities shows us again how narrow the balancing spot is between mutual assertion and 
recognition and how easily the intersubjective circuits can be twisted between psyches.  
The danger of the game is when tactics used to navigate through pain and abandonment 
become the overwhelming psychologically normative way of life, when submission is 
mistaken for recognition and obedience for love.  As Sir Stephen reminds O, “You’re 
confusing love and obedience.  You’ll obey me without loving me, and without my 
loving you.”27    
 
Gender Polarity, Social Institutions, and Recognition 
 Just as intrapsychic dynamics become intersubjective dynamics, so too do 
intersubjective dynamics become patterned in social institutions.  While Jessica Benjamin 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
 
27 Réage, 86. 
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concentrates on the phenomena of gender polarity as it moves from the family strata to 
social and political strata, her insight about the movement itself from intimate cases of 
submission and domination to the socio-political realm is applicable to discussions of 
how patterns of domination and submission are at work in other social institutions and are 
replicated in other seeming polarities, like race and sexuality.  
Across the ecological spectrum, gender polarity is reproduce and reified.  To 
understand this phenomena, Jessica Benjamin critically examines the Oedipus complex 
and considers how it normalizes women’s roles as emotive engulfers while men are made 
as autonomous and rational selves.  Further, she articulates how domination operates by 
relegating women to the private, domestic sphere, while men are in the world.  These are 
splitting dynamics and psychological impairments to full recognition, she argues.  
Furthermore, splitting is replicated in social and political life.  She concludes, however, 
that finding the balance between assertion and recognition between the genders is a 
difficult task, but one that when undertaken will be a corrective to the patterns of 
domination and submission at multiple levels of relationship—between intimates and 
family members, and in the socio-political sphere28.  I explain her argument more fully in 
the next section to show how dynamics of domination and submission are pervasive in 
                                                
28 Liberationist Marcella Althaus-Reid describes a similar process in Latin American 
intrapersonal and social relationships.  Additionally, she describes the role of religion in 
maintaining the spheres of proper gender conduct.  While machismo regulates the 
behavior of men, hembrismo defines the domestic as the rightful place for women.  She 
argues that machismo and hembrismo are results of complex webs of colonization and 
patriarchy reproduced in social and theological practice.  For example, she cites a Latin 
American Mariology which perpetuates harmful sexist ideologies of womanhood and is 
even more insidious because it interpreted as liberative, a process that literacy educator 
Paulo Freire calls ‘naïve consciousness.’  See Marcella Althaus-Reid, “When God is a 
Rich White Woman Who Does Not Walk: The Hermeneutical Circle of Mariology and 
the Construction of Femininity in Latin America,” From Feminist Theology to Indecent 
Theology (London: SCM, 2004), 30-43.   
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the everyday practice of relationships whether mediated through actions, emotions, or 
words.  
 Benjamin rereads the Oedipus conflict as the locus of gendered polarity.  Like her 
critique of Mahler, Benjamin argues that Freud’s description of the oedipal conflict is 
based on the incorrect assumption that individuation requires absolute separation for the 
creation of an autonomous, psychologically healthy self.  Boys are made to repudiate all 
of that which is feminine in order to become men.  Fathers serve a primary role in forcing 
the choice: the boy can either be coddled by the mother and remain in the domestic 
sphere or he can choose to become an autonomous agent.  Thus, the mother’s goodness is 
understood as “a seductive threat to autonomy.”29  And yet, the boy wants the mother to 
continue to nurture and protect him, and yet, she cannot.  Male individuation thus 
requires a hard and sound split from the mother.  
To control his desire for the maternal even while repudiating it, the man-boy 
psychically separates himself from any feminine attributes contained inside himself.  
What cannot exist within himself also cannot exist within family or political life.  The 
autonomous male subject is created as the female becomes a non-subject. As Benjamin 
writes, “It enforces the split between male subject and female object, and with it, the dual 
unity of domination and submission.”30  
 The result of the split is an idealization of the maternal and feminine while at the 
same time repudiating it from the male perspective.  The feminine then becomes a 
fantasy that the male subject can project onto the female object.  As a result, she retains 
                                                
29 Benjamin, 136. 
 
30 Ibid. 
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an omnipotent status within the male psyche without the male ever having to be presented 
with the dissolution of her omnipotence as a real person who feels, emotes, fails, asserts, 
and recognizes.  In short, she can remain perfect because she is an object who can be 
dominated in the male fantasy.  Benjamin explains:  
The symbolic structure of gender polarity produces the fantastic ideal of 
motherhood even as it stimulates the fear of destroying all maternal goodness.  On 
the social level, male rationality sabotages maternal recognition, while on the 
psychic level, the oedipal repudiation of the mother splits her into the debased and 
idealized objects.  The reparation for debasing her takes the form of 
sentimentalizing and idealizing the mother, a strategy that locks both men and 
women into an inner fantasy world and evades the real issue: the recognition of 
each other.31 
 
Male rationality requires that the emotional reasoning associated with the feminine also 
be cut off.  In this way, the autonomous individual is a non-feeling individual whose 
wants, needs, and desires have nothing to do with emotions.  The autonomous male must 
cut himself off from all that would threaten his ability to be absolute and independent, 
and so he (and society) makes the idealized mother who will never threaten him again. 
 This is the ultimate psychological paradox, though.  For in attempting to cut 
himself off from the real or introjected mother figure, he threatens his own sense of self-
coherence as rational agent.  He desires her unconsciously even while consciously 
pushing her and all that she stands for further away.  It is an internal self-destruction 
played out in family and social life.  Sadly, in this battle between the sexes, every one 
loses.  “The self’s aspiration to be absolute destroys the self, as well as the other, for as 
long as the other cannot face the self as an equal in the struggle, the battle results in loss, 
and not mutual recognition.”32 
                                                
31 Ibid., 214. 
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 Erotic submission is an evocative example of male domination.  However, it is 
also an example that can lead us to focus primarily on the morality of the acts between 
two individuals while distracting us from considering how submission and domination is 
engendered in more subtle ways through social institutions and practices.  Jessica 
Benjamin explains,   
It is difficult to grasp the fact that the center of male domination lies not in direct 
expressions of personal violence (rampant though they are) but in the societal 
rationality which may or may not be defended by men.  Male domination, as 
Weber said of rationalization, works through the hegemony of impersonal 
organization: of formal rules that refer to the hypothetical interaction of 
autonomous individuals; of instrumental knowledge founded in the subject’s 
control of the objective world; of the accumulation of profit, which bows neither 
to need nor tradition.  It is this protean impersonality that makes it so elusive.33 
 
Male rationality is both pervasive and destructive.  It distorts the recognition process in 
society and “eliminates the maternal aspects of recognition (nurturance and empathy) 
from our collective values, actions, and institutions” while also reducing assertion, social 
authorship, and agency.34  It is insidiuous, but not irreparable. 
Benjamin concludes that recognition between equal subjects can occur, but only 
by sustaining the paradoxical tension between assertion and recognition.  We have 
simultaneous needs for both recognition and for independence, and the other who is 
required for our recognition is the very same other who can cripple our independence.35  
Thus, we must embrace this paradox to begin to undo the bonds that would bind. 
                                                
32 Ibid., 215. 
 
33 Ibid., 216. 
 
34 Ibid., 218. 
 
35 Ibid., 221. 
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“This means not to undo our ties to others but rather to disentangle them; to make of 
them not shackles but circuits of recognition,” asserts Benjamin.36  It is an ongoing, 
imperfect process, but one to which we must aspire, accepting “the inevitable inconstancy 
and imperfection of our efforts, without relinquishing the project.”37  By acknowledging 
the inconstancy and imperfection of our efforts to recognize each other, we become 
agents who can identify where the tension has broken down, and thus are able to restore 
that tension.  If we refuse to do so not only will our personal desires for recognition be 
unfulfilled, but so will our hopes for social transformation. 
 
The Effects of Structural Violence and Political Repression on Subject Formation  
 
 
As a theory of subjectivity, Benjamin has much to offer.  First, she provides an 
etiology of domination and submission by tracing child development in relationship to 
primary caretakers, a dynamic which also finds its way into other bonds of love between 
men and women as partners.  Second, she names patriarchy and its ensuing dynamics of 
submission and domination are problematic and also implicates the reproduction of 
patriarchy from generation to generation through family systems.  Third, she critiques 
psychoanalytic psychology, explaining that what was assumed to be normative—Freud’s 
Oedipus Complex—is actually sexist ideology posturing as normal human behavior.  
Fourth, she gives agency to men and women, arguing that to counteract patriarchy both 
genders must make the difference to balance the uneven scales from submission/feminity 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
 
37 Ibid., 224. 
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and domination/masculinity to mutual recognition/assertion.  Lastly, Benjamin does not 
shy away from images and themes of the body, sex, and desire.  She is explicit and 
graphic, a deviation from feminist theorizing that sterilize sexuality.  Essayist Phyllis 
Grosskurth comments, “She is concerned with the strong puritanical streak among 
feminists and its consequences.  In their attacks on pornography and campaigns for its 
censorship, some seems to have rejected sex, its fantasies, and its pleasures altogether.”38  
She challenges her readers to refuse to gloss over the erotic. 
Benjamin has done us a great service by showing how recognition is a 
fundamental human desire, and as such, the extent to which we will go to receive 
recognition—extents which include severe physical pain, and human degradation until 
we become, and become to believe, that we are objects meant solely for the use by 
another.  The loss of self to another in order to have self-worth affirmed is tragic.  
Further, the one who receives the lost self of submission and capitalizes on the need to be 
affirmed by wielding domination as power is also a tragedy.  Yet, Benjamin remains 
hopeful that the balance can be found.  With enough self-knowledge and enough self-will 
the destructive patterns of domination and submission can be rooted out.  Individual men 
will recognize individual women: “I love you.  You are awesome and amazing.”  
Individual women will assert themselves to individual men: “I love me.  I am awesome 
and amazing.”  It is assumed that from these words right action and right treatment 
worthy of all human dignity will flow.  Psychic splits can be reunited; gender polarity can 
be reversed.   
                                                
38 Phyllis Grosskurth, “The New Psychology of Women,” The New York Review of 
Books, 24 October 1991, 31. 
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I am hopeful as well, but more measured in my hope for what is possible given 
the constraint of the assertion-recognition circuits.  When a subject is malformed and 
does not possess the capability to assert oneself in sexual or psychological relationships, 
theorists of subjectivity must be careful not to mistake coerced consent for conscious or 
unconscious submission.   
Benjamin’s reflections fail to take into account surrenders that are neither sexual 
nor psychological, but socially and politically coerced through systems that do bodily 
violence, not only patriarchal logic.  These kinds of surrenders are the injustices of 
victims who have no choice, but give ‘consent’ under extreme duress from overwhelming 
and coercive exercises of power.39  Submission is forced.  If one concludes from 
Benjamin’s theory that subjects have the power to say no, the unintended result is the 
formation of a subject-agent who may be blamed for his or her lot in life, without 
examination of the systems or networks that surround that person. 
As I wrote earlier, there are circumstances when no ‘safe word’ is available and 
when assertion requires that one end a relationship.  Cycles of interpersonal violence, like 
domestic abuse and battering, are topics which pastoral theologians have brought to the 
church for reflection and action that fall into this category.40  However, there are cycles 
of violence where one does not wish to participate but must because there is no personal 
                                                
39 Ethel Spector Person, “Why It’s So Sweet to Surrender,” New York Times, 26 February 
1989.  Online http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/26/books/why-it-s-so-sweet-to-
surrender.html. Accessed 13 December 2011.  I echo Person’s critique that Benjamin’s 
“major omission is her failure to distinguish psychological surrender, whether to love, 
mysticism, or religion, from the necessary submission to overpowering force – a pure 
victimhood.” 
 
40 See for example, Woman Battering (Adams, 1994) and Cry of Tamar: Violence against 
Women and the Church’s Response (Cooper-White, 1995).   
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exit strategy.  Furthermore, it may be the case that assertion at the socio-political level 
leads to death, especially in the case of political repression where asylum is not granted.   
In addition to analyzing the circuits of domination and submission at the 
intersubjective level of subject formation, theories of subjectivity must also account for 
the violence of domination and submission at the social level and it effects on the 
individual.  Attending to social and political violence helps us to analyze the effects of 
social suffering at the individual level.  Next, I examine the effects of structural violence 
and political repression in relationship to subject formation.   
 
Structural Violence 
Just as suffering happens everyday, so does violence.  But, what counts as 
violence?  Obviously, we know certain one-time and on-going actions are violent: 
terrorism and bombings, rape, crimes, murders, and wars.  We can observe this violence.  
We will often say that ‘we know it when we see it.’  Behind each of these of these violent 
actions is an actor.  Thus, as philosopher and cultural theorist Slavoj Žižek reminds us, 
violence with an agent or actor is subjective violence.41  
                                                
41 Slavoj Žižek, Violence (New York: Picador, 2008), 2.  Žižek presents two additional 
types of violence that he groups as objective violence, e.g. that they do not have an actor 
or agent behind them.  He names them as symbolic violence and systemic violence.  
Symbolic violence is found in language where patterns of social domination and claims 
of universalism are habitually reproduced in speech.  Systemic violence is the 
“catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political 
systems.”  Both types of objective violence are often invisible.  We mistake symbolic and 
systemic violence for the normal state of affairs, the even keel against which we judge 
subjective violence as the deviation from the norm.  Instead of using Žižek’s category of 
systemic violence, I use the term structural violence to capture the limiting of human 
agency and the confluence of structures, like institutions, laws, and environments, that 
impede human flourishing. 
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However, there is a more insidious kind of violence which is structural in nature.  
Structural violence is objective, meaning that there is no one agent, actor, or author 
behind the violent acts that cause social suffering which becomes evident at the 
individual level.  Medical anthropologist and physician Paul Farmer argues that social 
suffering is “structured by historically given (and often economically driven) processes 
and forces that conspire…to constrain agency.”42  Consent to submit is not given; instead  
“life choices are structured by racism, sexism, political violence, and grinding poverty.”43  
One does not submit to the extremes of this violence and suffering, but instead comes to 
exist in these systems.  Agency is limited.   
Paul Farmer tells the story of Acéphie whose story is not unique.  A poor, young 
Haitian woman from a rural area contracts HIV from a sexual liaison with a married 
soldier, the only men who receive a regular salary in the area.  She moves to Port-au-
Prince to find a moun prensipal, an unmarried main man, and works as a maid for $30 a 
month.  She finds a main man, Blanco, and becomes pregnant before they marry.  She is 
fired because of her pregnancy.  Her fiancée calls off the engagement.  She returns to her 
rural village to have the baby and soon after the birth her HIV positive status becomes 
visible, devastating her body and spirit until she dies.44   
Farmer’s point, and mine as well, is simply that Acéphie’s story is not just a 
personal tale of victimization or another citation of tragic individual suffering.  Instead, 
                                                
42 Paul Farmer, “On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below,” Social 
Suffering, eds. Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Margaret Lock (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1997), 263.  
 
43 Ibid. 
 
44 Ibid., 266-267. 
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her story is indicative of a network of suffering that many women in Haiti face.  Further, 
her story is indicative of the limited agency she has available to her because of the 
confluence of violent structures that impinge upon her.  Her identity as a Haitian and as a 
woman certainly play roles in our understanding of her suffering, but her story cannot be 
considered without consideration of the effects of structural violence on the psyche. 
Beyond limited opportunities to develop one’s capabilities,45 structural violence 
wears on those who suffer in such a way that on-going trauma becomes tedious and 
numbing, both to those who experience it and to those who witness it.  Speaking about 
Acéphie’s story and the stories of his other poor, female patients, Farmer comments,  
There is a deadly monotony in their stories: young women—or teenaged girls—
who were driven to Port-au-Prince by the lure of an escape from the harshest 
poverty; once in the city, each worked as a domestic; none managed to find 
financial security.  The women interviewed were straightforward about the 
nonvoluntary aspect of their sexual activity: in their opinions, they had been 
driven into unfavorable unions by poverty.  Indeed, such testimony should call 
into question facile notions of “consensual sex.”46 
   
Witnesses, like pastoral theologians, caring ministers, and social justice practitioners, 
bear the burden of ensuring that the violence of suffering through structures is heard and 
                                                
45 Economist Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum are two theorists of global 
justice who utilize the capabilities approach. The capabilities approach argues that justice 
is advanced when people have the capability to pursue the ends they desire.  As such, 
freedoms to pursue those ends are required.  This is a significant shift from thinking 
about poverty as economic misdistribution to thinking about poverty as capability 
deprivation.  Nussbaum states that a capabilities approach to justice pivots on the “idea 
that all human beings have an inherent dignity and what they require is life circumstances 
that are worthy of that dignity” (Examined Life, 124).  Or, as Sen articulates, a just 
society requires that individuals have “substantive freedoms—the capabilities—to choose 
a life one has reason to value” (Development as Freedom, 74).  As such, a capabilities 
approach supports systems which diminish poverty, such as health-care and basic 
education for a nation’s citizens. 
 
46 Farmer, 271. 
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interpreted as oppressive, even if there is no one dominator.  It is an illusion to 
understand Acéphie’s choices as willing participation or even unconscious consent. 
Too often the social construction of indifference is misinterpreted as tacit consent 
in persons who experience the monotony of everyday social suffering.  In the 
ethnography Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil, 
anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes investigates the social production of indifference 
to child death.  As a community health worker focused on child and maternal health in 
Alto do Cruzeiro, a shantytown in the northeastern state of Pernambuco, Scheper-Hughes 
chronicles her first encounter with child death.  A young mother brought her very sick 
male baby to Scheper-Hughes, who took him to the hospital.  Despite her efforts and 
those of other medical professionals, the baby died.  Scheper-Hughes writes that she was 
both overwhelmed with grief and fearful of the reaction of the mother.  Carrying the dead 
weight in her arms through the shantytown while weeping bitter tears, she was confused 
when the mother took the baby from her arms in an unconcerned manner.  She writes,   
Noting my red eyes and tear-stained face, the woman turned to comment to a 
neighbor woman standing by, “Hein, hein, coitada!  Engraçada, não é; Tsk!  Tsk! 
Poor thing!  Funny isn’t she?”  What was funny or amusing seemed to be my 
inappropriate display of grief and my concern over a matter of so little 
consequence.  No one, least of all the mothers, had expected the little tyke to live 
in any case.47 
                 
From Scheper-Hughes’ perspective, the idea of the casual acceptance of child death is 
cognitively perplexing and emotionally jarring.  She argues that indifference to child 
death is not merely a cultural difference to be ‘tolerated’ or ‘respected.’  Instead, 
indifference of this kind is born of the routinization exhibited in the lives of individuals, 
                                                
47 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in 
Brazil (Berkeley: University of California, 1992), 271. 
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and uncritically reproduced through formal, public institutions and located in social 
practices.  She specifically cites the loss of breast-feeding culture as a matter of somatic 
scarcity and its replacement with formula made by multinational corporation Nestlé; 
poverty and its effects on mortality and fertility patterns; and an aversion to medical 
abortions and unnatural forms of birth control (e.g. the pill and condoms) coupled with 
strong religious sentiments linking prematurely terminated pregnancies with sin.48  When 
combined with the personal experiences of suffering that come from familial and 
relational injustices, these elements create the structural violence into which Acéphie or 
this young mother live.  Structural violence deadens their ability to assert their claims for 
well-being as it deadens their affective capabilities.  
 Describing structural violence is also tricky because it resists telling in a linear 
method where the casualties are easily visible.  Structural violence is masked by complex 
and hard to predict natural, social, and political forces.  Take, for example, the 7.0 
earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010.  It devastated the country, the poorest nation in 
the Western hemisphere, and especially the capital city of Port-au-Prince, with an 
estimation of over 222,570 dead, 300,572 injured, and 2.3 million, a quarter of the 
population, displaced.49  Coverage of the natural disaster was extensive.  It would be hard 
to believe that a significant population of the world’s human inhabitants are unaware of 
this social suffering, caused by non-agential environmental factors, but amplified through 
grinding poverty, lack of national infrastructure, and political instability as a democracy.  
                                                
48 Ibid., 316-317, 327, 333. 
 
49 United Nations, Haiti: 6 Months After…, Online 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/documents/6_months_after_com
memoration.pdf.  Accessed 15 December 2011. 
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However, what became less visible were the harms reproduced through ongoing 
structural causes of suffering.   
 Nearly ten months after the earthquake, a bacterial strain of cholera found in 
South Asia appeared in Haiti.  Haitians has not been exposed to cholera in roughly a 
century, so with such little resistance, 4,500 died and 300,000 were sickened.50  An 
independent panel of experts from across the globe assembled to determine how cholera 
was introduced into the Haitian environs.  They considered three hypotheses: first, that 
the strain was introduced to Haiti via the Gulf of Mexico after the tectonic plates shifted; 
second, that the strain was already present in Haiti before the earthquake but evolved into 
a pathogenic strain; or third, that a human host inadvertently carried the strain into Haiti.  
Haitian locals particularly believed the third hypothesis, arguing that UN soldiers from a 
country with cholera introduced the strain while serving at the MINUSTAH (Mission de 
Nations Unies pour la Stabilisatíon en Haïtí) camp.  The panel confirmed that the 
bacterial strain of Vibrio cholerae was unintentionally introduced by a human carrier and 
transmitted through fecal matter in the Meye Tributary System of the Artibonite River.  
The widespread contamination, though, resulted from several factors beyond the control 
of any one individual.  They write, 
This explosive spread was due to several factors, including the widespread use of 
river water for washing, bathing, drinking, and recreation; regular exposure of 
agricultural workers to irrigation water from the Artibonite River; the salinity 
gradient in the Artibonite River Delta, which provided optimal environmental 
conditions for rapid proliferation of Vibrio cholerae; the lack of immunity of the 
Haitian population to cholera; the poor water and sanitation conditions in Haiti; 
the migration of infected individuals to home communities and treatment centers; 
                                                
50 Alejando Cravioto, Claudio F. Lanata, Daniele S. Lantagne, and G. Balakrish Nair, 
Final Report of the Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti.  
Online http://ww.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/un-cholera-report-final.pdf.    Accessed 
13 December 2011. 
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the fact that the South Asian type Vibrio cholerae strain that caused the outbreak 
causes a more severe diarrhea due to the larger production of the more potent 
classical type of cholera toxin; and, the conditions in which cholera patients were 
initially treated in medical facilities did not prevent the spread of the disease to 
other patients or to the health workers.51 
 
The panel concluded that all these factors created another instance of social suffering 
created by the confluence of circumstances.  The assert that the outbreak “was not the 
fault of, or deliberate action of, a group or individual.”52   
Here, oppressive forces have no particular agent, perpetrator, or dominator against 
whom one can assert one’s self.  Instead, all become subjects formed and deformed by 
ongoing structural violence.  The psychological imperative to reestablish the tension 
between recognition and assertion simply does not work here.  Indeed, to call for 
recognition between two subjects misses the fact that even good intentions may cause 
harm, such as the human carrier of Vibrio cholerae who entered Haiti in an effort to assist 
in disaster efforts.53          
                                                
51 Ibid., 4. 
 
52 Ibid., 29. 
 
53 This line of argumentation is advanced by John L. McKnight, Professor of Education 
and Social Policy at Northwestern University.  In The Careless Society: Community and 
Its Counterfeits, McKnight identifies the ‘professional problem’ of care as a major 
contributor to cycles of poverty and oppression.  In interviews conducted through asset-
based community development, the poor and advocates for the poor described their 
victimization: as “poor people defined as deficient by those whose incomes depend upon 
the deficiency they define”(19).  Building on philosopher, Catholic priest, and social 
critic Ivan Illich’s work in Medical Nemesis (1982), McKnight argues the ‘professional 
problem’ is best explained through the iatrogenic argument—that the work of helpers and 
carers actually hurts and disables those they assist with “sick-producing medicine, 
stupidifying education, and criminalizing justice” (20).  He argues that weak 
communities are at the root of the professional problem and proposes asset-based 
community organizing as a strategy to recenter lives lived in community and to return 
those who are exiled (172).  While I agree with McKnight’s diagnosis, I believe he gives 
too much agency to those who participate in caring systems, so that one blames the carer 
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Political Repression  
As I mentioned in the case of Haiti, an individual’s experience of social suffering 
cannot be separated from collective experiences of political repression that are 
subjectively and objectively violent.  Liberation psychologist Ignacio Martín-Baró, a 
Spanish Roman Catholic priest and one of the six Jesuits murdered by a Salvadoran death 
squad November 16, 1989, provided intellectual acuity on these topics and the necessity 
of a political psychology to confront, document, and analyze political regimes that 
oppress ‘the people’—a concept he argues can be defined by historical particularity, 
political solidarity, and socioeconomic exploitation.54  In the essay “The Psychological 
Value of Political Repression,” Martín-Baró cites the effects of repressive violence on the 
psyche of the repressor, the repressed, and the spectator. 
Repressors, those who carry out violent acts, experience two psychological 
effects.  First, they internalize another’s dehumanization in response to cognitive 
dissonance between violence and other principles (e.g. democratic values, religious 
values).  Second, they act out learned habits of violence to resolve interpersonal 
                                                
rather than looking at a more nuanced interaction between systems and capability 
deprivation.         
 
54 Ignacio Martín-Baró, Writings for a Liberation Psychology, eds. Adrianne Aron and 
Shawn Corne, trans. Adrianne Aron (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), 182.  He explains, “The people is a search and an effort directed at creating 
a concrete community of free people.  The people is…a denial of all slavery, not as an 
achieved present reality, but as a dynamic demand, as a vocation—a calling.  It is 
important to understand that this calling can remain trapped in the unconscious, repressed 
by the jealous violence of the oppressor.  Contemporary Latin American history gives 
palpable proof of how, when this communitarian vocation is awakened in the popular 
consciousness, the established powers become ever more violent in their efforts to repress 
and silence it: Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile—the list goes on.”  
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conflicts.55  Repressors undergo psychic splits, positing their social group (us, we) as ‘the 
good’ over and against opposing groups (them) as ‘the bad.’56  Often, this occurs along 
the fault line of ethnic identity, especially in Central and South America, where 
indigenous peoples are suppressed economically, socially, and politically.  Social 
collaboration and even communication are stymied, and repressive cycles of violence are 
enacted.     
Because political repression is often directed against basic human needs such as 
food, shelter, and work, and because repression punishes behavior without providing an 
alternative to learned behaviors, the repressed experience the routinization that Scheper-
Hughes identified while working in Brazil.  They internalize a passivity to their own 
lives.  Martín-Baró comments that is not uncommon to hear those in the campo say, “It is 
better to die fast from a bullet than slowly from hunger.”57  Personal passivity congeals 
into political passivity.  Repressive violence discourages behaviors through fear.  The 
repressed internalize emotions that they associate when they encounter the regime—
police, army, government—and thus are inhibited from action against the regime.  Rules 
of the authority figure are internalized as inhibitions and lead to guilt when evaluative 
criterion of correct behavior is violated.  Internalized guilt leads to a desire to hide 
transgressions.  Thus the repressed also experience aggression as a result of their 
frustration. 
                                                
55 Ibid., 156-157. 
 
56 Ibid., 166. 
 
57 Ibid., 160. 
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Spectators of violent repression experience psychological effects that are 
dependent upon their identification with the repressed.  If they identify with the 
repressors, the spectator may scapegoat the victims, separating themselves from those 
who deserved punishment, and distancing themselves from ‘guerrillas,’ ‘subversives,’ or 
‘criminal’ elements.  Those who identify with the repressed may experience cognitive 
dissonance as they name the repressors—‘fascist,’ ‘murderer,’ etc.58  The most important 
psychological effect for the spectator is the learned value of violent power in response to 
social situations. Martín-Baró writes, “The daily spectacle of violence committed by 
repressive forces teaches and encourages spectators to use similar behaviors to solve their 
own problems.”59      
Political repression limits agency and multiplies social suffering by dismantling 
any form of consent.  Here, submission is required for existence.  Individual assertions 
against the regime guarantee a protracted death from starvation, the purgatory of torture, 
or the anxiety of anticipating an attack against oneself or one’s closest friends and family.  
As an aspect of structural violence, political repression challenges us to understand 
subject formation in political contexts where assertion is met with violence to the body 
and the psyche.  As a result, a theory of subject formation must take up the challenges to 
recognition at the social level and their effects on the individual.  
More than this, theoretical considerations should attend to the ways that persons 
resist their own deformation.  Scholars of religious practice, like pastoral theologians, are 
particularly well-equipped to deepen that conversation.  In the next section, I argue that 
                                                
58 Ibid., 164. 
 
59 Ibid. 
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lamentation as an emotional and theological act of resistance and solidarity informs my 
theological understanding of recognition, suffering, and the potential for healing. 
 
Lamenting Circuits of Submission and Domination 
 
 
Therefore I will not restrain my mouth; 
I will speak in the anguish of my spirit; 
I will complain in the bitterness of my soul…. 
When I say, ‘My bed will comfort me, 
my couch will ease my complaint,’ 
then you scare me with dreams 
and terrify me with visions, 
so that I would choose strangling 
and death rather than this body. 
I loathe my life; I would not live forever. 
Let me alone, for my days are a breath.60 
 
      The words of Job, written somewhere in the 6th to 4th century B.C.E., are not so 
far removed from words of those who experience submission and domination in personal 
relationships, structural violence, or political repression.  Like the author, they may be 
persecuted by another person or entity which leaves them loathing their lives.  However, 
unlike the author, we heard that domination sometimes means that the person who suffers 
does not cry out in anguish, does not wail lament, does not complain in the bitterness of 
her soul.  Instead, the on-going trauma of violence is normalized so that the subject is 
either muted, for example the slave who thinks nothing of fetching glasses or opening the 
door for his master, or responds in a way that seems contradictory to the emotion 
presented, such as when the mother laughed when Scheper-Hughes tearfully returned to 
the favela with the mother’s dead son.   
                                                
60 Job 7:11, 13-16, (NRSV). 
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 Social theorists of emotion have argued that the emotive aspects of the self are 
shaped in relationship to culture.61  For example, we know that in Japan anger is an 
inappropriate emotion to express between two persons of the same social groups.  In 
contrast, in the U.S., anger between individuals who are colleagues or friends is 
acceptable.62  Emotions, then, are not “innate or prior to social engagement,” but instead 
are “cultural artifacts” built from social norms, interpersonal relationships, and cultural 
structures.63  Pastoral theologian Barbara J. McClure explains, 
…our sociocultural contexts encourage the cultivation of certain dispositions and 
not others.  As we develop and mature we learn what actions and emotions are 
appropriate in what contexts.  The relations of communication and culture in 
which emotional vocabularies and moral regulations develop are figurations of 
power balances that change by context and with history.64               
   
In other words, the muted emotions of the person who submits, or cultivated indifference 
observed by laughter toward child death, are conditioned emotions that stem from the 
cycles of submission and domination to oppressive persons and systems.  Certainly, 
political repression forms subjects through fear and aggression who are then limited in 
their capability to assert themselves in social and political spheres.  What, then, is an 
appropriate pastoral theological response?    
While culture in the form of social location, personal relationships, and structural 
violence may shape the range of emotions available to those who suffer, it is not merely 
                                                
61 Rom Harré and W. Gerrod Parrott, eds, The Emotions: Social, Cultural, and Biological 
Dimensions (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996); Keith Oatley, Dacher 
Keltner, and Jennifer M. Jenkins, Understanding the Emotions (Malden, MA: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2006).  
 
62 Oatley, Keltner, and Jenkins, 64. 
 
63 McClure, 197. 
 
64 Ibid. 
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cultural.  As I have shown in the sections above, relationships of ‘care,’ whether by social 
institutions, the political state, or primary caretakers, can be unjust and oppressive.  As a 
feminist pastoral theologian, I believe that we must critique the insidious everyday 
violence that makes a subject’s ability to wail in lament personally difficult or even 
incomprehensible.  When persons who experience everyday violence and social suffering 
cannot lament for themselves in a way that is broadly recognizable, pastoral theologians 
and caregivers are called to stand against oppression and injustice by offering their 
lamentation as a form of solidarity and resistance to deformation of the subject.   
To be in solidarity extends beyond compassion and empathy for others.  To be in 
solidarity requires a commitment to be in the struggle—en la lucha65—with those who 
experience oppression and domination.66  Pastoral theologians and caregivers, indeed all 
of creation, are called to be moved, emotionally, relationally, and even physically by the 
virtue of mercy when confronting injustices.  Pastoral theologian Brita L. Gill-Austern 
asserts, “We must struggle alongside of the suffering in the pursuit of justice-making, 
knowing that by being in closer proximity relationally and physically more may be asked 
of us than we had anticipated.”67 
                                                
65 Ada María Isasi-Díaz, En la Lucha/In the Struggle: A Hispanic Women’s Liberation 
Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993).  To be en la lucha is an overarching theme for 
Isasi-Díaz’s work in this book and in her subsequent texts that develop mujerista 
theology (Mujerista Theology: A Theology for the Twenty-First Century, 1996; and La 
Lucha Continues: Mujerista Theology, 2004). 
 
66 Brita L. Gill-Austern, “Engaging Diversity and Difference: From Practices of 
Exclusion to Practices of Practical Solidarity,” Injustice and the Care of Souls, eds. 
Sheryl A. Kujawa-Holbrook and Karen B. Montagno (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2009), 35. 
 
67 Ibid, 36. 
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Lament is one aspect of ‘the more’ required of us as relational beings who are 
both agents and subjects in the projects of becoming ourselves.  Without lament as a 
Christian pathos,68 we are ill-equipped to encounter (and counter) domination, 
oppression, and suffering.  Instead, we are stuck in “silent despair,” “forgotten sadness,” 
and “frozen grief.”69  We become comfortably numb to ourselves and to the pain of 
others that calls for a response.  Lament is grief work; it is the voice that cries out, like 
Job’s.           
Even when those who suffer injustices cannot cry out, lament offered by those in 
solidarity is an assertion that calls for recognition.  It is a distinctively recognition-
oriented response that lays the groundwork for further engagement through resilient 
performances and hopeful participations, ideas that I develop in the next chapter.  When 
communities of faith, pastoral theologians, and caregivers lament, we acknowledge that 
we are social selves who are not only subject to domination, structural violence, or 
political repression, but also agents whose voices rise resiliently in the face of the 
systems that cause suffering.  Further, lamenting in solidarity ensures that theology and 
politics are not marked off as separate containers of belief and action, but instead bleed 
into each other.   
When we wail our lament, we affirm the human need and ability to heal from 
political and social wrongs that cause undue social suffering and oppression.  Writing 
about South African apartheid, feminist practical theologian Denise M. Ackermann 
                                                
68 Wiliam Blain-Wallace, “The Politics of Tears: Lamentation as Justice-Making,” 
Injustice and the Care of Souls, eds. Sheryl A. Kujawa-Holbrook and Karen B. Montagno 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 188. 
 
69 Ibid., 184. 
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observes that the systems of repression “required compliant interlocking political, social 
and religious systems.”70  Thus, she argues, social healing cannot be separated from 
political healing.  Further, just as political repression psychologically harms all those 
subject to it, Ackermann argues that apartheid did so as well.  Thus, victims and 
perpetrators need the opportunity to lament wrong-doing and the loss of humanity in 
order to heal from social and political oppression.  Lament then becomes a theological 
and political act of assertion.   
More than a theological and political act, lament is an embodied act of resistance 
to the status quo.  For example, Ackermann describes “keening bodies” of women who 
are deemed liturgically inappropriate in South Africa’s mainline Christian churches, yet 
who publicly lament for days on end in African rural villages and townships.71  The 
keening body of an African woman is a formidable site; her cries affirm that not all is 
right and that there are wrongs that must be acknowledged.  Lament is the cry of 
resistance against being turned in a symbol of the subjugated Other.       
 In Garhwal, India, in the Central Himalayas, the Harijans are the lowest castes of 
persons.  They suffer economically, physically, politically, and even spiritually.  They are 
constantly humiliated, with insults hurled at them, or addressed as boy or girl, the form of 
‘you’ reserved for animals and children.  As anthropologist William S. Sax writes, “If 
ever there was a ‘community of suffering,’ this is it.”72  In the face of their suffering, they 
                                                
70 Denise M. Ackermann, “A Voice Was Heard in Ramah,” Liberating Faith Practices: 
Feminist Practical Theologies in Context, eds. Denise M. Ackermann and Riet Bons-
Storm (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 81. 
 
71 Ibid., 96. 
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too lament, crying out to the Hindu deity Bhairav.  Bhairav is their god of justice who 
responds when the Harijan call out, “I have no one.”  Commenting on the hidden 
transcripts that detail Bhairav’s appearance, the secreted property of the Harijan, Sax 
explains, “When the protagonist utters this sentence, it is a moment of maximum 
weakness and helplessness, and yet it is at precisely this moment that the god of justice 
appears, to punish the wicked and bring justice to the oppressed.”73 
 In rituals the Harijan call on Bhairav and ask him to manifest himself in the 
bodies of the believers.  Gathered together they sing songs and proclaim “I have no one,” 
a profound sentiment given that networks of allies are the measure of political and social 
power in traditional societies.74  Alone and vulnerable, the Harijan assert the truth of their 
situation and await religious response.  Believers know when Bhairav recognizes the 
truth of the Harijan claim; he possesses the body of the believer, with hands clawed, teeth 
barred, and waist bent.  He dances on his knees and rolls on the floor.  The body of the 
believer becomes Bhairav’s and through this embodiment, the Harijan experience a 
modicum of healing.      
The Harijan and cult of Bhairav are important reminders to those of us who call 
for lament, healing, and justice.  Just like the Harijan are a community that embodies 
their god of justice, Christian communities of faith are called to embody the Christian 
God of justice.  Christian communities are called to practice lament for themselves and 
for others, and in doing so, to manifest the grace of God, to become persons who can 
                                                
72 William S. Sax, God of Justice: Ritual Healing and Social Justice in the Central 
Himalayas (New York: Oxford, 2009), 25. 
 
73 Ibid., 32. 
 
74 Ibid., 45. 
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recognize subjects who are made other by the doctrines, laws, and structures that would 
mask injustice.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I presented Jessica Benjamin’s psychological theory of recognition 
and assertion and described their imbalances in the forms of submission and domination.  
I argued that her theory is helpful to understand the importance of recognition for subject 
formation.  I critiqued her theory for relying too heavily on an assent to submission and a 
capability, understood as freedom, to mutually engage in the process of assertion and 
recognition.  I used structural violence and political repression to make the case that 
asserting oneself in the midst of social suffering is challenged through conditioned forms 
of submission that become indifference.  I argued lament is a practice to be cultivated in 
order to move from indifference to recognition and resistance. 
In the next chapter, I consider another theory of subjectivity and recognition in the 
work of philosopher Judith Butler.  As I describe her theory, she stands as an oppositional 
figure of sorts to Jessica Benjamin in that she draws out the limitations and binds of 
recognition.  No doubt, there is hope for change in Butler’s work, but it will require that 
pastoral theologians be willing to read signs of resistance to fixed identities. 
 136 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
STRUCTURAL FORMATIONS AND PERSONAL IDENTITIES: 
RECONGINZING AND ASSERTING/PASSING AND CONFRONTING 
 
 
 
Women experience violence of all sorts in which they are targeted because of 
their gender: sexual violence, domestic and intimate partner abuse, trafficking, and 
human rights abuses in the form of forced marriages.  These are violent acts that 
contribute to a state of insecurity for women.1  In addition, women experience economic 
inequities, and social, political, and religious blocks that prevent their participation and 
reception of the goods found in these systems.  Taken as a whole, they are the symptoms 
of interpersonal, social, and structural relationships that are unjust and oppressive to 
women.    
   Symptoms call for diagnosis through analysis.  As I have shown, gender is one 
helpful category to analyze suffering.  Gender analysis helps us to determine strategic 
interventions for care.  As an analytic category, gender functions to show us 
commonalities between those who suffers.  However, gender, like other identities, is not 
the only means for analysis.  What is needed in many analyses is the intersection of 
gender analysis with other identities that place women at-risk, such as race or sexuality.  
                                                
1 Brooke A. Ackerly, Universal Human Rights in a World of Difference (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4.  Ackerly uses ‘insecurity’ to describe complex 
political, social, and economic conditions that contribute to gendered human rights 
violations.  For example, in Bangladesh violent crimes against women go unreported or 
underreported.  When they are reported, the judicial arms of justice, e.g. the police and 
the judiciary, do not evenly enforce the law.  Legal failures are linked to social practices 
of violence that violate women’s human rights, creating a “context of insecurity.”  
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Even then, analysis by identity, like gender, becomes less than helpful when we mistake 
the analytic category for an experiential formation of the subject.  
In my initial research with hospital chaplains, I was critical of the chaplains’ lack 
of an intersectional analysis of the women’s identities and social locations, and how these 
factors impacted their experience of child loss or fetal demise.  I saw this as a problem of 
misrecognition which impacted the kind of care a woman received.  It was a problem of 
gendered care injustice.  However, as I continued to research best pastoral care practices, 
I confronted the problem of recognition and assertion, again.  This time, identity itself 
became a category for analysis.  When I stepped back from my research, I was able to see 
that I asked about the category of identity as if it were something that the subjects did 
once and forever, instead of asking how they were done by, or submitted to, their 
identities.  As a result, I missed a chance to analyze how they understood their subject 
formation through a socially-constructed identity and if they resisted their formation. 
Furthermore, I faced a conundrum in trying to write about pastoral care through 
the lens of identity.  Did I presume that all the women suffered emotional outpourings of 
grief because I assumed that females were more natural or ‘in-touch’ with their 
emotions?  Did I presume that I could tell these women about the kind of care they 
needed because they seemed intelligible to me?  Did I misrecognize them by fixing and 
solidifying identity even when assertions to the contrary were being made?  By 
solidifying in my mind who counted as a woman in need of care, did I not recognize 
certain women, making them Other?  In other words, I found myself in a Catch-22.  I 
desired to analyze my findings through an intersectional approach using the categories of 
gender and race/ethnicity in order to give voice to the women whose suffering I thought 
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was compounded by health injustices that they might have experienced as a result of 
ethnocentrism, racism, and classism.  Yet, I was aware that my attempts to do this kind of 
analysis, especially through a broad pastoral care lens, bordered on misrecognition and 
abstraction.     
In the last chapter, I focused on unjust individual and social suffering in the form 
of domination.  I explained how this suffering occurs from a psychological standpoint 
and explained how it shapes subjects.  Without complex accounts of suffering and 
subjectivity, we cannot adequately think toward responses which enable recognition and 
assertion in intersubjective or socio-political relationships.  I argued that lament is a 
theological practice that assists those who suffer, (and those who stand in solidarity with 
those who suffer), to assert themselves.    
In this next chapter, I focus on how one suffers by who one is and what identities 
she occupies.  Drawing from philosopher Judith Butler, I argue that it is vital to 
understand identity as a crucial element in the formation of one’s subjectivity.  Although 
recognition proceeds through relationships between persons, social institutions, and 
cultural and political regimes, it is mediated through identity.  As well, identity is formed 
in relationship to persons, social institutions, and cultural and political regimes who 
confer recognition.  Identity is not the whole and sum of a person; is it one aspect of a 
much fuller subjectivity that emerges in a future horizon.  However, identity is a means 
by which we evaluate whether a subject is like us or not like us.  Identity is also one 
means through which we seek recognition.  We identify people who are like us in gender, 
race, sexuality, or ability in order to organize and advocate for ourselves.  Thus, identities 
can be used to help achieve personal and social recognition.  But at the same time, they 
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can cause suffering to a subject through non-recognition or misrecognition which effects 
harms.   
  
 
Social Recognition: Judith Butler and Performative Identities 
 
 
 
On January 22, 2006, the indigenous people of Bolivia, who make up nearly sixty 
five percent of the population, celebrated a significant win for their social recognition and 
political representation when Evo Morales, an Amayran Indian coca grower and union 
leader from the Chapare region, was sworn in as the first indigenous president.  Wearing 
a jacket embroidered with traditional Andean designs, Morales asked for a moment of 
silence for the fallen heroes of Bolivian rebellion, and then recounted in a booming voice 
how the indigenous peoples were subjugated for the past 500 years.  He critiqued the 
capitalist and colonial systems that had looted the natural resources of Bolivia and the 
political leaders who had aligned their policies with those demanded by the International 
Monetary Fund’s neoliberal policies, resulting in the oppression and economic 
exploitation of the indigenous peoples.  Staring down former presidents, he announced 
that his government had come to power to change the historical situation of the 
indigenous people and put an end to the colonial state.  Within the year, a new 
constitution for the plurinational state of Bolivia was approved and included safeguards 
to ensure social recognition for the plurality of indigenous groups and their languages, 
and their political representation in the National Assembly.2  Despite the multiethnic 
                                                
2 Luis A. Gómez, “Evo Morales Turns the Tide of History,” Dispatches from Latin 
America: On the Frontlines Against Neoliberalism, eds. Teo Ballvé and Vijay Prashed 
(Cambridge, Mass: South End, 2006), 140-145.  
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indigenous population, this is a case in which organizing persons by a shared identity 
resulted in a level of social recognition that had been hampered by centuries of 
exploitation. 
Like the indigenous people of Bolivia, second wave feminists of the twentieth 
century argued that women as a group of people had experienced centuries of oppression 
and subjugation through patriarchal culture, language, and philosophy.  They argued that 
women needed to work together to achieve personal, economic, and political gains.  
Beginning in the early 1980s, third wave feminists brought attention to the fact that 
feminism was, like patriarchy, largely white and upper-middle class.  In theology, 
womanists and mujeristas pointed out that feminist theology had not adequately 
accounted for the unique experiences of black and Latina women, thus presuming a 
universal white female subject.  Recall from Chapter Two that in the last twenty years 
feminist pastoral theology has attended to the need for diverse voices to speak about the 
specifics of suffering from racist and sexist systems, and encouraged minority voices to 
identify culturally-appropriate care strategies.  In addition to challenging essentialist 
definitions of womanhood that are racist, third-wave feminists include thinkers and 
activists who challenge us to think beyond binary categories of gender and sex, critiquing 
the idea that sex is biological and fixed while gender is variable and cultural.3  In this 
next section, I explore the claims of gender performativity and its impact for social 
recognition drawing on the work of Judith Butler.         
                                                
3 For discussions in feminist theology see Ellen T. Armour, Deconstruction, Feminist 
Theology, and the Problem of Difference: Subverting the Race/Gender Divide (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1999); Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Changing the Subject: 
Women’s Discourses and Feminist Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994). 
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Both critiqued and admired in the academy and in public life, Judith Butler is a 
third-wave feminist philosopher whose social theories cannot be ignored. Her writing 
examines broad and divergent topics including gender and sexuality, war and violence, 
and cultural politics.  She draws from continental philosophy, literary theory, social and 
political theory, feminist theory, and queer theory, of which “she is regarded by many as 
the queer theorist par excellence” and a founder of the field.4  She is the Maxine Eliot 
Professor in the departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature and the co-director 
of the program in Critical Theory at the University of California at Berkeley. She also 
holds the Hannah Arendt Chair at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, 
Switzerland, where she teaches a summer intensive. She is a prolific writer, authoring, 
co-authoring, and editing over twenty books, and authoring numerous book chapters and 
countless articles. She is the subject of the film Philosophical Encounters of the Third 
Kind (2006) and featured in the film The Examined Life (2008).   
Judith Butler is best known for her influential book Gender Trouble: Feminism 
and the Subversion of Identity (1990) in which she questioned whether “women”, who it 
was assumed shared essential characteristics and interests, was the proper subject of 
feminism.5  Gender Trouble not only pioneered new territory in feminist thought, but 
established itself as a foundational text in queer theory.6  Working in a Foucaldian spirit, 
she destabilizes the account of gender through her theory of performativity which draws 
                                                
4 Sara Salih, Judith Butler (New York: Routledge, 2002), 7. 
 
5 Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville, eds., “Judith Butler in Theory,” Bodily 
Citations: Religion and Judith Butler (New York: Columbia UP, 2006), 1.  Also see Salih 
(2004). 
 
6 Ibid., viii.  
 142 
from philosophers J.L. Austin and Jacques Derrida. In her account, gender is active; it is 
“a doing rather than a being.”7 Cause and effect are reversed in this theory. I do not ‘do’ 
my gender; my gender does me.  Gender, then, is not a performance that is freely chosen 
from myriad creative possibilities by the subject. Instead, gender performance is a 
constraint that may also become a site for its undoing.  
Gender Trouble is a significant work of queer theory. Once a derogatory term for 
LGBT persons who challenged the heteronormative ideal, queer denotes a move away 
from binary categories such as gay/straight, woman/man, and connotes fluidity in sexual 
orientation and gender identity.  Likewise, queer theory challenges the premise that sex 
and gender are essential categories that exist by genetic or divine decree. As 
anthropologist Tanya Erzen explains, “Instead, queer theory argues for the idea that 
identities are culturally and historically determined rather than fixed; sexual practices and 
desires change over time and do not consistently line up with masculine or feminine 
gender expectations.”8   In broader academic discourse queer theory deconstructs 
normalizing practices and institutions. It does not signal a sexual identity as such, but 
indicates an outlook that challenges hegemony, dominating discourses (including that of 
identity), and knowledge-power regimes.9       
                                                
7 Sarah Salih, The Judith Butler Reader, ed. Sarah Salih with Judith Butler (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2004), 90. 
 
8 Tanya Erzen, Straight to Jesus: Sexual and Christian Conversion in the Ex-Gay 
Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press), 2006, 14. 
 
9 Joretta Marshall, “Models of Understanding Differences, Dialogues and Discourses: 
From Sexuality to Queer Theory in Learning and Teaching Care,” Journal of Pastoral 
Theology 19 (Winter 2009) : 37. 
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In the academic discourse of religion, Judith Butler and queer theory occupy an 
increasingly vital and critical place.  In pastoral theology, care, and counseling, queer 
theory has not yet had a starring role in the extensive conversations about sexuality, 
gender, and difference.  However, the conversation has begun.  Feminist pastoral 
theologians Joretta Marshall, Pamela Cooper-White, and Elaine Graham have conversed 
with Butler’s work by way of the topics of gender/sexuality, multiplicity and the self, and 
practice, respectively.10  
The site of subjectivity as the site of agency is a theme in Butler’s writing. She 
explores these themes of limitation in Bodies That Matter (1993), where she takes up the 
materiality and the intelligibility of the body, correcting and responding to critiques of 
her theory of performativity.11  This same theme is also explored deeply in The Psychic 
Life of Power (1997). Butler draws on the Foucauldian paradox that one becomes a 
subject through being subjected and subjecting oneself to power relations, as well as a 
Freudian account of the psyche, to expand her theories of gender and sex.  The 
implications demonstrate the limits of recognition in social and political life and the need 
for an ethic in which mourning displaces the fixity of identity, themes which she explores 
in Giving An Account of Oneself  (2005), Precarious Life (2006), and Frames of War 
(2009). 
In this section, I hope to extend the conversation by thinking about recognition in 
light of Butler’s insights on gender performance and subjectivity, the materiality of the 
                                                
10 See Marshall, 2009; Pamela Cooper-White, 2011; and Elaine Graham, TP, 1996.      
 
11 BTM, x-xii. 
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body and its implication for recognition, and the ethical implications of recognition and 
loss.  
 
Gender Performance and Subjectivity 
It is not unusual to hear conversations in which sex is described as fixed and 
anatomical, and gender as socially constructed, with sexuality arising from the blend of 
these two descriptions.  Judith Butler reverses this way of thinking and argues that 
sexuality privileges heternormativity, misshaping how we understand gender and sex.    
In this next section, I explain how Judith Butler uses the concept of gender performance 
to deconstruct the feminist subject, and the implications for social recognition.   
Judith Butler is often cited for her work on gender performance.  In Gender 
Trouble (1990), Butler argues that gender is an iterative performance, following from 
Simone de Beauvoir’s statement that a woman is not born but made.  In Butler’s thought, 
the body is a permeable site where social and political systems of gender/sex significate 
themselves.12  Whereas second-wave feminists wished to oppose biological determinism 
by showing that sex does not determine gender roles, for example that an anatomical 
female may become a powerful business person, or that an anatomical male may become 
a house husband, Butler collapses sex/gender distinctions.13  According to Butler, 
masculinity and femininity as gender “masquerade as natural” by pointing to the body’s 
primary and secondary sex organs “as their signature and guarantee.”14  However, sex is 
                                                
12 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1999), 189.  Henceforth GT. 
 
13 Armour and St. Ville, 2. 
 
14 Ibid., 5. 
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no more natural than gender.  Butler explains, “Gender is not to culture as sex is to 
nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which ‘sexed nature’ or ‘a natural 
sex’ is produced and established as ‘prediscursive,’ prior to culture, a politically neutral 
surface on which culture acts.”15  It is not our sex which determines our gender and 
sexuality, or the presence of the penis which illuminates masculinity and leads to 
heterosexual desire marked by absence as vagina and thus woman.  Instead, “a social 
system of compulsory heterosexuality” shapes desire in such a way that it must be 
worked out through gender and sex as two distinct and binary aspects of our 
subjectivity.16      
I do my gender correctly through my learned performance of ‘woman.’  To take 
on this role, I move a certain way with my body and wear certain kinds of clothes and 
shoes that reflect my gender.  I react in certain kinds of ways to emotional overtones, 
such as caring for others at the expense of my own well-being.  Additionally, my learned 
performance of ‘woman’ includes (or is suppose to include) heterosexual desire.  Thus, I 
am constituted as a woman when the social and political systems of gender/sex have 
acted upon me sufficiently enough to render me intelligible, or recognizable, as ‘woman.’  
I repeat this performance day-in and day-out and thus I become intelligible as a woman 
because I live up to the social law of woman as heterosexual. 
Those who do not perform woman correctly are subject to othering, abjection, or 
expulsion.  “Butch” women are too manly; black women are not white enough; and 
lesbians are not heterosexual.  Their performances of ‘woman’ do not measure up.  
                                                
15 GT, 10. 
 
16 Armour and St. Ville, 5. 
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According to Butler’s theory, the ideology of woman cannot tolerate deviations and thus 
expels those who expose the ideology of the idealized woman.  However, Butler argues 
that no person ever measures up to the ideal significations of gender, and this is the point 
where those who would perform woman can leverage their performances to undo systems 
of gender.  Drag performances of women are one example.  
In a drag performance, a biological male performs as woman.  Butler explains that 
there are actually three distinct aspects of performing woman: anatomical sex, gender 
identity, and performed gender.  A woman cannot be defined by gynecological category 
alone nor by how she identifies herself.  These two aspects of being a woman are distinct, 
but also interpreted in light of how she inhabits her womanhood.  A drag queen may have 
a penis and identify as a man, but his performance as a woman suggests that he is a 
woman.  The result is a dissonance between these three distinct aspects.  This dissonance 
asks us to unravel the illusion of gender as one, naturalized thing instead.  Drag 
performances reveal that no gender identity is ever stable, but always a contested and 
contingent terrain.  Butler explains,    
As much as drag creates a unified picture of “woman” (what its critics often 
oppose), it also reveals the distinctness of those aspects of gendered experience 
which are falsely naturalized as a unity through the regulatory fiction of 
heterosexual coherence.  In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative 
structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency.  Indeed, part of the pleasure, 
the giddiness of the performance is in the recognition of a radical contingency in 
relation between sex and gender in the face of cultural configurations of causal 
unities that are regularly assumed to be natural and necessary.17 
 
Butler’s point here is that ‘woman’ should not be understood as something natural or 
given.  Woman is not naturally heterosexual or even anatomically female.  Instead, 
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woman is a set of normative practices that are reiterated over and over upon subject, 
forming the subject into someone recognizable as a woman. 
 Due to the creative dissonance between anatomical sex, gender identity, and 
gender performance, drag performances in particular are locations where the lies of a 
‘natural woman’ are revealed.  Because every performance of woman is an iteration of 
signifying practices, every performance is radically contingent.  A ‘woman’ can fail to do 
her gender correctly in all sorts of ways.  A subject underperforms or overperforms 
woman and shows the contingency of gender.  A drag queen or male-to-female 
transgendered person clothes herself in make-up, pantyhose, brassieres, and high heels, 
and ‘fools’ the man on the street.  Were that man on the street to recognize the drag 
queen as a male/man ‘masquerading’ as a woman, we assume that he would judge her 
performance a failure.  However, instead of judging her performance as a failure of 
woman, we are urged to consider how no one ever measures up to the heterosexual (and 
white, able-bodied, and upper-middle class) ideologies that constitute woman.  Every 
body is a gender outlaw. 
  Becoming a woman is a subject formation by repetition and failure.  It is a 
“regulated process of repetition.”18  Social recognition of oneself as a woman is 
conditional.  It hinges upon the subject’s performance of discursive codes.  Butler writes, 
“Indeed, to understand identity as a practice and as a signifying practice, is to understand 
culturally intelligible subjects as the resulting effects of a rule-bound discourse that 
inserts itself in the pervasive and mundane signifying acts of linguistic life.”19  To be a 
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woman is to consciously and unconsciously assert one’s participation in the matrix of 
social gender codes and await the response.  Though we cannot determine our success or 
failure at meeting social norms, recognition from discursive, social, and political systems 
confers intelligibility as a “yes,” a “no,” or a “maybe”. 
 
 
Recognition of Intelligible Bodies: Passing As   
 
 In Butler, to become a subject one is subjectivated to constellations of power that 
map themselves upon the body.  Rule-bound discourse shapes something into 
somebody—on the one hand, somebodies who are intelligible and recognizable, but also, 
on the other hand, somebodies who are not intelligible and are misrecognized or not 
recognized at all.  Because all bodies acts in light of this idealized image of the gendered 
subject, no body ever performs its gender perfectly.  In fact, there are innumerable 
opportunities for performance failure: “The injunction to be a given gender produces 
necessary failures, a variety of incoherent configurations that in their multiplicity exceed 
and defy the injunction by which they are generated.”20   
Gender failures are not performances for which we ought to chide ourselves or 
feel ashamed.  Instead, Butler instructs us to see failed performances as sites of agency 
that challenge the ideological systems that dominate the subject.  However, she also 
warns that challenging ideological systems is risky and can cause harm to those who do 
so through personal violence—think of Matthew Shepard’s violent death because he 
challenged the normative heterosexual matrix—or through structural violence—think of 
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the impact of political systems in Bolivia that punished the indigenous to fit the ideal of 
the colonized subject.  I explore these claims below.  
Performances are not costumes or clothes.  Gender/sex identities cannot be taken 
on and off, like sweaters or shoes or pantyhose.  They are constructed but also given. So, 
while I may choose to enact a gender performance of a certain type, there are limits to my 
intelligibility.  Like the drag queen’s Adam’s apple or the humiliated, bent-over posture 
of the Harijan,  my body may give me away in all sorts of ways I had never imagined 
possible.  As such, performativity is a delimiting concept rather than one which allows 
for the making and unmaking of all gender, as if all gender and sex options were 
available in the fictional closet.  Butler explains, 
There is a tendency to think that sexuality is either constructed or determined; to 
think that if it is constructed, it is in some sense free, and if it is determined, it is 
in some sense fixed.  These oppositions do not describe the complexity of what is 
at stake in any effort to take account of the conditions under which sex and 
sexuality are assumed.  The “performative” dimension of construction is precisely 
the forced reiteration of norms.  In this sense, then, it is not only that there are 
constraints to performativity; rather, constraint calls to be rethought as the very 
condition of performativity.21   
 
As a delimiting process, performativity maps power and constraints.  However, it also 
opens up possibilities through deviation. 
Performative possibilities are deviations—intentional and more often 
unintentional.  Deviation of a correct gender or sex performance makes possible 
alternatives for doing and undoing gender/sex.  However, deviation from reiterated norms 
comes at a price.  A subject may become unintelligible and unrecognized at multiple 
levels of scale, or worse, may experience violence, injustice, and oppression as a 
consequence of lack of recognition.   
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When subjects do not perform their gendered, sexual, or racial identities correctly, 
they reveal the ideological construction of a normative identity.  Heteronormativity, 
racism, sexism, and classism are ideological products that work through identity to 
delimit, fix, and make static a subject.  When a woman claims that she could never be a 
lesbian, she stabilizes and fixes her subject position as a heterosexual woman.  She 
removes a possibility.    
 When the removal of a possibility is mourned, greater psychic self-cohesion is 
possible.  When the removal of a possibility is not mourned, the subject experiences 
sexuality as split between good and bad.  She unconsciously chooses between all good—
heterosexuality—or all bad—homosexuality.  When heterosexuality (and heterosexuals) 
is posited as all good, and homosexuality (and homosexuals) is posited as all bad, the 
lives of heterosexuals are blessed while the lives of homosexuals are denigrated.  This 
line of thinking show us that theories and practices of gender/sex and care ought to be 
carefully examined for ideological norms contained within them that bless some lives and 
denigrate other lives.      
Subjects who occupy multiple planes of identity are also confronted by the 
ideological apparati that may confer recognition if the subject performs correctly enough, 
deny recognition, or enable misrecognition in the form of passing.  Categories of identity 
cannot be neatly unpacked and deideologized because the subjects who inhabit and are 
inhabited by identities do not live their lives as separate categories of existence.  To do so 
can cause harm, as critical race theorist and UCLA School of Law and Columbia Law 
School professor Kimberlé Crenshaw has shown. 
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In her article “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color,” Crenshaw argues that when policymakers and social 
organizations do not attend to structural, political, and representational intersectionality 
women of color are hurt by mutually reinforcing policies of racial and sexual 
subordination, as I mentioned in Chapter One.  For example, Crenshaw shows us that 
white women who experience rape access better interventions for assistance than women 
of color.  She informs us that information about rape crisis centers is distributed more in 
white communities than communities of color, that rape counselors assist women of color 
with housing and needs other than the emotional and physical trauma of rape, and that 
although resources are allocated to have professionals accompany victims of rape to 
court, women of color are less likely to pursue their cases in the criminal justice system.22  
She argues that “intervention strategies based solely on the experiences of women who 
do not share the same class or race backgrounds will be of limited help to women who 
because of race and class face different obstacles.”23 
Like Crenshaw, Butler urges us to consider to how the collusion of race and 
gender form the subject.  While intersectionality examines the formation and deformation 
of the subject at the nexus of systems of gender and race, Butler argues that the systems 
of identity articulate the conditions “for each other.”24  She asks,  
How is raced lived in the modality of sexuality?  How is gender lived in the 
modality of race?  How do colonial and neo-colonial nation-states rehearse gender 
relations in the consolidation of state power? How have the humiliations of 
colonial rule been figured as emasculation (in Fanon), or racist violence as 
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sodomization (Jan Mohammed); and where and how is “homosexuality” at once 
the imputed sexuality of the colonized, and the incipient sign of Western  
imperialism (Walter Williams)?25   
 
Here we are to notice that the collusion of social systems of normative identity not only 
effect the interventions possible in a racist, sexist, classist, ableist, colonial society, but 
shape how subjects must recognize other subjects according to the discursive law.  As 
well, we are to notice the presentation of deformed, partially intelligible, and 
misrecognized subjectivities by those who do not live up to the ideal performance of 
intersectional identity.       
In the essay “Passing, Queering: Nella Larsen’s Psychoanalytic Challenge,” 
Butler argues that identities are not to be read as distinct listings to be set off by 
commas—gender, sexuality, race, class—but as signifiers upon signifiers of power, 
agency, and recognition that are visible and hidden at the same time.  Like 
intersectionality, we must analyze power at the points of identity convergence to reveal 
harms.  In addition, analyzing power at the point of convergence yields information about 
the ways that identities work together to mask what the ideological law would hold as a 
less than good-enough performance of the ideal.  Butler shows us how to do this when 
she rereads Nella Larsen’s short story Passing.  
 In Larsen’s short story Passing the narrative raises questions about the visible and 
the hidden.  “The question of what can and cannot be spoken, what can and cannot be 
publicly exposed, is raised throughout the text, and it is linked with the larger question of 
the dangers of public exposure of both color and desire.”26  Clare is a character who 
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passes in several senses: first she passes as white and second she passes as straight.  In 
fact, she passes better as white because she passes as straight.  Moreover, her passing in 
both senses “signifies a certain freedom, a class mobility afforded by whiteness.”27 
 Butler argues that her passing in white circles must be considered in light of her 
straightness and class assumptions.  “Clare passes not only because she is light-skinned, 
but because she refuses to introduce her blackness into conversation, and so withholds the 
conversational marker which would counter the hegemonic presumption that she is 
white.”28  But even more, in those same circles her blackness is not called to account 
because her body cannot be read “because what can be seen, what qualifies as a visible 
marking, is a matter of being able to read a marked body in relation to unmarked bodies, 
where unmarked bodies constitute the currency of normative whiteness.”29  To say it 
another way, because Clare acts white and appears white, there is no question of her 
whiteness.  Her body is perceived as an unmarked body.  She passes.   
However, her passing is an act of misrecognition of her bodily performance of a 
raced woman.  Yet, she benefits by misrecognition in terms of her social status.  Further, 
in her misrecognition she receives recognition from her overtly racist husband, who 
claims that he would never associate with blacks.  Paradoxically, his ability to recognize 
her as white is fueled by his vehement racism.  In his psyche he experiences blackness as 
bad and whiteness as good, a dangerous psychic split that enables him to embody his 
whiteness as a pure identity.  Butler explains, Bellow “cannot be white without blacks 
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and without the constant disavowal of his relation to them.  It is only through that 
disavowal that his whiteness is perpetually—but anxiously—reconstituted.”30   
Passing does not remove the inhabited identities that constitute the subject, but 
instead enlists intersubjective misinterpretation and misrecognition for the sake of 
mutually upholding the normative ideal.  For example, Butler implies that Clare’s body is 
not fully under her own control, even in its passing.  Though her blackness becomes 
visible to her racist husband Bellew when he sees her in the company of other black-
skinned persons in a Harlem salon, there are intimations of her blackness from Bellew 
before this time.  He calls her “Nig” as a pet name; he says that she is becoming more 
dark-skinned day by day.31   
Yet Bellew does not actively name her blackness.  To do so would mean that the 
distinct categories of black as bad and white as good that he desires are not possible in 
the body of the one he loves without exposing his investment in that dichotomy.  When 
Bellew does not consciously allow himself to see Clare’s blackness, he can 
unconsciously desire her as his fetish object.  He desires her blackness even when he says 
he does not want it.  His denied desire eroticizes Clare and makes her more and more an 
object, something to be conquered and dominated.  Her subjugation as an exotic object is 
made possible by his perceptions of her racial ambivalence.  Like many acts of 
recognition and misrecognition of the things that one’s body cannot hide, this game of 
recognition is serious.  Bellow sees her in the all black Harlem salon and he internally 
must confront his racism.  Her passing as white, which is also her passing as 
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heterosexual, is sustained by Bellew’s misrecognition.  He cannot see in her what he 
cannot consider for himself. Butler writes:  
Even as it appears that Clare’s veneer of whiteness is shattered, it is Bellew’s as 
well; indeed, it is the veneer by which the white project of racial purity is 
sustained.  For Bellew thinks that he would never associate with blacks, but he 
cannot be white without his “Nig,” without the lure of an association that he must 
resist, without the spectre of a racial ambiguity that he must subordinate or deny.  
Indeed, he reproduces that racial line by which he seeks to secure his whiteness 
through producing black women as the necessary and impossible object of desire, 
as the fetish in relation to which his own whiteness is anxiously and persistently 
secured.32 
 
As the veneer of Clare’s whiteness disintegrates, so too does her assumed 
heterosexuality.  Sitting next to her, on the precipice of the window, is Irene, another 
light-skinned black who passes, but with great self-ambiguity.  With equal ambiguity, 
Irene both desires Clare and denies her very same desire.  As Butler reads Larsen, “Clare 
embodies a certain kind of sexual daring that Irene defends herself against…and Irene 
finds herself drawn by Clare, wanting to be her, but also wanting her.”33  When Clare 
falls out the salon window to her death, we are to wonder what role Irene played in 
Clare’s death by defenestration.  In her denial of what she cannot have, what she may 
never been able to dream of having, does Irene push Clare so far away that Clare falls to 
her death? 
Along with her theory of gender performativity, Butler makes a significant 
contribution to our understanding of recognition and subjectivity in her interpretation of 
Passing.  With her we learn that intersubjective recognition is not guaranteed, even by 
those who say they love us and with whom we have committed ourselves as partners.  
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We also learn that our being recognized by another correlates to their understanding of 
our intersectional performance of gender/sex, race, and class.  Yet, our recognition is also 
in part based on that other’s ability to reckon with their disavowal by bringing it from 
unconsciousness to consciousness through the work of mourning, as I explore more 
thoroughly below.  Additionally, as we learned earlier, our performances are contingent 
and subject to failure of the idealized norm.  Thus, when recognition is not positively 
conferred, our subjectivity borders on misrecognition in its search to overcome non-
recognition.   
In comparison to Benjamin, Butler’s theory of recognition demonstrates the 
confines of subjectivity.  Assertions by individuals are not guaranteed recognition, even 
when men and women make the difference.  Social groups who press claims for cultural 
recognition are subject to misrecognition even as they move from a non-recognized 
status.  Social mechanisms do us (and our psyches) in such a way that we are limited in 
our ability to imagine other horizons of gender/sex, race, or class.  Yet, horizons stretch 
forward as we perform and fail, calling into question the hegemonic ideal through our 
deviations from the norm.  Butler’s theory calls us to question what hegemonic ideals 
shape our attention to certain subjectivities in feminist pastoral theologies of care, which 
bodies are misrecognized (or pass) in hopes of a positive conferral of recognition, and 
whether formation as a feminist pastoral theologian invites self-introspection of the 
subjectivities we might not consider for ourselves.   
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Mourning and Recognition 
 As Freud has shown us, psychic loss is inevitable.  Mourning, however, does not 
always follow from loss.  Further, a lack of emotional response to loss is a loss in itself.  
Our ability to mourn the lives of others is directly tied to our ability to mourn our own 
lives.  Judith Butler has explored these themes in several of her recent books, including 
Giving An Account of Oneself (2005) and Precarious Life (2004).    In this next section, I 
will show how recognition, mourning, and loss are intertwined processes that affect 
subject formation. 
 In Giving An Account of Oneself, Butler argues that recognition is an ethical 
project based on failure and opacity.34  Remember that for Butler the descriptions we give 
of ourselves are contingent.  They are predicated upon norms into which we have been 
born.  Thus, while we might insist on saying that we have ‘chosen’ to become something, 
this choosing is illusory.  At the same time, deviations in our performance make room for 
new possibilities.  Every time that we say we have chosen an identity, we reveal the 
limitations of the making of that identity even as our performances fail and show the 
making of norms.  Even more, certain ways that we give accounts of ourselves, such as 
the way Clare tells about herself (both by what she says and cannot say, both by what she 
performs and what she cannot perform) show how identities are maps of power, but also 
how they might be recharted.  But more than this, identities and stories are the ways that 
we tell others as well as ourselves about who we are and who we are becoming.   
Yet, Butler makes the point that to give a full account of ourselves is impossible.  
We do not fully know ourselves in the present moment.  Nor do we fully know the selves 
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of our becoming in the future.  Nor do we know if the language, and social and political 
structures available to us will render us unintelligible to others, maybe even to ourselves.  
And yet, we are called to account for ourselves. She writes, 
Although we are compelled to give an account of our various selves, the structural 
conditions of that account will turn out to make a full such giving impossible.  
The singular body to which a narrative refers cannot be captured by a full 
narration, not only because the body has a formative history that remains 
irrecoverable by reflection, but because primary relations are formative in ways 
that produce a necessary opacity in our understanding of ourselves.  An account 
of oneself is always given to another, whether conjured or existing, and this other 
establishes the scene of address as a more primary ethical relation than a reflexive 
effort to give an account, by which we make ourselves intelligible to ourselves 
and to others, are not of our making.  They are social in character, and they 
establish social norms, a domain of unfreedom and substitutability within which 
our “singular” stories are told.35      
 
Our accounting of ourselves is imperfect, and even perhaps impossible.  We recognize 
that our own imperfect or unknown self-knowledge may result in a failure to be 
understood when we try to give an account of ourselves.  When we try to give accounts 
of others, we are even more stymied.  For Butler, this conclusion leads to ethics.   
Given the sustained failure to know the selves that we are becoming and the 
selves that others are becoming, we must suspend judgment of self and of others.  
Because there are pieces of one’s self that have become othered through the process of 
splitting, the suspension of self-judgment calls into being a destabilized and reflexive 
self.  She is a subject who pauses in the midst of her assertions and petitions for 
recognition because she acknowledges the limitations of fully knowing herself.  If she 
cannot fully give an account of herself, then giving a full account of another is equally 
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difficult.  Thus, an ethic of recognition “obligates us to suspend judgment in order to 
apprehend the other.”36   
In the last chapter, I recounted how domination oppresses subjects through 
personal and social relationships.  Psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin argued that 
domination and submission is a twisting of the bonds of love that roots in the psyches of 
both individuals.  Likewise, recognition and judgment are relational.  The acts 
presuppose some kind of relationship between the knower and known.  While 
interpsychic phenomena are important, Butler urges us to consider the ethics of rhetoric.   
Judging is enacted by the mode of address. The words spoken tell us something about the 
nature of the relationship between selves and the relationship one has with one’s self.  
Take condemnations as one example.  Condemnation, denunciation, and excoriation as 
forms of address “posit an ontological difference between judge and 
judged….Condemnation becomes the way in which we establish the other as 
nonrecognizable or jettison some aspect of ourselves that we lodge in the other, whom we 
then condemn.”37   Like domination, condemnation limits self-knowledge by creating 
greater disparity between the disavowed and the judger.  If the judger can see no 
commonality between herself and another, then her own self-knowledge becomes even 
more opaque.  
Like domination, condemnation enacts violence against another subject.  It purges 
and externalizes one’s own opacity, so that it is not part of one’s own self but instead 
removed.  For example, Bellew’s projects his vehement racism outward in his inability to 
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understand his desires.  He judges and condemns the personification of blackness that 
desires but that he will not acknowledge in himself.  Butler writes, “Judgment can be a 
way to fail to own one’s limitations and thus provides no felicitous basis for a reciprocal 
recognition of human beings as opaque to themselves, partially blind, constitutively 
limited.”38  As such, recognition is based on the awareness of self-limitation, which 
provides an ethical basis for an awareness of another’s limitation.  Judgment is 
misrecognition and stems from a failure to know that we are limited in our knowledge of 
ourselves and others who surround us.       
Like other limitations and failures, lack of self-knowledge calls for grief work and 
lamentation.  However, by its very nature, the inability to mourn our lack of self-
knowledge is difficult.  In order to mourn what we are not due to foreclosure of 
possibilities—the straight man who will never be gay—requires self-reflexive knowledge 
and terrible self-insight.  As such, we cannot grieve that which we do not wish to 
acknowledge in ourselves.  We cast internal otherness outward in judgment and 
misrecognition resulting in oppression and domination in our personal and social 
relations. 
However, it is also the case that internalized otherness is not cast-out, but instead 
goes unrecognized and unacknowledged.  Instead of misrecognition, it is non-
recognition.  Non-recognition, like misrecognition, is an injustice to one’s self and to 
another.  Non-recognition results in an inability to grieve one’s life or another’s life.  It is 
a state of deep opacity in which one no longer stretches out her hands to feel for another, 
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but surrenders to the inky darkness in which no emotions of grief or injustice can 
reinstate an ethical relationship.     
In her 2004 book Precarious Life, Butler asks, “What makes for a grievable 
life?”39  We may ask her question differently: Why are some lives ungrievable?  She 
indicates that subjects become ungrievable by prohibitive speech acts.  She reports that in 
2002 a Palestinian citizen of the United States submitted obituaries of two families killed 
by Israeli troops.  The San Francisco Chronicle refused to run the obituaries without 
proof of death.  In lieu of obituaries, they stated that memoriams could be submitted to 
the paper.  After revision, the memoriams were rejected as well “with the explanation that 
the newspaper did not wish to offend anyone.”40   
Butler argues that the refusal to acknowledge the deaths publicly in speech is the 
violence of non-recognition enacted on those who were killed.  It is not their deaths that 
are offensive to others, but their lives, which will not be written as ‘lost.’  Butler writes, 
Is it that these deaths are not considered to be real deaths, and that these lives not 
grievable, because they are Palestinian, or because they are victims of war?  What 
is the relation between the violence by which these ungrievable lives were lost 
and the prohibition on their public grievability? Are the violence and the 
prohibition permutations of the same violence? Does the prohibition on discourse 
relate to the dehumanization of the deaths—and their lives?41     
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In this case, the “refusal of discourse”42 dehumanizes the subject.  They are made victims 
twice-over, first in their deaths and again in the public’s inability to be confronted by 
their deaths.  Their lives are erased in a physical and literal sense.     
The lack of an ability to identify lives lost as fellow subjects is a particularly 
egregious form of violence.  It is violence by omission.  Butler writes, “Violence against 
those who are already not quite living, that is, living in a state of suspension between life 
and death, leaves a mark that is no mark. There will be no public act of grieving.”43  The 
inability to publicly grieve, to recognize a loss, points to the limits of public discourse 
and silence as a key concept in understanding structural violence.  “It is not just that a 
death is poorly marked, but that is it unmarkable.  Such a death vanishes, not into explicit 
discourse, but in the ellipses by which public discourse proceeds.”44     
Public grief work is important for social and political life.  A refusal or inability to 
grieve forecloses moments of vulnerability when one may be truly challenged, 
rearranged, or transformed.45  Undergoing grief, mourning the loss of another’s life, and 
mourning what never was in our lives reveals the ties that “constitute what we are…that 
compose us.”46  Grief interrupts the carefully constructed narrative that we give of 
ourselves-in-relationship.  Butler writes, “What grief displays…is the thrall in which our 
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relations with others hold us, in way that we cannot always recount or explain, in ways 
that often interrupt the self-conscious account of ourselves we might try to provide, in 
ways that challenge the very notion of ourselves as autonomous and in control.”47  The I 
that I was before loss is different from the I that I am now.  I recognize that I am different 
somehow through the loss, through the foreclosure, of the other’s life. I am also made 
different in the foreclosure of how our lives together might have been, reflecting the 
relationship with others that constitute us as subjects opaque to ourselves. 
It is our ability to mourn and to grieve that elicits the conditions for recognition.  
For recognition is not only about the present, but also about the future which holds both 
possibility and foreclosure.  Butler writes, “To ask for recognition, or to offer it, is 
precisely not to ask for recognition for what one already is.  It is to solicit a becoming, to 
instigate a transformation, to petition the future always in relation to the Other.”48  To 
become a recognized subject requires that one mourn and grieve in order to allow space 
for intrapsychic self-in-relation transformation.  It is an assertion of loss.    
 We assert our losses because they reflect the poverty of our relationships.  When 
we mourn the unjust death of a vulnerable person who experiences multiple jeopardies of 
interlocking oppressions and structural violence, we signal that we are unwilling 
immediate participants who actively seek transformation.  We petition the future (and the 
others of the future) to recognize subjects who are misrecognized or non-recognized 
because I am formed, informed, and deformed by my ethical relationships with others.   
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The ethics of recognizing other subjects requires that we name the binds in which 
we find ourselves.  In primary relationships with caregivers, deformation to the subject 
occurs in relationship to physical and psychosocial needs. The infant becomes an I 
through recognition of self-worth by another.  And yet we know that not all infants have 
the mother or primary caretaker whose face reflects joy and delight upon meeting face to 
face with the human infant.  Instead, they experience emotional paucity or emotional 
abuse, often alongside additional co-factors of economic vulnerability, political 
instability, and social misrecognition or non-recognition, as well as oppression and 
injustice.  Butler writes, “This bind of radically inadequate care consists of this, namely, 
that attachment is crucial to survival and that, when attachment takes place, it does so in 
relation to persons and institutional conditions that may well be violent, impoverishing, 
and inadequate.”49  At the socio-political level, we also find ourselves in binds when we 
do not know whom to mourn because we do not know of their existence.  Butler urges us 
to identify “the cultural barriers against which we struggle when we try to find out about 
the losses that we are asked not to mourn.”50  
Informed by a Butler, a theory of subjectivity requires an account of recognition 
that presumes loss and failure as a condition of its occurrence.  Mourning our losses 
makes recognition possible.  As we petition the future, potential arcs in the relationships 
of our lives open and close against a horizon that we cannot predict or know fully.    
Thus, mourning requests an increased consciousness of the relationships that move us in 
order to inform an ethic which refrains from judgment, on the one hand, and on the other 
                                                
49 Ibid., 45. 
 
50 Ibid., 46. 
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hand, resists the cultivation of cultural blinders that disable responses of recognition.  In 
developing accounts of subjectivity, a Butlerian account of recognition reminds us to 
consider opacity as potentially operative in the most hopeful of attempts to care-fully 
engage persons who suffer and call for intersubjective and/or social recognition.      
  
Critiques of Butler’s Subject 
 
 In the above passages, I presented three areas of Butler’s work that speak to 
subject formation and recognition: gender performance as indicative of the instability of a 
subject position, passing and the intelligibility of the body, and mourning as an ethic of 
recognition.  She has received criticism, especially from feminists and womanists who 
interpret gender performance as removal of an agentic self for personal, social, and 
political change.  I explain these critiques and others below. 
 
 
Removal of the Feminist Subject’s Agency by Language 
    
Philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s 1999 article, “The Professor of Parody,” in The 
New Republic is well-known, perhaps because it is considered to be particularly mean-
spirited. In it, Nussbaum parallels Butler’s dense writing style with the style used by 
ancient sophist rhetoricians.  She argues that Butler’s writing obscures the line of 
argument and “bullies” the reader into accepting the propositions and their conclusions. 
In addition to writing in a difficult to understand style, Nussbaum argues that Butler’s 
theorizing hurts women by removing any normative turn toward a feminist ethic of 
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“social justice and human dignity.”51  What Butler offers is quietism and retreat from the 
most pressing problems that face women; her stance “collaborates with evil,” Nussbaum 
argues.  In short, her work is morally vacuous.   
While Nussbaum’s attack was particularly vitriolic, it captured a sentiment shared 
by feminists who linked theorizing with social action: how does the claim that ‘woman’ 
or “lesbian” as a series of citational performances help those who suffer in material ways 
and who do not yet possess sufficient power to make social and political changes that 
translate into changes in their everyday live?  Does not this claim in fact strip women of 
their agency to create, if not their hope for, significant social and political strides?  Are 
parody and difficult prose real tools for social change?  
Butler engages these critiques in her subsequent writing projects.  In her 1999 
preface to Gender Trouble, Butler informed the reader that her theories were informed by 
social experience and social concern.  “Despite the dislocation of the subject that the text 
performs, there is a person here: I went to many meetings, bars, and marches, and saw 
many kinds of genders, understood myself to be at the crossroads of some of them, and 
encountered sexuality at several of its cultural edges,” she writes.52 Likewise, after the 
publication of Gender Trouble, she heard from many persons outside of the academy 
who, though conceding it is a difficult read, “also felt that something was at stake in that 
                                                
51 Martha Nussbaum, “The Professor of Parody,” The New Republic. 22 February 1999.  
Online http://www.tnr.com/archive/0299/022299/nussbaum022299.html.  Accessed 23 
October 2011.     
 
52 GT, xvi. 
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theoretical work that made the reading worthwhile.”53 In an interview, Butler explains 
that reading her theoretical work is difficult because it destabilizes everyday usage of 
language.54 In this way, language may become a tool for social action by opening up 
linguistic possibilities of refutation, leading us to imagine a different world and to take 
pragmatic political action to calls this world into being.55 However, a fundamental 
question remains: if language is destabilized to make odd what was once normal, is the 
remaining destabilized (and complex!) language available to those who are subjectivated 
at the psychological and material level?  
Likewise, Butler is prescient of feminist political anxiety.  If the feminist subject 
cannot be said to exist as such, how can any political praxis which seeks to rectify 
perceived gendered injustice persist?  Butler responds to this anxiety by reiterating that 
subject construction does not remove agency.  “Construction is not opposed to agency; it 
is the necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and 
becomes culturally intelligible.”56  Gender performances that stretch the limits of 
intelligibility are possible critical interventions.  Rather than globalize the subject through 
use of imperial strategies, strategies which “feminism ought to criticize,”57 the political 
                                                
53 Margaret Soenser Breen and others, “There is a Person Here”: An Interview with 
Judith Butler” International Journal of Sexuality and Gender Studies 6, no. 1/2 (2001) : 
23. 
 
54 Ibid. 
 
55 Robert Alan Brookey and Diane Helene Miller, “Changing Signs: The Political 
Pragmatism of Poststructuralism,” Internal Journal of Sexuality and Gender Studies 6, 
no. 1/2 ( 2001) : 139-153. 
 
56 GT, 201. 
 
57 Ibid. 
 168 
subject who is aware of the construction of gender is an agent who can utilize the tools of 
gender inscribed through the body to contest the matrix of an idealized gendered woman: 
heterosexual, anatomically female, and white.  These are subversive acts of an agent 
whose subjectivity is unstable from the first.  Through repetitive performances, the 
subject both does and undoes gender and him/herself at the same time.58  Performances 
are variations on the idealized subject and thus can potentially make visible the cultural 
apparatus that inscribes the rules of a good or bad gender performance and enables 
subjects to do their performance another way. 
 
 
Theology, the Void, and Gender Injustice 
 
Academics have explored how to put Butler’s theory to work in politics.  They 
argue that bodily-linguistic performances and ongoing performance failures ought to be 
understood as resistance, and by resistance, hope for personal and political change that 
works by coalition rather than as assumed identity by gender, race, ability, etc.  However, 
this conclusion does not necessarily follow from Butler’s writing in Gender Trouble, a 
point that Nussbaum makes in her scathing critique.  Nussbaum writes, “There is a void, 
then, at the heart of Butler’s notion of politics.  This void can look liberating, because the 
reader fills it implicitly with a normative theory of human equality or dignity.  But let 
there be no mistake: for Butler, as for Foucault, subversion is subversion, and it can in 
principle go in any direction.”    
Nussbaum, like many critics of deconstruction, is anxious about the void and its 
results for the subject.  Three questions arise that I think are worth exploring with 
                                                
58 Ibid., 195. 
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theological thinkers who draw on Butler.  First, is this void an empty space for Butler that 
can be filled within anything? Second, is there some kind of ethical vision that this space 
holds open?  Third, what does the void of gender/sex and additional analytic categories of 
identity mean for subjects who experience injustice?  To the first and second, Butler’s 
later writing articulates an ethos that critiques exclusion.59  Empty space exists, but it 
exists for the future possibilities that we cannot yet imagine but which we petition by 
attending to the present’s dimensions of othering.  The void is not empty, but full of 
contingency and possibility, which can never rule out the possibility of failure or 
exclusion. 
British theological ethicist Susan F. Parsons elaborates an eschatological ethos of 
the void in her article, “The Boundaries of Desire: A Consideration of Judith Butler and 
Carter Heyward” in the journal Feminist Theology.  She writes that Butler’s gender 
theorizing is “a move beyond ethics, of after ethics, into what is a spirituality of living 
towards an open horizon.”60  She explains that if we accept the proposition that even the 
best attempts at ethical reasoning are shaped by and reinforce the hegemonic imagination 
and law which excludes, there is a need to think through matters differently.  Different 
thinking leads to different living—temporal living, transcendent living, living with 
Nothing according to Parsons.  At the edges of transcendent living is the acceptance of 
contingency, “an awareness that the orders in which we find ourselves might not be as 
                                                
59 Butler writes in Bodies That Matter, “The task is to refigure this necessary ‘outside’ as 
a future horizon, one in which the violence of exclusion is perpetually in the process of 
being overcome” (53). 
 
60 Susan F. Parsons, “The Boundaries of Desire: A Consideration of Judith Butler and 
Carter Heyward,” Feminist Theology 8 (January 2000) : 103. 
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they are.”61  Parson concludes that transcendant living touches relationships with friends 
where we hold open space for becoming, and living in such a way is closely tied to the 
“deep wisdom of Christian prayer.”62  
The third question I articulated about the dissolution of an ontological feminist 
subject asks us to assess its validity in the face of oppression and injustice.  Womanist 
theologian Karen Baker-Fletcher offers critique: “While White feminists are busy 
deconstructing self, Black women are still claiming the selves that a racist, sexist, classist 
society relentlessly essays to render invisible.”63  However, pastoral theologian Pamela 
Cooper-White offers a positive take on the dissolution of the essential woman.  She 
writes, “[I]t is precisely because these categories are finally constructs, and not 
immutable facts of nature, that gaps and inconsistencies within them may provide spaces 
from which both women and racialized, subaltern, and queered subjects can speak.”64  
The voices from the gaps cast doubt on the working of the idealized norm making 
machine.  As such, “subjugated voices can erode and ‘jam the machinery’ of dominance 
much the way fluids can erode seemingly solid rock.”65  The implication of a stance like 
Cooper-White’s requires that we hold loosely universal moral imperatives and instead 
contextualize them through the intersections of the life of the subject, intersections which 
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are constituted in and through their performance and petitioning of the yet-unknown.  
This stands in contrast to ethical and pastoral projects that begin in the assumptions of 
moral imperatives for sexual or gendered conduct.66   
      
 
Fundamentally Hostile Relationships 
 
For philosopher Kelly Oliver, Butler’s theory of subjectivity is problematic 
because it assumes a hostility between persons as the condition for recognition.  Hostility 
begets an alienation in which transformation of power structures is made impossible.67  
Oliver writes, “By insisting that the structure of subjectivity is one of subjection and 
subordination, Butler builds oppression and abuse into the foundation of subjectivity.”68  
Oliver’s critique hinges upon a different reading of primary attachments in the family of 
origin. 
Per Oliver, in The Psychic Life of Power, Butler normalizes the trauma caused by 
subordination to a child’s primary attachments.  Oliver writes, “Trauma is the essential 
feature of these formative familial relations that set up the possibility of subjectivity.  It is 
the trauma of original subordination that is repeated in all performances of 
                                                
66 Queer theory is perceived from some theological and institutional church circles as 
promoting a permissive, anything goes sexuality based completely on acts of pleasure of 
the individual.  I believe that they misinterpret queer theory more generally as a theory 
without ethics rather than pointing to the ways that exclusion and binary codes function.  
For example, see Christian sexual ethicist Kathy Rudy, Sex and the Church (Boston: 
Beacon, 1997), 123-125.     
 
67 Kelly Oliver, Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis, 2001), 76. 
 
68 Ibid., 62. 
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subjectivity.”69  The problem for Oliver is that subordination and dependency are not 
synonymous; dependency need not result in subordination.  Oliver explains, 
Why does dependency have to be figured as violent, alienating, subjugating, and 
dominating?  Only if we start with the ideal of the self-possessed autonomous 
subject is dependence threatening.  If, however, we give up that ideal and operate 
in the world with a truly interrelational conception of subjectivity, a subjectivity 
without subjects, then dependence is seen as the force of life, as the very 
possibility of change, rather than as the paradoxical life bought at the expense of 
violence and death (Oliver 1998).  Subjectivity need not be the Faustian bargain 
struck by Butler.70 
 
It does not follow that the need for primary caretakers results in subordination, nor that 
subordination by primary caretakers is necessary for subjectivity.  Instead, Oliver asks us 
to envision subject formation made possible by witnessing, a process which can be 
destroyed or damaged through subordination and trauma.71  However, as Butler has noted 
in recent work, the bind of radically inadequate care must be considered in light of 
subject formation.  
 
 
Resilient Performances, Hopeful Participation, and Confrontation 
 
 
 
 Judith Butler assures us that there is a person behind her theorizing.  The question 
for pastoral theologians is whether this notion of the person is adequate.  Butler’s critics 
have implied that it is not.  Nussbaum reminds us that descriptions of persons ought to 
enable their capacity to live better, free from poverty and violence.  Oliver reminds us 
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that childhood trauma ought not be the cause for our becoming subjects.  However, 
Parsons sees the potential for transcendent living in Butler’s work.  Cooper-White 
describes subaltern, minority, and oppressed subjects of a Butlerian stripe whose voices 
confront dominators.   
I believe that Butler’s account of how one becomes a subject does not adequately 
explore intentionality.  Butler’s theory of the subjectivity forgets that a subject’s 
becoming also hinges on the subject’s interpretation of what she is doing in performance, 
as well as what she cannot control.  Subjectivity does not hinge solely on an endless 
recitation of failed performances that seek conferral of external recognition alone; 
performances can be acts of hope and resilience, even when our performance is initially 
understood to be one in which identity recognition is sought and conferred.  Therefore, 
performances which destabilize discourse—which are always happening, both 
intentionally and unintentionally—should also be read through the lens of resilient 
performances and hopeful participations.  
 In the essay “Unconforming Becomings: The Significance of Whitehead’s 
Novelty and Butler’s Subversion for the Repetitions of Lesbian Identity and the 
Expansion of the Future,” Christina K. Hutchins problematizes her participation in a 
denominational conference meeting of the United Church of Christ.72  She recounts being 
anxious and troubled by the structure of the meeting, which was called to address 
multiculturalism and identity.  The planners of the meeting had asked her to participate as 
‘the lesbian representative’.  She argues that though their intentions came from a place of 
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Novelty and Butler’s Subversion for the Repetitions of Lesbian Identity and the 
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engaging diversity, they othered gay men and lesbians by asking them to speak as if their 
primary identity was limited to their sexuality.  She explains, 
While the planners of the multicultural discussions had some sensitivity to issues 
of race, sexual orientation, and other “isms,” the fact was that there were a 
designated “gay” and “lesbian” but no “heterosexual” representative.  All other 
participants of various ethnic and social categories were presumed to be 
heterosexual, an unexamined operation of heteronormativity in which gay men 
and lesbians were defined as “Other.”73 
   
Hutchins thoughtfully and graciously turns a potential interpersonal and pastoral conflict 
into a learning opportunity.  When it was her turn to speak, she introduced herself and 
stated that she “was asked to participate as a lesbian.”74  She did not say, ‘I am a lesbian.’ 
She offered the persons gathered two gifts that lesbians bring to the church.  The first is 
an attention to the embodied nature of faith.  The second is a realization that identities are 
cultural constructs and fluid in their nature, with the outcome that “the categories 
themselves and act of categorization, while often helpful, are also restrictive.”75  Her 
decision to verbalize herself as a participant and not an identity reflects a hope-filled 
consciousness of doing an identity over being identity.  As well, her second gift points to 
the resilience of subjects in spite of categories that limit.  
 Doing an identity is a hopeful participation.76  Participation in an identity 
acknowledges the fluidity and ad hoc nature of an identity without taking away from the 
fact that identities can wound us as well as bolster us.  Participation is an action which 
draws us toward hope.  In participation we come to see that claims of “I am…” do not 
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define the whole of who we are, that identities need not be fixed, that growth and 
transformation are possibilities.  Further, participation has the ability to give rise to hope, 
just as hope gives rise to participation.  Pastoral theologian Susan Dunlap identities five 
qualities of hope.  She writes that it is an action, that it is specific, that it “means 
patience,” that it is rebellious, and that it is communal.77  Participation in an identity—
which is given and chosen, done and undone, a cause and rising of subjectivity—ought 
not be separated from hope, even in the face of systems and persons which cause our 
subjection.   
 Our hope-filled participation is performed resilience.  In the face of setbacks, 
domination, oppression, and injustice, we perform resilience in the everyday practices of 
our lives.  We pursue the big pictures items of our lives—health, healing, good and 
paying work, spirituality, loving families of origin and choice—but we also mourn and 
lament the people that we cannot be in a particular time and place because of structures 
that would dominate us.  Yet, we resist and become more resilient.  Like exposure to a 
disease through vaccination, exposure to ideologies whose normal operations cause harm 
builds up our immunity.  Immunity does not mean that the infection cannot invade our 
bodies and our lives; it can and does.  Immunity means that our bodies and our lives are 
learning how to be unsuitable hosts to diseases that cause personal, social, political, or 
pastoral subordination and oppression. 
 Performances of resilience, like some gender performances, are intended to elicit 
discomfort.  In face of everyday violence which forms, deforms, and informs subjectivity, 
hope-filled participation must make room for confrontation of systems and persons who 
                                                
77 Susan Dunlap, Counseling Depressed Women (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1997), 122-125. 
 176 
would avert their gaze of recognition.78  Confrontation is a key piece of a performance of 
resilience.  When a subject confronts, she gazes at herself as well as another subject.  
Like Butler’s mourning, confrontation employs self-reflexivity. However, it can be 
carried out in various emotional keys, often with layers of dissonant chords: longing and 
desire, love for self and other, and anger and frustration.   
In Black Skin, White Masks, psychoanalyst and postcolonial theorist Frantz Fanon 
shows us the power of confrontation as a performance of resilience.  He begins by 
describing the binds of recognition when he petitions the very same dominator who has 
bound him by his race and gender to recognize him as a black man.   
Locked in this suffocating reification, I appealed to the Other so that his liberating 
gaze, gliding over my body suddenly smoothed of rough edges, would give me 
back the lightness of being I thought I had lost, and taking me out of the world put 
me back in the world.  But just as I get to the other slope I stumble, and the Other 
fixes me with his gaze, his gestures and attitude, the same way you fix a 
preparation with a dye.79 
 
Fanon asks the Other to recognize him as a black man in order to rehumanize him, and 
when that happens, the Other fixes him in his subject position, and makes it impossible 
for him to be anything except black.  He is dehumanized again.  He is not even a man 
because he is black. 
Yet, Fanon implies that he, like O, participates in his objectification through non-
resistance.  He writes, “Disoriented, incapable of confronting the Other, the white man, 
                                                
78 Scheper-Hughes, 272.  Scheper-Hughes describes the averted gaze as “the turning 
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who had no scruples about imprisoning me, I transported myself on that particular day 
far, very far, from my self, and gave myself up as an object.”80  Rather than an active 
participation in his own subjection, the systems of coloniality, race, and gender enlist his 
desire for recognition.  “There were some who wanted to equate me with my ancestors, 
enslaved and lynched: I decided I would accept this.”81  Like O, his becoming a man in 
the eyes of Others, requires his submission.  Yet, he cannot become a man in their eyes 
because he gives the appearance of submission, an act that cannot constitute his 
subjectivity as male.  This is an unconscionable bind.      
Unlike O, Fanon has an epiphany.  Despite his submission, “the white world, the 
only decent one, was preventing me from participating.”82  He recognizes the bind of 
recognition and decides “to make [him]self known” through confrontation.83  He 
confronts the systems and those would dehumanize him through non-recognition and 
misrecognition. He gives us a short dialogue to demonstrate: “Look how handsome that 
Negro is,” he writes.  “The handsome Negro says, ‘Fuck you,’ madame.”84  He 
aggressively asserts himself and restores some sense of his own agency.  He desires 
recognition, but goes about it by exposing his objectification vis a vis the mechanism of 
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the white gaze.  This is the lie that Fanon actively deconstructs in his performance—that 
“what is called the black soul is a construction by white folk.”85 
 Pastoral theologians and ministers ought not shy away from confrontations or 
aggressive assertions, whether we are the ones making them or the ones hearing them.  
As feminist pastoral theologian Kathleen Greider notes, aggression is neither inherently 
negative or positive, but is part of “human createdness,” important to psychospiritual 
health, and indispensable to justice-making.86  Our ability to be effective change-agents 
and caregivers requires our ability to listen for testimonies of resilience and to then 
support persons in their resistance to harmful personal and social relationships and the 
effects of structural violence.   
As pastoral theologians, we know that this is work for the long-haul.  Further, we 
know that it requires communal spaces to facilitate resilience and hope.  In the essay 
“Resistance Is Not Futile” Church of God in Christ minister and psychotherapist Cedric 
C. Johnson argues for a heterotopic praxis to enable “the identification and creation of 
communal spaces of alternate ordering outside of social control.” 87    A heterotopic space 
is central to caring for those who are dispossessed, subaltern, or oppressed. While church 
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communities can be natural places for this work,88 I urge us to resist the making of new 
heterotopic spaces that care, welcome, or serve marginalized subjects.  The making of 
new programs and new spaces by systems of power, including pastoral power, does not 
guarantee their use as a heterotopic space of cultural resistance nor do they always 
provide the creative and playful resources that build up resilient selves.  In pastoral 
theology, what is first needed are modes to enable recognition between subjects.  In my 
next, and last, chapter I outline these modalities and qualities of encounter.        
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 In this chapter I presented Judith Butler’s theory of subjectivity, drawing on key 
concepts of identity performance, their articulation through each other, interpersonal and 
social recognition, and mourning.  Likewise, I presented strong critiques of her theories 
which argued that she normalizes familial and social oppression as necessary conditions 
for agency.  I critiqued Butler for not accounting for intentionality and reframed claims 
for recognition as resilient performances and hopeful participations.  In my final chapter I 
summarize conclusion and reflect on a feminist pastoral theology and praxis of 
recognition.   
                                                
88 There are two considerations.  First, congregations can be heterotopic spaces, 
especially those that develop by, with, and for an oppressed community such as the black 
church.  Yet, even within these communities, experiences of oppression vis a vis 
sexuality are taboo (Anderson, 2004; Douglas, 2004).  What are the spaces where queer 
black folk gather for resistance and resilience?  Second, congregations in the United 
States have taken proactive steps to become welcoming communities for queer folk (gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex).  Faith-based organization Reconciling Ministries 
Network works with congregations in the process of becoming a community that does 
sex/gender justice through inclusion and participation.  The language of welcome and 
hospitality is a first step, but continues to reify the otherness of sexual minorities.      
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
RECOGNIZING OTHER SUBJECTS: TO ENCOUNTER EACH OTHER 
 
 In the preceding chapters I described theories of recognition to understand 
problems in effecting just care.  I showed the possibilities and limitations in interpersonal 
and social-political recognition and how that affects who a person becomes.  I wove my 
argument by describing how recognition proceeds and how it mutates into destructive and 
harmful conditions for the subject.  I described who and what is recognized in light of 
identity formations.  
Those who suffer from structural violence, political repression, domination, and 
interpersonal and familial injustice ought to be afforded recognition.  Yet, this is 
precisely the problem.  Despite the desire to recognize and affirm persons, we all are 
subject to blindness.  Appeals to identity are one way to ensure recognition.  The power 
of indigenous people, LGBTQ activists, racial justice activists, and feminists bears 
testimony to the fact that economic misdistribution is not the sole cause of injustice and 
oppression, but in fact is deeply tied to the perception of one’s identity by a dominant 
majority and the ability of persons to become self-determining, flourishing selves.        
We cannot rid ourselves of identity.  It would be folly for those who suffer 
injustice in relationship to their chosen and given identities.  It would be hubris on the 
part of those whose chosen and given identities uphold destructive ideologies.  The 
failures of recognition urge us to identify ways to recognize other subjects in ways that 
are not domination, submission, or repression.  In this chapter I propose practices of 
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encounter after drawing conclusions from the previous chapters.  While aimed at 
encountering subjects that are not ourselves, practices of encounter nonetheless are 
transformative to the self and enable self-reflection on the ghosts of our own subjection 
with hope for our personal transformation into agents of change. 
 
Project Summary and Conclusions on Recognition and Subjectivity 
 
In this dissertation I argued that attending to theories of recognition provides 
insight into subject formation, claims for justice, and care interventions for feminist 
pastoral theology.  In this section, I review my major arguments and draw preliminary 
conclusions for a feminist pastoral theology that reflects on recognition in its construction 
of the subject.  I conclude that a feminist pastoral theology of recognition examines 
multiple levels and modalities of suffering which inform subjectivity and, further, that 
this theology must inform a praxis of just care.    
 
Overview 
In Chapter One I reflected on problems I encountered while researching decision-
making in ritualized pastoral care practices.  I observed that my chaplain informants 
offered little analysis about how their perception of identity shaped the kind of care they 
gave nor about how their care was received given an (or multiple) identities, especially 
for women who experienced multiple intersecting jeopardies.  I also wondered about the 
limits of knowledge when identity is the primary category of analysis.  I found that the 
literature of feminist pastoral theology, care, and counseling echoed the feminist 
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movement’s examination of gender from a single point of identity (e.g. 
woman/patriarchy) in second wave feminism to multiple points of identity (e.g. woman 
of color/racist and sexist society) in third wave feminism.  I identified challenges to 
proliferation of identity, including the question of recognition.  Recognition is a challenge 
at both an interpersonal and social level.  Yet, recognition (and its counterpart, assertion) 
is also a human need that when gone awry contributes to oppression at every ecological 
level of the psychosocial world.  I argued that feminist pastoral theology ought to be in 
dialogue with theories of recognition because it constructs theologies of care and 
subjectivity for those who suffer.  Lastly, I briefed outlined a revised critical correlational 
and feminist method.  
In Chapter Two I argued that the concern about the subject is at the heart of 
feminist pastoral theology.  Using the themes of paradigms, pastoral functions, and 
human experience, I gave an overview of key texts in the discipline of pastoral theology, 
care, and counseling to narrate the important role that the person plays to the subject 
matter of the discipline.  Next, I examined five examples of contemporary feminist 
pastoral theologies for their understanding of the subject: Joretta L. Marshall on sexuality 
and lesbian identities; Carroll A. Watkins Ali on racial injustice and poverty; Barbara J. 
McClure on a social self; Elaine Graham on cultural discourses that create Others; and 
Pamela Cooper-White on theological anthropology and multiplicity.  I situated my work 
within the scope of feminist pastoral theology.  
In Chapter Three, I articulated Jessica Benjamin’s theory of subjectivity through 
recognition and assertion.  I showed how submission becomes habituated into one’s 
psyche through interpersonal relationships and is perceptible in social structures, like 
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patriarchy.  Benjamin argued that the tension between assertion and recognition must be 
regained in order to end the cycle of domination and submission.  I argued that her theory 
does not adequately take the effects of structural violence into account, citing the 
cultivation of a subject’s passivity and indifference in the face of ongoing suffering and 
the effects of political repression that dismantle consent through bodily and psychic 
violence.  I suggested that theological lamentation is an assertion of resistance to 
domination and oppression.  For those who are unable to lament, solidarity in lament is 
needed. 
In Chapter Four, I presented Judith Butler’s theory of subjectivity through 
recognition using identity performance, bodily intelligibility, and mourning.  I offered 
critical and constructive responses to Butler’s theories, including worries about the 
dissolution of gender, obscure language, and normative claims for agency through 
subordination.  I expanded Butler’s arguments by advocating for attention to 
intentionality.  While our gender and other identities do us, as Butler suggests, subjects 
are also agents who participate with hope in their chosen and given identities and perform 
resiliently through confrontation.         
In the previous four chapters I advanced my overarching thesis that feminist 
pastoral theologians and theorists of recognition have much to converse about in terms of 
subjectivity, domination, suffering, and violence.  Following a feminist revised critical 
correlational method, I identified practical problems in caring for women and elaborated 
on them conceptually.  I reviewed pertinent literature and situated my research, informed 
by colleagues in feminist pastoral theology.  I argued that the theories of recognition 
developed by Jessica Benjamin and Judith Butler provided insight on subject formation 
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through interpersonal and socio-political forces.  I dialogued with additional theorists and 
concepts in psychology, theology, and philosophy to expand theories of recognition.   
 
A Feminist Pastoral Theology of Recognition 
 As I argue in this dissertation, feminist pastoral theology contains implicit and 
explicit reflections on the subject, how harms affect human and social development and 
their impact on subject formation, and what kinds of interventions are possible to enable 
a subject’s flourishing.  Feminist pastoral theology has been particularly attentive to the 
role of difference and identity in thinking through subjectivity and care.  In this next 
section I add my voice to feminist pastoral theological reflections, drawing conclusions 
from the material I presented in the previous chapters.  Below, I describe a feminist 
pastoral theology of recognition in five parts.    
 First, a feminist pastoral theology of recognition attends to the making of subjects 
at the porous and historical peripheries of the intrapsychic, interpersonal, and social-
political.  It asks about the subject, her recognition, and conditions that thwart 
flourishing.  Major theorists Jessica Benjamin and Judith Butler showed us that the 
interplay between intrapersonal, interpersonal, and social relations are dynamically co-
constructive of subjectivity.  Further, each element is both historically situated, materially 
embodied, and influential in creating the internal and external psychosocial environment 
of subjects.  Persons who are denigrated at a social level absorb that denigration 
intrapsychically and may engage in interpersonal relationships where that denigration is 
played out again, often between persons of opposite gender.  These are conditions by 
which oppression and subjugation are made possible.  With other feminist pastoral 
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theologians who have contributed to linking the interpersonal and social realms, a 
feminist pastoral theology of recognition attends to the spiraling levels of complexity 
while making connections between the individual and larger socio-political issues of 
injustice.           
 Second, a feminist pastoral theology of recognition is critically aware of how 
human needs and capabilities are enlisted to oppress and subjugate persons.  At the same 
time, a pastoral theology of recognition is aware that even when needs and capabilities go 
unmet and unrealized, they are still at-play and can be used by the one who seeks 
recognition.  With Jessica Benjamin we learned that persons are capable of recognition 
and assertion.  Because the circuits of recognition and assertion are both capabilities and 
needs, the desire for recognition can morph from circuits to shackles.  Reading The Story 
of O with Jessica Benjamin, we saw that, in some cases, withheld recognition creates a 
psychic need which is filled by submission to an external source of authority.  In reading 
Nella Larsen’s Passing with Judith Butler we saw that Clare’s need for recognition is 
fulfilled through her misrecognition and subsequent passing as a white woman.  Rather 
than ask for an external authority to confer recognition and interpret her performance as 
‘correct’ or ‘incorrect,’ Clare games the system that would expose her body as black, and 
thus an incorrect performance, and passes as white.  A pastoral theology of recognition 
looks toward all these dimensions in order to articulate how a subject is constituted by 
needs and capabilities, but also possesses the ability to subvert systems.         
 Third, a feminist pastoral theology of recognition identifies critical interventions, 
practices, and programs that are attentive to the affective dimensions of life as they are 
expressed in relationships, verbally, and through the body.  We are called to rewire the 
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shackles of domination and submission so that they become circuits of recognition and 
assertion.  Rewiring requires that both genders participate in the work of recognition and 
assertion by balancing the tension.  For pastoral theologians, this work occurs at 
interpersonal and social levels.  As pastoral theologians have noted, the practices of one-
on-one pastoral care and pastoral counseling provide opportunities to recognize persons 
who seek confirmation of their assertion of selfhood.  At the social level, when 
communities of care and persons of faith stand in solidarity with those who are 
dominated, they assert the need for recognition, especially when structural violence and 
political repression would have us mistake silence or indifference for consent.  In these 
tasks, the ‘negative’ affective dimensions of life, such as lamentation and aggressive 
assertion, are indicators of injustice and ought to be cultivated by caregivers who seek to 
end oppression and domination.   
 At the same time, lament and aggression are not only verbal activities.  Like 
submission and oppression, they are also visible on the body of the subject.  Grinding 
poverty and structural violence leave their traces on stooped bodies, ill bodies, and 
emotionless bodies that are gendered and raced, often feminized, colonized, or colored.  
Bodies speak when words fail.  Thus, a feminist pastoral theology of subjectivity is 
attentive to the physical, material body as a means of communicating the need and 
capacity for recognition and assertion when emotions caused by experiences of injustice 
and expressed verbally are disabled.   
Fourth, a feminist pastoral theology of recognition is attentive to the 
particularities of differences of gender, sexuality, ability, and race/ethnicity, but not 
constrained by the categories of identity.  Some histories of abuse and oppression must be 
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told through the lens of identity, for example the history of unnecessary hysterectomies 
on women of color.  Other times, collective (and coalitional) action in support of 
identities (e.g. gay rights), which we may or may not individually share, begets necessary 
social change.   And at wholly other times, our identities do us in ways beyond our 
control.  With Judith Butler we learned that we cannot trust that being a certain gender 
affords us recognition.  One’s gender is made and remade through a series of repeated 
norms—norms which call us to account for ourselves and which give us a mandate to do 
gender correctly.  Those who do not do their gender correctly, or any of the other 
identities we inhabit, may be condemned for their failure.  A feminist pastoral theology of 
recognition is keenly aware that identity cannot be forgotten in analysis, but also 
navigates with intention and skill through uses of identity that would fix or make stable a 
subject’s position.     
Fifth, a feminist pastoral theology of recognition reflects on and enables just 
caring practices.  Rethinking gender as an unstable category ought to give us pause as 
pastoral theologians.  While it opens wide a veranda of possibility, the instability of 
gender also asks us to develop an ethic of just care to attend to subjects who have been 
elided by misrecognition, unintelligibility, or non-recognition.  While feminist pastoral 
theologians cannot ensure that every subject or social group is recognized, as this is an 
impossible task, we can practice and teach a certain self-reflexivity that is based on 
participation in systems which are imperfect and unjust but which we change through 
assertion of resilient agency in the face of harmful structures, as we come to understand 
what these things are.   
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Additionally, as pastoral theologians, we must veer away from well-mapped out 
routes in order to encounter subjects who are not us.  A self-reflexive ethic hopes that we 
learn about their own, and our own, becoming.  When major newspapers and other media 
sources of information refuse to speak about some kinds of lives, like the murdered 
Palestinian family, we seek out sources who will speak to us about the frailty and the 
resiliency of subjects caught in the webs of interpersonal, religious, social, and political 
relationships so that we may know more about the human condition and think toward 
infrastructural and superstructural change.  When we seek out sources unlike ourselves 
we enable our capability to mourn the things that we are not and will never be; we enact 
an ethic that asks us to confront the sources of our self-making.  As theologians we 
approach this kind of endeavor with a spirit of humility in order to resist participation in a 
reification process that vilifies, condemns, or others subjects.  Like Anton Boisen’s 
decision to have theology students serve persons with mental illness, a feminist pastoral 
theology of recognition seeks exposure to othered subjects.   
Still, this ethic acknowledges the limitations and the incommensurability of 
knowing.  This too—the frustration of not being able to connect, the frustration of not 
being understood, the frustration of never fully knowing or understanding a person—
spurs moments of self-reflexivity.  Thus, it remains a vital part of a feminist pastoral 
theology of recognition.           
Additionally, Butler, with Crenshaw, urged us to think about identity without 
reducing identity to a series of markers which must be attended to individually.  In Butler 
individual identities map social power, and are constituted through each other and 
through the repudiation of the external and/or internal other.  Therefore, providing just 
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care requires analysis of that which is repudiated in a construct of identity.  So, for 
example, the ‘most’ ‘straight’ ‘man’ can only be straight by his vehement denial of a 
feminized homosexuality.  He must close that door—and foreclose any future 
relationships that seem to take on ‘homosexual’ qualities—in order to be straight.  His 
denial of a possible homosexual future makes the present irrevocably straight.  His 
disavowal and repudiation of a potential self-identity is thus projected outward.  He must 
disdain, or even hate, that which he fears could be part of himself.  Theologies of care 
and the person must examine these components of subjectivity.  Pastoral theologians, in 
particular, are called to show the linkages between the disavowed and feared other and 
the subject’s formation through harmful religious ideology.  Moreover, pastoral 
theologians play a central role in creating and disseminating new theological visions in 
response to harmful ideologies.     
Further, a feminist pastoral theology of recognition, while serious, should 
encourage imagination and play in order to resist a limiting or fixed identity discourse.1  
For persons who are already conscious of their own interpersonal or socio-political 
                                                
1 Sherry B. Ortner, Making Gender: The Politics and Erotics of Culture (Boston: Beacon 
Press,1996).  I use the terms ‘serious’ and ‘playful’ following anthropologist Sherry 
Ortner’s theory of practice as “serious game.”  She writes, “I want to propose a model of 
practice that embodies agency but does not begin with, or pivot upon, the agent, actor, or 
individual….The idea of the ‘game’ is meant to capture simultaneously the following 
dimensions: that social life is culturally organized and constructed, in terms of defining 
categories of actors, rules, and goals of the games, and so forth; that social life is 
precisely social, consisting of webs of relationship and interaction between multiple, 
shiftingly interrelated subject positions, none of which can be extracted as autonomous 
‘agents’; and yet at the same time there is ‘agency,’ that is, actors play with skill, 
intention, wit, knowledge, intelligence.  The idea that the game is ‘serious’ meant to add 
into the equation the idea that power and inequality pervade the games of life in multiple 
ways, and that, while there may be playfulness and pleasure in the process, the stakes of 
these games are often very high.  It follows in turn that the games of life must be played 
with intensity and sometimes deadly earnestness” (12).   
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oppression and subjugation through ethnicity/race, gender/sex, or capitalist forces, 
playful but serious “tactics” of resistance give rise to alternative, sometimes intentional, 
visions of living as a subject of interpersonal and social forces and as an agent within 
those very constraints.2             
 
Social Geography Themes for Feminist Pastoral Theology 
 
Feminist pastoral theologians are well-posed to continue to make significant 
contributions to theories of recognition and subject formation.  Our work of caring for 
subjects and communities organized by identity and affiliation ensures that our 
theological constructions of subjectivity are never too far away from the lived 
experiences of persons.  Our commitment to care for marginalized and oppressed persons 
ensures that we continue to seek out those who visibly suffer at all psychosocial levels. 
However, as I noted, the problem of recognition is precisely that there are subjects 
who are misrecognized or non-recognized.  Recognizing other (and othered) subjects of 
care requires psyche driven acts of assertion that manifest in voiced or embodied claims 
for care and justice.  When subjects are habituated into their own submission or 
oppression, their voiced or embodied claims of assertion are misinterpreted for consent or 
indifference.  This is misrecognition and requires thoughtful mechanisms to correctly 
hear and interpret claims for interpersonal and social recognition. 
                                                
2 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: 
University of California, 1984), 34.  Certeau invokes “strategies” and “tactics” as one 
example that holds in tension cultural symbolic systems and the actions of participants in 
these systems (xi).    
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In addition to subjects who are misrecognized, there are subjects who are not 
recognized at all, especially at the social-political level.  In interpersonal relationships 
with persons unlike themselves, these subjects may also experience non-recognition of 
the specific conditions of difference that affect their experience of suffering.  Non-
recognition of subjects and groups of difference at the social-political level indicates the 
state of political-moral discourse within a given society.  That is, social recognition is 
conferred by a public that supports organized social groups who articulate and assert their 
claims of inequity.  While the task of building a social movement is crucial for large scale 
conscientization, it does not ensure recognition of persons and groups who suffer 
injustices that have not reached the level of mass perception.  Social theorist Axel 
Honneth reflects on this problem, writing,  
Only experiences of suffering that have crossed the threshold of mass media 
attention are confirmed as morally relevant, and we are unable to advocatorially 
thematize and make claims about socially unjust states of affairs that have so far 
been deprived of public attention….It is all too easy to abstract from social 
suffering and injustice that, owing to the filtering effects of the bourgeois public 
sphere, has not yet reached the level of political thematization and organization.3                   
 
Non-recognition means that a subject’s claims for care and justice have not yet been 
heard by those with authority to recognize; it does not follow the subject is failing to 
assert herself. 
 Reaching a level of political thematization and organization requires interventions 
that demonstrate how psychosocial harms of misrecognition and non-recognition are not 
only perpetuated through structural violence, political repression, and ideological 
machinations, but concretely through social practices located in space.  This is the field of 
social geography which links social phenomena and spatiality by bringing social theory 
                                                
3 Honneth, 115. 
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into dialogue with physical sites, cartography, and geography.  Social geography is an 
unusual dialogue partner for pastoral theology, but one that provides a critical reflection 
in thinking about recognition and subjectivity as located processes, not only 
intersubjective or social processes.  Additionally, I believe that the conversation between 
social geography and pastoral theology can be mutually beneficial when we consider the 
situatedness of religious practice.  Would the cult of Bhairav have such influence on 
another group of low-caste people in a different region?  In this section, I argue that in 
order to adequately cultivate the theo-social practices of lament, resiliency, and 
confrontation that enable a pastoral theology of recognition, as well as the practice of 
encounter that I develop in what follows, we must understand them as actions in situated 
spaces that invoke an imperfect openness toward the other. 
 Social geography is closely linked to the major sub-discipline of human 
geography in the discipline of geography.  While human geography maps people, 
communities, and cultures in relationship to human activities (health, politics, population, 
economy, development), social geography appropriates qualitative research 
methodologies to site and critique structural inequalities.  For example, well-known 
social geographer Manuel Castells uses a Marxist framework to show that “cities, as we 
see and experience them, inscribe in concrete the history of contested power, successes, 
failures, and compromises within capitalism.”4  Radical cartographers perform social 
geographies by physically mapping political, social, and personal realities that, echoing 
Butler, we are asked not to see, like subjects who are misrecognized or not recognized at 
                                                
4 Ida Susser, ed, The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory (Malden, Mass: 
Blackwell, 2002), 3. 
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all.5  Two themes of social geography are valuable tools for analysis to feminist pastoral 
theology as we grapple with the complex realities of personal and social suffering and 
their effects on a subject’s being and becoming.  First, social geography expands care of 
the living human web to encompass ill- or mis-charted locations of the marginalized and 
oppressed subjects who we are asked not to see.  Second, social geography reads the 
living texts of persons and bodies on the street and in the neighborhood to legitimate and 
illuminate local knowledge, including lived knowledge on the complexity of subjectivity.   
 Social geography navigates the relationship between social space and physical 
space.  As a corollary, intrapsychic and interpsychic space may also be charted by 
accounting for the relationship between subject formation as an iterative socially 
constructive and localized process, though, as we explored above, subject formation is 
not reducible to a predetermined result that would constrict agency.  Instead the space of 
subject formation is the place where agency is made possible and exercised in innovative 
and unpredictable ways.  As I have argued, if one aspect of intersubjective recognition 
gone awry masks the assertions of persons and populations, and if pastoral caregivers are 
to stand in solidarity with lamentation or confrontation to structural violence which 
influences personal capacities for self-determination instead of submission, then tools are 
needed to improve visibility of persons in social-spatial settings.  Said another way, 
subject formation through recognition is also, in part, spatially determined; as such spatial 
interventions are critical loci for practices of pastoral care that attend to those who have 
yet to press claims for recognition in socially acceptable ways as well as for those whose 
intersectionality results in unmitigated misrecognition or non-recognition. 
                                                
5 Lize Mogel and Alexis Bhagat, eds. An Atlas of Radical Cartography (Los Angeles: 
Journal of Aesthetics and Protest Press, 2008). 
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 Spatiality as a lens to view intrapsychic, intersubjective, and social suffering 
reinforces and expands a central concept in feminist pastoral theology: that the living 
human web is also a physically situated web.  In the multi-authored text Weight of the 
World, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu elaborates the relationship between the personal, 
social, and spatial.  He writes, “Because social space is inscribed at once in spatial 
structures and in the mental structures that are partly produced by the incorporation of 
these structures, space is one of the sites where power is asserted and exercised, and no 
doubt, in its subtlest form, as symbolic violence that goes unperceived as violence.”6  The 
effects of spatial neglect mark a region, and the people who live in it, as verboten: tough 
neighborhoods, dangerous neighborhoods, spaces filled with others who are expelled 
from social-political discourse as full subjects and denied parity of participation.  
Accounting for subjectivities in feminist pastoral theology will require attention to 
personal and social identity as well as how these categories (both positive and negative) 
are maintained by seemingly impermeable boundaries.  
 Additionally, spatialization contributes to the numbing effects of structural 
violence that suffocate assertion and deaden imaginative possibilities through self-
reflexivity.  The example that I cited in chapter 3 of the female favela resident who 
scoffed at Scheper-Hughes’ tears is one example.  As Scheper-Hughes narrates in her 
lengthy ethnography, the production of indifference to child death is not just located in 
the favela, but produced by the space of the favela.    She writes that “the ‘600,000 square 
miles of suffering’…that constitute the pockmarked face of the Brazilian Northeast” are 
                                                
6 Pierre Bourdieu, “Site Effects,” Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary 
Society, trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson, Susan Emanuel, Joe Johnson, and Shoggy T. 
Waryn (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999), 126. 
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plagued by diseases once thought to be eliminated and which claim the lives of children.7  
She argues, however, that the contraction of diseases, like typhoid, dengue, malaria, 
polio, and tuberculosis, are the diseases of “disorderly development” or poverty, not the 
result of a tropical climate mixed with human ecology.  Long-term suffering which 
impairs circuits of assertion and recognition is produced through abandoned and mal-
developed spaces.  Yet, the role of religious practice and ecclesial institutions is not 
sufficiently or systematically charted in this territory.  I ask, how might the development 
of pastoral theology and praxis in conversation with the aims and methods of social 
geography open new ministries of care, new visions of care, new kinds of definitions of 
who is constituted as a pastoral caregiver?  Likewise, how might charting what religious 
practices and ecclesial institutions do within a space to effect change at the intrapsychic, 
intersubjective, and social level open dialogue with social geographers and others 
committed to social justice?               
 As a field of study and a research practice, social geography questions the 
marking out of the verboten regions through situated social analysis.  Further, it has the 
possibility of dismantling the moralistic geography that judges before intellectual analysis 
or affective engagement.  Situated as a response to the devastating effects of Hurricane 
Katrina and urban disasters through the lens of human geography, geographer James C. 
Fraser uses the phrase “moral geography” to critique how FEMA officials framed 
relocation from the 100-year floodplains as a responsibility to mitigate the risks for self 
and others.  Fraser argues that such an argument is “individualistic and focuses on 
rationalizing people’s decision making to create a moral geography of sorts that 
                                                
7 Scheper-Hughes, 31.   
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legitimates the dismantling of state protection for social welfare.”8  Fraser’s claim points 
to Bourdieu’s insight that spatiality, socio-political identities and locations, and 
intersubjectivity shape subjects and affect their self-determinative capabilities for 
flourishing.  For a pastoral theology of recognition, spatial analysis urges us to consider 
how the “silent riots of everyday life” are habituated and inhabited through claims made 
by space on agents, and agents on that very same space.9  Again, pastoral theology can 
also play a role in thinking through theologized space. 
 One result of social geography in pastoral theological practice might encourage 
the reading of the living texts of persons and bodies on the street and in the 
neighborhood, not just those in the hospital room, the church nave, the caregiver’s office, 
or the counselor’s private room, in order to legitimate and illuminate local knowledge, 
including lived knowledge on the complexity of subjectivity and potential pastoral 
responses.  Though not a far cry from the practice of visiting the faithful as pastoral care 
or peripatetic spiritual practices such as pilgrimage, I am suggesting that social 
geography for pastoral practice encourages contact with the ‘non-faithful’, the other who 
may illuminate modes of lived subjectivity that ought to be examined. 
                                                
8 James C. Fraser, “The Relevance of Human Geography for Studying Urban Disasters,” 
Space and Culture 9 (February 2006) : 16.  
 
9 Loïc J.D. Wacquant, “America as Social Dystopia: The Politics of Urban 
Disintegration, or the French Uses of the ‘American Model’”, The Weight of the World : 
Social Suffering in Contemporary Society, trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson, Susan 
Emanuel, Joe Johnson, and Shoggy T. Waryn (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999), 133.  
Regarding high poverty urban communities, Wacquant observes, “The media stampede 
after the 1992 outburst of rage in Los Angeles following the acquittal of the white 
policemen guilty of beating Rodney King must not divert attention away from the silent 
riots of everyday life.  Though such low-grade, routine, interpersonal violence is less 
spectacular, it is no less destructive….”   
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 Samuel R. Delany, Professor of English and Creative Writing at Temple 
University, writes a performative social-spatial walk-about in the first essay of his book 
Times Square Red, Times Square Blue.  As a long-time visitor to the peep shows, porn 
theaters, and bars as well as shish kebab vendors and electronic stores along Forty-second 
Street in New York City (before its complete redevelopment), Delany invites the reader 
to stroll with him as he reads the streets.  Along with photographic images, Delany’s 
prose speaks to complex subjectivity in space.  With him we meet Darrell Deckard, a 
hustler and “ a good-looking black man of twenty-six.”10  We learn that Darrell has been 
hustling for two years and that today’s concern is “the Public Morals Squad”, e.g. the 
police, who, according to street wisdom, are hiding in theaters to make arrests.  Neither 
sentimental about the vices of Forty-second Street—drugs, violence, prostitution, sexual 
public health risks and HIV/AIDS specifically—nor condemning of his subjects, 
including himself as subject, Delany walks a fine line to bring to our attention to those 
whom the machinations of recognition would confer a “yes, if…,” “maybe,” or “no”.  His 
method invokes an epistemology that favors movement into and through the subjectivity 
of those whose lives are foreclosed or denigrated in social space.  In the next section, I 
come back to Delany and his proposal of ‘contact’ as a social good.   
 In summary, when pastoral theology enlists social geography, care of the living 
human web includes explicit attention to the spaces inhabited by persons-in-community. 
Ill- or mis-charted locations of the marginalized and oppressed subjects who we are asked 
not to see become available for pastoral theological reflection.  We gather more data on 
human flourishing and suffering that enables our engagement in and mutual critique of 
                                                
10 Samuel R. Delany, Times Square Red, Times Square Blue (New York: New York UP, 
1999), 10.  
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the public square, the church, and the academy.  In my last section below, I develop a 
feminist pastoral praxis of encounter and the image of the street journalist to flesh out 
what a feminist pastoral theology of recognition might look like. 
     
A Feminist Pastoral Praxis of Encounter 
 
 Feminist pastoral theology ought to make stakes with and for those whose 
suffering is filtered through interests that would absorb and obscure the commonplace 
atrocity of suffering.  Following an incarnational theology that pays attention to social 
geography, we pitch our tents with those who are marginalized in society, accompanying 
each other in a world where brokenness abounds but where grace also lives.  In this way, 
a feminist pastoral theology of recognition is concerned with praxis as well as theoretical 
and ethical considerations.    Next, I outline a feminist pastoral praxis of encounter.  
 As I wrote earlier, the problem of recognition is also the solution: recognition.  
When caring lay or ordained ministers offer solace or comfort to persons who hurt, they 
are afforded the opportunity to hear claims for recognition.  Likewise, when communities 
of faith encounter persons and groups of difference, they are afforded the opportunity to 
use their social capital, privilege, and whatever power and assets are available to them to 
make change in the church and the public.  Theological educators, and especially feminist 
pastoral theologians, play a very specific role in this schema as they teach a 
transformative pedagogy that integrates the wisdom of the ages, intellectual acuity, and 
practical know-how for the sake of just caring.  However, just as the ‘filtering effects of 
the bourgeois public sphere’ make it so that claims for recognition go unheard in media, a 
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disheartening corollary also exists in the church.  Claims of recognition are misheard, 
underheard, and unheard.  Additionally, some claims for recognition are not mis-, under- 
or unheard, but heard and made other through vilification masked as orthodoxy or 
orthopraxis.  Examples are too numerous to fully explicate, but a small list will suffice: 
the denial of women’s ordination in some denominations; the exclusion the LGBTQ 
community from rites and sacraments of the church, such as marriage; and the 
infantilization and exclusion of persons with cognitive and physical disabilities.     
In Chapter 4, I hinted, with Cedric C. Johnson, that heterotopic spaces of 
resistance assist misrecognized and nonrecognized subjects to build movements of 
assertion.  Heterotopic spaces enable the physical nature of existences: place where we 
gather to recognize truths within ourselves and with each other about the particularities of 
suffering due to injustices, whether interpersonal, structural, or political.  In heterotopic 
spaces of resistances, movements of assertion can be addressed through empathic care, 
collective power, political will, and a theo-social imagination.  Heterotopic spaces of 
resistance may be militantly antiracist, antisexist, anticolonial, and/or anticapitalist, and 
thus inherently political, but they are also liminal spaces where care and theology are 
worked out, sometimes antagonistically, sometimes in more relational ways.  While I 
support the cultivation of heterotopic spaces of resistance, I argued briefly that pastoral 
ministers and theologians ought to resist the urge to ‘create’ a heterotopic space.  
Heterotopic space resists ‘creation’ by persons in authority, whether authority is 
conferred by dominant culture status or religious bodies.  As such, creation of a 
heterotopic space would be unattainable and pure folly—the reification of homogenizing 
projects of domination and submission through colonization, occupation, and infiltration.  
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Heterotopic space cannot be created; however, it can evolve from a praxis of encounter 
that bears witness to the difficulty and possibility of recognition. 
 Encountering an other subject, whether internal or external, is fraught with the 
possibilities of both conflict and mutuality.  Taken from Latin in + contra, encounters are 
meetings in which our face-to-face contact may pit us against another, whether internal or 
external.  Yet, encounters are also unexpected or chance happenings.  With the right kind 
of dispositions—generosity, humility, curiosity, prudence—encounters can also be 
fruitful.          
A praxis of encounter is built on the internal goods of interclass, interethnic, 
interreligious, intergender/sex contact, and all other potential contacts with difference.  
Samuel R. Delany argues that “life is at its most rewarding, productive, and pleasant 
when large numbers of people understand, appreciate, and seek out interclass contact and 
communication conducted in a mode of good will.”11  Delany uses the redevelopment of 
New York’s Times Square as his prime illustration of the power and the displacement of 
contact as a social practice.  Prior to its ‘Disneyification’, Times Square was a place 
where interclass contact was possible among gay men seeking sex.  Peep shows, sex 
shops, bars, and movie theaters were the physical spaces where sexual contact between 
two men of different classes could occur over and against the social practices that would 
encourage class warfare between them.  According to Delany the happenstance nature of 
contact—similar pleasurable pursuits conducted within a geographic area—produces 
unexpected goods.  He gives the example of connecting a recent ex-Jesuit priest to a job 
opportunity in publishing as well as a chance encounter with a man who became a long-
                                                
11 Delany, 111. 
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term partner.  His point is that interclass contact encourages “important or dramatic” 
occurrences as strangers with various social goods and social needs interact with each 
other in public space.12  Public spaces which encourage homogeneity and remove 
‘dangerous’ elements—homosexuals, anarchists, persons of color, religious minorities—
disable encounters which may become transformative, either psychically or materially.  A 
feminist pastoral praxis of encounter encourages the goods of contact with difference.                  
 A feminist pastoral praxis of encounter is also built on the uncertainty of 
possessing a space, and thus relies on mobility.  Encounters are tactical in nature, and 
therefore are full of uncertainty and mobility.  Social theorist Michel de Certeau writes 
that a tactic is “a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus.”13  A 
tactic is a play made by those who do not hold strategic powers.  Tactical encounters are 
not premeditated or planned.  Those who engage in encounter employ tactics to out-
maneuver the structural systems that do violence by rendering other all persons who do 
not live up the normative ideal.  In addition to those who work through programs and 
policies toward the psychological and social recognition of vulnerable populations whose 
suffering is intelligible, practitioners of encounter “seize on the wing the possibilities that 
offer themselves at any given moment.”14  Tactics of encounter are timely, and thus resist 
being overtaken by systems, institutions, or persons who exercise power.  Time cannot be 
possessed, only passed.  Because encounter resists homogeneity and stability, uncertainty 
and mobility are key elements in a feminist pastoral praxis of encounter.       
                                                
12 Ibid., 169. 
 
13 Certeau, 37. 
 
14 Ibid. 
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 How might a praxis of encounter be embodied and cultivated in ministry and 
theological education?  Let me suggest one image for ministry that pushes beyond the 
traditional boundaries of pastor, pastoral care specialist, or faith-based activist and which 
responds to the interpersonal and social need to assert and to recognize as well as the 
constraint of achieving these ends.  The image I have in mind is the street journalist.  This 
image trades on the cultivation of skills and practical know-how that epitomize the 
feminist pastoral theological endeavor—listening, empathy, mutuality, justice, care, 
attention to difference—and put these skills sets to use through images that encourage 
their deployment in extra-pastoral temporal and spatial locations. 
 Acts of recognition and assertion occur from person-to-person, person-to-social-
political institutions, group identities-to-social-political institutions, and group identities-
to-person.  I have argued that claims for recognition are being made even when there is 
silence or pressure to consent in systems that would oppress and subjugate a person.  For 
example, submission in sexual partnerships is a claim for recognition, but it destroys 
psyches by whittling away a subject’s self-determination.  Political oppression colludes 
with the desire for recognition and turns to violence to facilitate it.  Structural violence 
subverts claims for recognition by wearing down and numbing subjects.  If it is true that 
claims for recognition are silenced and obscured, not that there is a failure of assertion, 
then it follows that one response to this dilemma is the cultivation of persons who are 
capable of hearing assertions even when social practices and institutions would silence or 
obscure those claims.  The street journalist is a person who can do so as a roving listener 
and a social critic.   
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As roving listeners, street journalists form relationships with situated individuals.  
A roving listener engages in “heart-to-heart” conversations to strengthen relationships 
between persons and institutions.15 A roving listener appreciates the assets, or gifts, of a 
community in order to build social and economic opportunities.  A roving listener 
encounters subjects in the hopes of building relationships where dreams and hopes can be 
shared.  A roving listener listens closely to the stories of frustration, anger, mourning, and 
lament, as well as the stories and half-told stories of oppression that are stated without 
emotion.  As roving listeners, street journalists are peripatetic, walking along the paved 
streets and sidewalks as well as carving through the unsanctioned routes that those who 
do not hold power use to move through territory.  They encounter other subjects at a 
grassroots level that promotes inter-difference contact. 
However, street journalists are also social critics. They actively engage in analysis 
and criticism of “values, practices, and norms” in their daily life that silence or make 
voices go unheard and unrecognized.16  Street journalists as social critics gather 
knowledge about those silenced voices.  Though they attempt to make social change, the 
work of the street journalist is not guaranteed success.  Political theorist Brooke Ackerly 
writes, “social criticism is one way to counter, mitigate, or undermine power inequalities, 
but whether a particular effort will be effective is a matter of politics.”17  As such, street 
                                                
15 Susan Rans and Mary H. Nelson, Asset-Based Community Development Faculty 
Seminar, Institute of Pastoral Studies, Loyola University Chicago, November 16, 2011.  
See http://broadwayumc.info/publications/Miracle-RovingListener.pdf. Broadway United 
Methodist Church of Indianapolis, Indiana, employs a roving listener in their asset-based 
community development initiative, Miracle on 29th Street. 
 
16 Brooke Ackerly, Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2000), 13. 
 
 204 
journalists as social critics “promote inquiry, opportunities for deliberation, and 
institutional changes that facilitate broadly informed and inclusive deliberations.”18  They 
are self-reflexive, and potentially multi-sited, moving between communities to develop 
critical edges necessary to call attention to inequalities in social decision-making.19     
The street journalist deftly maneuvers amongst persons, neighborhoods, and 
institutions to hear and recognize the complexity of subjects living under constraints, 
which they may or may not have the ability to choose freely, but which nonetheless are, 
in part, determinative of their becoming.  Street journalists tell these stories in their 
complexity, moving between personal experiences of misrecognition or non-recognition 
to indictment of social-political systems, and from message to action.  The venue and 
mode of analysis and action is largely dependent upon the skill set and artistic vision of 
the street journalist.  She may be a printmaker, a writer, a filmmaker, a musician, a 
theologian-minister.  A street journalist is a way of life more than a profession; she 
pursues leads that come from the people and frames them as claims of injustice that must 
be rectified through personal and social transformation as well as mutual love and care.        
One example is that of hip-hop duo Rebel Diaz, brothers Rodrigo Venegas 
(Rodstarz) and Gonzalo Venegas (G1).  In one lyric they call themselves periodistas de 
la esquina, or street journalists, and as such, they make normative assertions for 
recognition with and as subjects who suffer injustices, especially from the everyday 
violence of capitalism, racism, and xenophobia, and visible in police brutality, 
                                                
17 Ibid., 5. 
 
18 Ibid., 150. 
 
19 Ibid., 155 and 151. 
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deportations, and the incarceration of persons of color.20  Their music is timely, speaking 
to social movements of resistance and liberation, like the execution of prisoner Troy 
Davis and the Occupy Wall Street movement in their most recently released mixtape, 
#Occupy the Airwaves.  While the sound itself is unique, the lyrics of the bilingual duo 
offer social critique.  In the song “Guilty” they perform a lyrical trial of systems and 
institutions that do harm to persons of color. 
(Male voice):  The US has the fastest growing prison population in the world. 
It’s like the real estate boom.  (Chuckle.)  Except of course the problem 
with real estate is that eventually you run out of land.  You never run out 
of people to put in prison. 
 
(Female voice): Guilty (repeat) 
(Rodstarz):  The capitalist system of America (guilty).  The US military (guilty). 
The FBI, CIA, AFT, ICE, Homeland Security, and the neighborhood 
police (guilty). (Let’s go.) 
 
They stole ¾ of  Mexico in 1848, abducted Africans and then sold into 
 slaves, genocide against the natives and for that we give thanks, 
 wrote the history books and made themselves great. 
  
 There are two types of crime: power and survival. 
 Crimes that deal with power are the ones you might not find. 
 Look at the trillions that were stolen from the Wall Street bail out and  
  Mumia still stuck in the jailhouse.   
 
 They sick.  They killed little Aiyana Jones, she was seven years old, man,  
  the story gets old.  Look at the wars, look at  colonialism, look at the trade  
  agreements, and the problems and the prisons.   
 
 We know the aggressor.  They train them in Georgia at the    
  School of the Americas where they teach torture.  My father’s a survivor.   
  He talks about it often, thousands disappeared, no funeral, no coffin.   
 And I can’t harm them without the charge of terrorism but they the  
  terrorists.  I charge the whole system. From the filthy politicians to the  
  lying professor—guilty as charged.  We convict the oppressor.  
  
                                                
20 Rebel Diaz, “Que’Sta Pasando! (Featuring Divine of the D.E.Y.).” Otro Guerrillero 
Mixtape, Vol. 2, 2008, Compact Disc. 
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 We plead our case, they (guilty) 
 To the crooks, throw ‘em the book, they (guilty) 
 In the court of the people, we deem them (guilty) 
 Pay their debt to society, return what they were robbing (guilty, guilty) 
  To the racists hating ethnic studies (guilty)  
  To the rich cutting school funding (guilty)  
  To the bosses denying our right to unionize (guilty)  
  We say they are (guilty)21 
 
These performed lyrics are bold assertions in response to oppressive systems and persons 
who are complicit in misrecognition and non-recognition.  They posit their assertions as 
convictions of multiple oppressors and systems of oppression.  In another song, they 
sample the civil rights freedom song, “Which Side Are You On?” and use this question to 
outline an extensive list of whose side they are on based on claims for human rights: “I’m 
on the side of the workers, the teachers and lunch ladies, on the streets with brown 
mommies raisin’ our brown babies.  I’m with youth organizers cleaning up the Bronx 
River.  I’m with Jaime Escalante when I stand and deliver.”22  As street journalists, they 
listen and critique, but they also act for transformations of situated selves.  Settling in the 
Mott Haven area of the South Bronx, the duo and their former partner, Lah Tere, 
established the Rebel Diaz Arts Collective (RDACBX).  Using a former warehouse, the 
RDACBX builds community through the arts, especially hip-hop and multi-media.  They 
teach youth how to use hip-hop as a tool for social commentary, developing programs 
and curriculum for critical thinking and political education.23   
                                                
21 Rebel Diaz, “Guilty” #Occupy the Airwaves, 2011.  MP 3. 
 
22 Rebel Diaz, “Which Side Are You On?”  Otro Guerrillero Mixtape, Vol. 2, 2008.  
Compact Disc. 
 
23 Daniel Beekman, “Hip-hop won’t stop in the South Bronx at the Rebel Diaz Arts 
Collective,” New York Daily News, March 3, 2011.  Available 
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 While their lyrics are political, and sometimes accusatory, as in the lyrics above, 
they perform a praxis of encounter that is based in the knowledge that encounters are not 
always pleasant.  On June 18, 2008, Rodstarz and G1 witnessed a street vendor selling 
fruit being harassed by police from the 41st Precinct.  They went over toward the vendor 
and the police.  According to witnesses, when the brothers asked the police officers for 
their badge numbers, the police officers became agitated, beat them with billy clubs, and 
charged them resisting arrest and assault.24  This face-to-face meeting was an encounter 
of conflict.  At the same time, this encounter had ripple effects beyond the control of the 
police officers or the brothers.  After their arrest 150 people gathered outside the precinct 
to demand their release, and a year after their arrest the charges were dropped by Judge 
Darcel Clark who cited their impressive community involvement and urged them to 
“keep up the good work.”25   
 I have described the elements of encounter and the image of the street journalist 
but have yet to speak as to why encounter is a needed image and praxis for a feminist 
pastoral theology of recognition.  Acts of recognition and assertion require an 
engagement.  To witness is only a first step when we seek to know something about the 
subject whose suffering is mutually reinforced by psychological, social, and spatial 
forces.  To witness is not enough when so many forces inside of ourselves and external to 
                                                
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-03-03/local/28669521_1_hip-hop-immigration-law-
factory. 
 
24 Davey D and Jenny on the Block, “NYC Police Beat Up Rap Group Members Rebel 
Diaz,” NYC Indymedia June 18, 2008. Available 
http://nyc.indymedia.org/en/2008/06/98039.html. 
 
25 Jaisal Noor, “Judge dismises case against Rebel Diaz, says ‘Keep up the good work”, 
The Indypendent, June 22, 2009.  Available 
http://www.indypendent.org/2009/06/22/rebeldiazfree/. 
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ourselves keep us from recognizing subjects who stand with us, and even within us.  And 
yet, our finitude and the nature of the future keep us from every fully plumbing the 
depths of another.  In fact, without that distance recognition and assertion are not 
possible.  
 It is the impossible but hopeful task of recognizing other subjects that our pastoral 
feminist praxis asks of us.  When we encounter other subjects we are offered 
opportunities to learn to love in a way that acknowledges our human frailty and 
conditions of social sin that we did not choose, but continue to live through.  As 
Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa has written, 
 One never loves another,  
 One loves what there is of oneself in them 
 Or what one thinks there is.26  
 
Though love beckons us to recognize, to care, to attend to the othered parts of ourselves 
and of subjects outside ourselves in intersubjective recognition, we also know that our 
capacity to do so fails.  It would be easy to harbor disillusion deep in our beings while 
living between suffering and flourishing.   
 Disillusion and disenchantment cannot be undone by maintaining the stories that 
run as an undercurrent through the American Christian mythos: hard work brings equal 
opportunity; dutiful prayer invites divine abundance; emotions are weak; diversity, so 
long as it does not challenge the status quo, is a celebration of God’s love for all people.  
We need new stories from the people themselves that incite metanoia, revolution, 
laughter, tears.  New stories (and very old ones, too), provide metaphors and images for 
caring, justice, and love that are not beholden to the stasis that impairs recognition.  
                                                
26 Fernando Pessoa, quoted in Augusto Boal, Games for Actors and Non-Actors, 2nd ed., 
trans. Adrian Jackson (New York: Routledge, 2002), 135.  
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Theologian Laurel Schneider writes, “Once upon a time, poets told stories and 
theologians explained the stories.  Once upon a time, theologians explained their own 
dreams and visions, and poets gave them wings….It is therefore past time for 
theologians, storytellers, and poets to listen again to each other and inspire one 
another.”27  Feminist pastoral theologians who inhabit encounter have the opportunity to 
tell the stories of people, and the stories of God, again. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this final chapter I reviewed my major arguments and drew conclusions.  I 
concluded that a feminist pastoral theology of recognition is attentive to the historical and 
psycho-social formation of a subject, and aware of how human needs are put to work in 
oppression.  It identifies critical interventions, practices, and programs, knowing that they 
are specific, targeted, and not universal.  It is attentive to particularities and differences, 
but not constrained by them.  A feminist pastoral theology of recognition reflects on and 
enables just caring practices.  Lastly, I proposed the practice of encounter and the image 
of the street journalist as a way to deploy the feminist pastoral theology of recognition I 
described.  
                                                
27 Laurel C. Schneider, Beyond Monotheism: A Theology of Multiplicity (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 111. 
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